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This thesis discusses how law, especially intellectual property and biodiversity laws, 
mediates the operation of the bioeconomy by „thinking through‟ the philosophy of 
Gilles Deleuze/Felix Guattari. As experimental thinkers, Deleuze/Guattari were 
committed to bring movement in concepts, that is, to experiment with concepts. 
Hence, the thesis deploys the concept of „desiring-machine‟ to explain the operation 
of the bioeconomy. In this respect, the thesis focuses on the Bt. brinjal controversy in 
India – a specific instance of bio-economic production. Techno-scientific and legal 
discourses in the controversy have highlighted the risk and uncertainty surrounding 
modern bio-technical science and its regulation. A more interesting narrative, 
however, is the discourse of biopiracy, which claims that a number of global/local 
entities appropriated local germplasm illegally to produce the Bt. brinjal. And so, the 
thesis looks at the controversy as an „event‟ in which heterogeneous elements, along 
with law, co-exist, co-function, form alliances and work in symbiosis. Pointing out 
the connection and relation between the elements, the thesis suggests that the 
bioeconomy operates in a connective fashion, through machinic conjunctions. Said 
otherwise, the bioeconomy is a „machine‟ – each element functions in conjunction 
with others. It follows that the Bt. brinjal controversy is an effect of machinic 
assemblage. And yet, the question is: what establishes machinic conjunctions 
between the elements? The thesis observes that the bioeconomy is founded on desire 
because it is desire that connects, couples, assembles, creates chains and produces 
intensities. In what follows, the elements of the machine relate to each other through 
the continuous movement of desire. The argument, then, is that the bioeconomy is a 
„desiring-machine‟. Its operation, however, is mediated by law. In view of this, the 
thesis sheds light on a number of issues by unfolding the controversy. In particular, 
the thesis shows how the desire to propertise, to normalise appropriation, to capture, 
to contest, to produce transformed subjects and more importantly, to expand the 
spaces of bio-economic production move and flow through disparate legal 
mechanisms and practices. To be more specific, the thesis highlights how law 
mediates the movement of desire, which establishes machinic conjunctions between 
an array of elements located in dispersed spaces, and by doing so, spatialises 
materiality, normalisation, power and subjectivity. The Bt. brinjal controversy, from 
this point of view, has „multiple dimensions‟.   
3 
 
Since the aim of this research is to experiment with concepts, the thesis „thinks 
through‟ the concept of „multiplicity‟ to construct the dimensions. As a topological 
concept, the term „multiplicity‟ puts emphasis on constructing the „multiple‟ by 
adding elements successively through conjunctions. In this vein, the thesis thinks 
rhizomatically – a style of thinking that moves in all directions to connect and link 
dispersed elements, thereby organises and arranges the relations between the „many‟ 
in semiotic chains. As such, the essence underlying the thesis is deeply topological or 
spatial because it not only connects the „many‟ through conjunctions and actualises 
their relations in extensive series, but also links up and combines one concept with 
another. Thus, while Deleuze/Guattari‟s philosophical thinking remains the enduring 
thread throughout the thesis, a number of other concepts, specifically from Michel 
Foucault and Georges Canguilhem, are added successively. To this effect, the thesis 
combines the concept of de/re-territorialisation with the analytics of 
„governmentality‟ and „normalisation‟, brings „desire‟ in conversation with „power‟, 
and links up „becoming‟ with „subjectivity‟ to multiply and expand the dimension of 
the controversy. The composition, then, itself becomes an articulation of the 
spatialisation of thought. Consequently, the thesis moves beyond the confines of the 
case discussed and relates the latter to broader issues concerning the operation of the 
bioeconomy. In fact, the Bt. brinjal controversy becomes a conduit for a theoretical 
exploration and explanation of how the bioeconomy operates as a desiring-machine; 
and how law mediates such operation in a global/postcolonial context. More broadly, 
the thesis engages with spatiality and spatialisation in a serious manner by focusing 
on how law spatialises materiality, normalisation, power and subjectivity, and to this 
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The central argument of this thesis is that the bioeconomy is a „desiring-machine‟.
1
 
The thesis, then, intends to provide an account of how the machine operates; and 
how law, especially intellectual property and biodiversity laws, „mediates‟
2
 such 
operation? To explore these questions, the thesis „thinks through‟ the philosophy of 
Gilles Deleuze/Felix Guattari. For Deleuze/Guattari, production is always machinic 
production – when something is produced, it is an effect of machine. Although 
comprised of heterogeneous elements, a machine is a composite unit. It operates in a 
connective fashion. Yet the components of a machine connect and relate to each 
other through the continuous flow of desire. Put otherwise, it is desire that establishes 
machinic conjunctions between the component parts. A machine is thus a „desiring-
machine‟. And production is always desiring-production. It follows that a desiring-
machine is an infrastructure or a social formation in which heterogeneous elements 
co-exist, co-function, form alliances, and work in symbiosis through the movement 





 To flesh out these insights, I look at the Bt. brinjal controversy in 
India as a case in point. I argue that the Bt. brinjal, a specific instance of bio-
economic production, is an effect of machinic assemblage. To this end, I explain how 
disparate elements connect, interact and relate to each other in the controversy. What 
is more, I show how desire moves through disparate elements, and how law mediates 
such movements. With this in mind, the thesis narrates the relations between 
heterogeneous entities situated in dispersed locations. To take it even further, the 
thesis reveals the „multiple dimensions‟
5
 of the controversy, specifically by 
                                                             
1
 I discuss the concept in more detail below, specifically in the section „Why Deleuze/Guattari?‟.  
2
 To avoid confusion, it is necessary to emphasise upfront that by saying law is mediator I am 
following Gilles Deleuze. For Deleuze, mediators are fundamental, nothing happens without them and 
they can be people, things, plants, animals, whether real or imaginary, animate or inanimate (Deleuze 
1990/1995, p 125).    
3
 A multiplicity can be understood as an organisational and differential relation belongs to the many 
that must be actualised in diverse spatio-temporal relationships (Deleuze 1968/1994, pp 182-183; 
Deleuze 1973/2001; Deleuze 2002/2004, p 177). I elaborate and move this understanding in a 
different direction in chapter 2.  
4
According to Deleuze/Guattari, an „assemblage‟ is a constellation of heterogeneous elements that are 
selected, organised and stratified by deducting from the flow. An assemblage, from this point of view, 
increases the dimension of a multiplicity (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, pp 9 and 448). The 
meaning of the term will become more clear in chapter 2. 
5 Although the meaning of the terms „multiple‟ and „dimension‟ will become clearer as the thesis 
progresses, it is necessary to emphasise these two terms early on. By „multiple‟ I do not mean an 
opposition between the one and the many, but rather „multiplicity‟. And by „dimension‟ I mean 
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illustrating how relations multiply and expand, and by doing so, spatialise 
materiality, appropriation, power and subjectivity. In short, the thesis describes how 
the bioeconomy operates as a desiring-machine, and how law mediates such 
operation in a „global/postcolonial‟
6
 context by looking into an event – the Bt. brinjal 
controversy.        
 
While I discuss Deleuze/Guattari‟s distinct style of doing philosophy below in 
detail,
7
 it is necessary to emphasis briefly at this stage that as philosophical thinkers, 
their approach to philosophy was experimental, that is, to experiment with concepts – 
to create new concepts by unmaking and remaking their own concepts. But 
Deleuze/Guattari were experimental thinkers, they were committed to bring 
movement in thought, to bring movement in concepts. So their experimentation was 
never limited to the creation of new concepts. It was equally oriented towards 
moving, combining and linking one concept with another because a concept has a 
number of components that not only function in conjunctions, but also link up with 
other concepts. And how to link or when to connect one concept with another appear 
in the flow of thought. Hence, for Deleuze/Guattari, establishing links or creating 
joints between the concepts is an act of thinking, an act of experimentation. 
Therefore, in this thesis „thinking through‟ their philosophy means experimenting 
through their concepts. That is, to deploy their concepts and link them up with a host 
of other concepts in order to multiply and expand the dimension of the controversy.      
 
The Bioeconomy Project (BP) 
 
We are aware that modern biotechnology, from its inception to experimental 
successes in the laboratories of industrialised countries, has rapidly become a global 
                                                                                                                                                                            
change in relationship, which changes according to the change in variables or co-ordinates in a 
multiplicity (Deleuze 1968/1994, pp 182-183). Taken together, „multiple dimensions‟ means 
multiplication, multiplying, and expanding the relations between heterogeneous elements. 
6
 In general, the term „postcolonial‟ alludes to both the impact and legacies of formally disposed 
imperial regimes and to new forms of exploitative global relations (McNeil 2005, p 106). Thus, the 
expression can be used to signify the contested spaces of globalisation – „at once an extension of the 
world systems of modern capitalism and colonialism and a newer network that presents a complicated 
picture of national and transnational agents, capital and labour, suppliers and markets, NGOs and 
multilateral agencies‟ (Loomba et al. 2005, p 2). 
7
 In the section „Why Deleuze/Guattari?‟ below.  
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technology promising enormous benefits not just to the world‟s poor but also to the 
biotech industry. To put it another way, not only does biotechnology promise to 
deliver new technological possibilities and solutions (plants and seeds with improved 
resistance to pests or insects, disease free plants, abiotic stress resistance plants, or 
plants with improved nutritional content) to overcome hunger, malnutrition, disease, 
environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity in the developing world; it has 
also created promising new markets for these technologies with increasing returns to 
the life sciences industry engaged in the production of genetically modified plants 
and seeds. We can find a clear manifestation of this rhetoric in the OECD‟s 
Bioeconomy Project. In a 2006 Scoping Paper (SP), the OECD describes the 
Bioeconomy Project (BP) as „the aggregate set of economic operations in a society 
that use the latent value incumbent in biological products and processes to capture 
new growth and welfare benefits for citizens and nations‟ (OECD 2006, p 3). 
Although humans have always had a bioeconomy, current thinking emphasises the 
use of cutting-edge science and technology to realise the economic potential of 
biological resources in terms of supporting growth and well-being (Frow et al., p 18). 
For instance, in a report published in 2009, the OECD – an inter-governmental 
organisation of thirty industrialised countries, proposes to transform the world 
through biotechnological inventions and innovation. The report, entitled The 
Bioeconomy to 2030: Designing a Policy Agenda (OECD 2009), points out that the 
„bioeconomy can be thought of as a world where biotechnology contributes to a 
significant share of economic output‟ (OECD 2009, p 22). Thus, the Report, a 
strategic policy document produced under the International Futures Programme (IFP) 
of the OECD, aims to promote biotechnologically designed and manufactured 
materials for sustainable growth in both developed and developing countries. In this 
direction, the Report identifies the key trends and transformative forces of modern 
biotechnology and prescribes long-term strategies to help governments formulate 
policies in order to capture the potential economic and social benefits of the 
bioeconomy. Further, the Report points out that the bioeconomy „covers a broad 
range of economic activities, each benefiting from new discoveries, related products 




The productive logic of the bioeconomy can be traced back in the 1970s. During this 
period, the US economy went through radical restructuring. In the face of declining 
profit in heavy industries based on Fordist mode of mass and standardised 
production, „it was claimed that in order to assert its world dominance, the United 
States would need to move from heavy industry to an innovation-based economy, 
one in which the creativity of the human mind (a resource without limits) would 
replace the mass-production of tangible commodities‟ (Cooper 2008, pp 17-18). In 
response to this speculative impulse, biological sciences and technologies started to 
play a commanding role in reformulating economic strategies, and research and 
development policies along post-industrial lines. The possibility to modify, alter or 
recombine the genetic, cellular or molecular elements of life through recombinant 
DNA technique,
8
 and its successful application in novel ways to produce chemical 
and herbicide tolerant plants and seeds, opened up new spaces for capital investment. 
From this point of view, new developments in molecular biology, cell biology, and 
microbiology marked a turning point in the US economy. Modern bio-technical 
science thus not only became the new strategy of economic imperialism (Jasanoff 
2006, p 276), but also „transformed biological production into a means for creating 
surplus value‟ (Cooper 2008, p 23). What is significant about these developments is 
that policies were geared towards bringing science, technology and economy into a 
tighter alliance to create a new regime of accumulation based on bio-technical 
materialisation of living substances that relocated production at the genetic, cellular 
and microbial level. 
 
 
The emerging bioeconomy is primarily concerned with optimising the economic 
value and latent forces of bio-genetic resources and, therefore, the transformation 
that came with it is widespread and remains deeply embedded in economy, society 
and culture. The OECD Report claims that the emerging bioeconomy is global in 
scope, in the sense that it leads to far-reaching changes not only in economic and 
                                                             
8
 Though fermentation practice is regarded as the oldest instance of microbial biotechnology, the 
recombinant DNA technique or genetic engineering is significantly different, since it allows biologists 
to mobilise the specific reproductive processes of bacteria as a way of generating new life forms. 
Thus, recombinant DNA technique allows biologists to create chimeric organisms by moving genetic 
sequences across the barriers of species and genus, transferring DNA from plants and animals to 
bacteria and back again through transversal processes of bacterial recombination and therefore, differs 
from traditional breeding methods, which is based on vertical transmission of genetic information 
(sexual compatibility). For details, see Cooper 2008, p 33. 
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scientific activities, but also in institutional and legal arrangements globally. Thus, 
there is a continuing emphasis on legal mechanisms with specific reference to – (1) 
sustainable access and utilisation of bio-genetic resources; and (2) protection of 
commercial investments in biotechnological research and inventions through 
intellectual property rights, mainly from developed countries and bio-tech industries. 
For example, the SP contends that in order to capture the benefits of bio-revolution, 
governments have to address a number of scientific, technical, economic, industrial, 
social and governance issues, and identify areas where public policy can be effective 
in removing barriers (OECD 2009). Given the OECD‟s role in providing a roadmap 
for governments and industry to capture the latent value of biological products and 
processes, the policy concern is mainly with existing legal and regulatory provisions, 
both at the local and the global level, which hinder or are having a negative impact 
on the future development of the bioeconomy (OECD 2006, p 13). Accordingly, the 
BP fleshes out that governments need to adjust regulatory provisions because 
sustainable access to biological resources and exchange of these materials openly by 
the industry is necessary to „transform plants into “factories” that can produce 
everything from modified foods to commodity chemicals‟ (ibid., p 8).  
 
 
There is no doubt that biotechnology poses a serious challenge for governance and 
regulation (see, for example, Forbes 2006; Black 1998), but for the BP, governance 
and regulation have a different dimension: harnessing biological resources to the 
market by removing impediments. For instance, in a Report published in 2003 titled 
Harnessing Markets for Biodiversity: Towards Conservation and Sustainable Use, 
the OECD points out that there is an emerging private market of biodiversity goods 
and services, such as genetic resources and therefore, policy-makers should consider 
the market as an integral part of biodiversity policies (OECD 2003, p 9). These 
policies should be geared towards biodiversity conservation and its sustainable use 
because traditionally extraction of biological resources and its exchange has taken 
place on an informal basis, which does not recognise its potential economic or 
market value. This absence of regulation by way of well-defined property rights has 
created the problem of over-exploitation and unprecedented rate of biodiversity loss. 
Therefore, the first step in the process of biodiversity conservation, according to the 
Report, is to identify the potential market value of biodiversity by creating markets 
16 
 
(ibid., p 7). In this respect, the key element for the development of markets for 
biodiversity is enforceable regulations because without regulation the market fails to 
recognise the exchange value of genetic materials (ibid., p 25). To ease this 
uncertainty, the Report suggests, first, regulation needed to be developed to allow for 
commercial exchange of bio-genetic resources (ibid., p 10). And second, property 
rights are fundamental for creating markets. If property rights are clearly established 
and enforced, and if trading is permitted, markets can in principle develop (ibid., p 
27). However, the main impediment in the commercial exchange of bio-genetic 
resources through market is the absence of regulation. Therefore, the absence of a 
potential market for bio-genetic resources is a failure or crisis in governance. Hence, 
for the OECD, this crisis in governance demands the creation of a new process or 
arrangement for governing – a new structure or an order which will regulate the 
exchange of bio-genetic resources in the market.  
 
 
However, what is more interesting about this narrative is that this concern with lack 
of governance mechanisms to regulate the appropriation and utilisation of biological 
resources for economic development was very much on the political agenda as early 
as in 1972.
9
 It was reasserted vigorously in a number of United Nations (UN) reports, 
conferences and declarations during the 1990s,
10
 culminating into the Convention on 
Biological Diversity 1992 (CBD) – a global governance mechanism that prescribes 
legal arrangements for the appropriation and exploitation of bio-genetic resources. 
Moreover, the attempt to re-define juridical institutions for creating a secure 
environment for capital investment in life sciences research and worldwide market 
for new bio-technologies was equally on the agenda during the same period. More 
specifically, rapid advances in agro-biotechnology in the US and other developed 
economies proved to be a strong justification for the creation of a new proprietary 
regime that would institutionalise the propertisation of living substances in the 
interest of their own biotech industry. Therefore, the reasons behind the creation of a 
new proprietary regime by way of patents on artificially manufactured living 
substances need to be understood in the larger context of high-tech euphoria and 
                                                             
9
 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972 (the Stockholm Declaration).  
10
 Such as the World Charter for Nature 1982, the Brundtland Report 1987 (Our Common Future), the 
IUCN Draft Convention 1988, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, 1992.  
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utopian impulse surrounding the „biotech revolution‟ and its promise to overcome all 
ecological and economic limits in the production and reproduction of biological life 
and capital on earth (Cooper 2008, p 00). Thus, a series of changes were made in 
intellectual property legislations to include innumerable life forms manufactured 
through biotechnological alteration or manipulation within the scope of patentable 
invention. The argument was, as Cooper points out, that 
 
„In the absence of any tangible assets or actual profits, what the biotech start-up can 
offer is a proprietary claim over the future life forms it might give rise to, along with 
the profits that accrue from them. In essence then, what these reforms have formalised 
is the prospective value of promise, turning life science speculation into a highly 
profitable – indeed rational – enterprise‟ (Cooper 2008, p 28).  
 
Intellectual property law, then, brought a paradigm shift in the ever expansive spaces 
of bio-economic production and shaped the future course of the emerging 
bioeconomy. The possibility to separate, modify, extract and recombine biological 
potentialities of living substances through recombinant DNA technique not only 
make visible the commoditisation of life and its innermost properties; it further 
highlight the emergence of an economy of growth based on the promise and 
potentiality of bio-innovation. As Palsson observes, „clearly, with modern 
biotechnology the “natural” capacities of the body have been turned into instruments 
of production, redefining both human[biological] labour and human[biological] 
bodies‟ (Palsson 2009, p 298). Put simply, genetic engineering is based on the 
premise that natural capacities of living organisms can be re-shuffled, re-
programmed and engineered on the molecular level to generate bio-economic value 
(Thacker 2001, pp 1-3). Thus, uncovering the secrets of productive bodies and their 
propertisation through intellectual property law become the only „drive‟ in the 
bioeconomy. As Franklin notes, „extracted from the body, cellular functionality has 
become a field of property speculation, in the sense that cells are seen both to have 
new formal properties, and to be valuable as new property forms; that is, as various 
forms of biocapital‟ (Franklin 2005, p 63; original emphasis). In this sense, biocapital 
is simultaneously a continuation, an evolution and a subset of capitalist production 
(Sunder Rajan 2006, p 10) that transforms biological capacities into commodities or 




Ownership of knowledge thus becomes increasingly important in the bioeconomy 
and intellectual property law, more specifically patent law, as a market device is 
instrumental in capturing and safeguarding the „biovalue‟ either generated from 
artificially isolated and manipulated gene and protein sequences, or embedded in 
artificially manufactured living organisms, such as genetically modified and 
improved plants and seeds.
11
 By „biovalue‟, Waldby refers to „the yield of vitality 
produced by the biotechnological reformulation of living processes‟ (Waldby 2002, p 
310). She explains further that „the production of “biovalue” is caught up with the 
production of capital value. The process of producing “biovalue” is also the process 
of technical innovation that enables the patenting of cell lines, genes and transgenic 
organisms as inventions, securing their status as intellectual property and possible 
sources of profit for their inventors‟ (ibid.; see also Waldby and Mitchel 2006, pp 32-
33). And yet what is crucial here is not just to understand the transformation of 
biovalue into intellectual property as capital value but also an understanding of how 
the „drive‟ or „desire‟ to produce, appropriate, and propertise operate, function and 
expand, how desire connects and assembles heterogeneous entities, and how law 




In this thesis, I have chosen to focus on Bt. brinjal controversy in India. The Bt. 
brinjal/aubergine is a genetically modified (GM) food crop and therefore, it is a new 
life form. The production of Bt. brinjal was started in 2000 by Maharashtra Hybrid 
Seeds Company Private Limited (Mahyco) under a collaborative partnership with 
global biotech firm Monsanto, a pioneering but controversial figure in the field of 
                                                             
11
 For example, between 1991 and 2002, biotechnology patent application grew by 8.3% a year, while 
total EPO patent application grew by 5.7%. In 2002, more than 5,800 biotechnology patents were filed 
at the European Patent Office (EPO), most of which originated from the United States (39.9%), 
Europe (34.5%) and Japan (14%). Similarly, New Zealand, Denmark and Australia have a very high 
ratio of biotechnology patent applications to the EPO (more than 10%). See van Beuzekom and 





 The genealogy of this collaborative relationship can be 
traced back in the production of Bt. Cotton, in the sense that it involves the supply of 
same Bt. gene (Cry1AB – Cry1AC)
13
 to Mahyco – a bio-technically engineered 
living organism patented by Monsanto. By inserting the chimeric Bt. gene into the 
cell of brinjal plant, Mahyco produced a genetically modified brinjal plant that 
promises to express lethally toxic resistance to lepidopteran pests, such as brinjal 
„fruit and shoot borer‟ (FSB). The Bt. brinjal was ready for field trial by 2002. 
However, in March 2003, a collaborative relationship developed between Mahyco 
and a number of other entities, such as Tamil Nadu Agricultural University, 
Coimbatore (TNAU-C), University of Agricultural Sciences, Dharwad (UAS-D), 
Cornell University, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), and the Department of Biotechnology (DBT). This collaboration was 
forged with the support of Agricultural Biotechnology Support Program (ABSP) II – 
a US Government strategic policy initiative to promote agricultural biotechnology in 
developing countries and create new markets for the US biotech industry.
14
 
Accordingly, Sathguru Management Consultants
15
 was appointed as the South Asian 
Region co-ordinator of ABSP II. The initial funding for this collaborative 
relationship came from the DBT, Government of India, to develop a pro-poor open 
pollinated variety for distribution to resource constrained farmers at marginal cost. 
However, it was decided that Mahyco was free to sell a hybrid variety at a higher 
price in order to recover its investment. Subsequently, the USAID provided funding 
to bring the product into the market „because the pro-poor strategy and the shared 
partnership were particularly attractive‟ to the U.S. Agency (Shelton 2010). 
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 Mahyco‟s Letter to Karnataka State Biodiversity Board (KBB), 25
th 
June 2010 (on file with the 
author). For more details on Monsanto‟s risky ventures and associated controversies, see Innovest 
2005; Robin (2010).    
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 Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt.) is a gram positive, spore forming bacteria that exist in diverse locations, 
such as soil, plant surfaces, insect cadavers and in grain storage dusts. For details, see Lenin et al. 
2007. 
14
 For more details, see chapter 1. It is important to point out that the Agricultural Biotechnology 
Support Project (ABSP), launched by the USAID in 1991, is a consortium of private corporations and 
public research institutions. The Project was launched to identify ongoing GM crop research projects 
at US public research institutions and corporate laboratories, and to push these projects in developing 
countries in collaboration with public research institutions. So the main purpose of the Project was not 
only to create new markets for US bio-tech corporations, but also to promote US style intellectual 
property legislations in developing countries. The ABSP II Project is managed by Cornell University 
and its private sector partners include leading agro-biotech corporations, such as Asgrow, Monsanto, 
Pioneer Hi-Bred, and DNA Plant Technology (DNAP). For details, see GRAIN 2005.    
15
 A management company based in Hyderabad, India. The company provides advisory service to 
public, private and academic institutions regarding technology transfer, public-private partnerships, 




The Bt. brinjal was approved for commercial cultivation on 14 October 2009 by the 
government-controlled Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC), a 
regulatory agency of the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), Government 
of India. Just after its commercial release, brouhaha erupted throughout the nation 
against the GEAC‟s decision. On the next day, Jairam Ramesh (then Minister of 
Environment and Forests) faced with extreme public outrage imposed a moratorium 
on its commercial release on the ground of scientific uncertainty and inadequacy of 
risk assessment. What is significant about the Bt. brinjal controversy is that from its 
inception in 2000, it has attracted enormous attention from concerned civil society 
actors and generated heated debates among concerned citizens and scientists, mainly 
because it was the first GM food crop to be released in India for commercial 
cultivation. However, these concerns and debates were limited to the risk and 
uncertainty of bio-technical science, which I will discuss in more detail in chapter 1. 
But to illustrate the point briefly here, even before the commercial release of Bt. 
brinjal, a number of civil society actors in Public Interest Litigation (PIL) at the 
Supreme Court of India highlighted the potential health and environmental risks, and 
the social and economic implications associated with GM crops field trials.
16
 
Responding to the petitioners, the Supreme Court imposed a moratorium on large 
scale field trials in 2006. Although it was lifted in 2007, the Court re-imposed the 





In contrast, Environment Support Group (ESG), a civil society actor based in 
Bangalore, India, that fights for environmental social justice (and its new leafy green 
web site
18
  provides ample evidence of it), made a submission pointing out some 
legal issues in the approval of Bt. brinjal to Minister Jairam Ramesh.
19
 The main 
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 Gene Campaign and Another v. Union of India and Others, Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 115/2004 and 
606/2007; Aruna Rodrigues and Others v. Union of India and others, Writ Petition no. 260/2005 (on 
file with the author).  
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 Aruna Rodrigues and Others v. Union of India and others, Writ Petition no. 260/2005 (on file with 




 www.esgindia.org  
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 Just after imposing the moratorium, Minister Jairam Ramesh announced that he will conduct a 
series of consultations in all major cities in India to collect opinions and concerns from concerned 
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contention of ESG was that Mahyco/Monsanto and their collaborators have accessed 
and appropriated local brinjal germplasm in the production of Bt. brinjal, for which 
prior approval of National Biodiversity Authority (NBA) is necessary. Therefore, 
this unauthorised appropriation of bio-genetic resources is illegal and amounts to an 
act biopiracy in terms of the Biological Diversity Act, 2002. The ESG further 
contented that this violation denies local farming communities who have protected 
and cultivated these local brinjal varieties from their right to receive compensation or 
benefit according to the CBD and the Biological Diversity Act – two global/local 
legal mechanisms that govern the access and appropriation of bio-genetic resources. 
Thus, instead of focusing primarily on the risk and uncertainty of bio-technical 
science, the ESG brought attention to the issue of unauthorised appropriation, „prior 
informed consent‟ and the right to receive compensation or benefit arising from 
commercial exploitation of local germplasm. However, there are a number other 
more pressing issues, such as Mahyco/Monsanto‟s desire to propertise a new life 
form and its future progeny, the desire to normalise appropriation, the desire to 
contest, and the desire to produce proprietary subjects that remain enveloped in the 
controversy. This brief description suggests that in the controversy, heterogeneous 
elements co-exist, co-function, interact and relate to each other. The Bt. brinjal 




Gilles Deleuze/Felix Guattari have a distinct style of doing philosophy, that is, not 
just to create new concepts, but also to bring movement in concepts. Throughout 
their philosophical oeuvre, they have consistently searched for new layers, new 
dimensions and developed mixed forms. Accordingly, their philosophy is 
differential, constructionist and experimental. In the initial period, Deleuze was 
mostly concerned with writing a history of philosophy by engaging with a particular 
author‟s philosophical thinking, such as David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Henri 
                                                                                                                                                                            
citizens regarding the commercialisation of Bt. brinjal. He conducted these consultations in the 





 In subsequent texts, however, he was more interested to develop his own 
philosophy of thought or image of thought, either by enfolding or folding his thought 
with other philosophers‟ thinking. For Deleuze, the „image of thought‟ is a style of 
thinking that orientates oneself in thought, to stretch out, run out along the horizon, 
and to keep pushing thinking further. In short, it guides the creation of concepts 
(Deleuze 1990/1995, pp 147-148). This is clearly noticeable in Difference and 
Repetition (1968/1994), a book that marks the beginning of Deleuze‟s distinctive 
style of doing philosophy – „the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or heard‟ 
(ibid., p xx). Weaving Kant‟s doctrine of faculties, Bergsonian notion of multiplicity, 
and Nietzsche‟s ontology of eternal return together and folding them with 
mathematical concepts and contemporary structuralism, Deleuze sets out his 
metaphysics of difference which, according to him, is a form of experimentation with 
asymmetrical ideas that makes repetition possible, and in turn produces conceptual 
difference. He points out that defining problems in terms of finding possible 
solutions is a dogmatic image of thought. Thus, rather than defining problems as 
questions, one must practice problematising, which views ideas as problematic 
because an idea has differential relations to its objects and these relations are 
actualised in extensive series (ibid., pp 169-173 and 245). In other words, difference 
is not a concept, but rather a process of „different/ciation‟ (Boundas 2006, p 4) or 
what Deleuze calls „transcendental empiricism‟. Deleuze was an empiricist, that is, a 
pluralist and empiricism, for him, explains the abstract, the aim of which is not to 
rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under which 
something new is produced (Deleuze and Parnet 1977/1987, p vii). Empiricism, from 
this point of view, is a practice of thinking in which the intelligible or understanding 
comes from the senses. It is an open-ended thinking, an experimentation or, a 
patchwork. As Deleuze and Parnet observe, 
„Empiricists are not theoreticians, they are experimenters: they never interpret, they 
have no principles. If one takes the exteriority of relations as a conducting wire or as a 
line, one sees a very strange world unfold, fragment by fragment: a Harlequin‟s jacket 
or patchwork, made up of solid parts and voids, blocs and ruptures, attractions and 
divisions, nuances and bluntnesses, conjunctions and separations, alternations and 
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 In conversation with Raymond Bellour and Francois Ewald, Deleuze acknowledges, „yes, I did 
begin with books on the history of philosophy‟ because history of philosophy was not „a particularly 
reflective discipline‟ (Deleuze 1990/1995, p 135). 
23 
 
interweavings, additions which never reach a total and subtractions whose remainder 
is never fixed‟ (ibid., p 55).  
Hence, Deleuze evokes a process of thinking that engenders thought, as he notes, „to 
think is to create – there is no other creation – but to create is first of all to engender 
“thinking” in thought‟ (Deleuze 1968/1994, p 147). However, for him, thinking was 
never just a theoretical matter, but rather experimenting, not interpreting but 
experimenting (Deleuze 1990/1995, pp 105-106) because the task of philosophy is 
not just to deal with concepts but to invent, to create new concepts (ibid., pp 32, 122 
and 136). Thus, in his later works, he was concerned with creating new concepts in 
relation to a specific problem, and then moved these concepts into new directions, 
different contexts or problems. He has repeatedly asserted this aspect of his 
philosophy in numerous texts. For instance, in Difference and Repetition he points 
out, „I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an 
always decentred centre, from an always displaced periphery which repeats and 
differentiates them‟ (ibid., p xxi). Similarly, in The Logic of Sense he observes, „the 
genius of a philosophy must first be measured by the new distribution which it 
imposes on beings and concepts‟ (Deleuze 1969/1990, p 6). The most detailed 
exposition on experimentation through concepts can be found in What is Philosophy? 
(1991/1994) written with Guattari.
21
 Concepts, according to Deleuze/Guattari, are 
philosophers‟ friend; the philosopher forms, invents, fabricates concepts and thinks 
through them. However, forming, inventing or fabricating is not a simple art of 
philosophy, but rather it involves creation because the object of philosophy is to 
create concepts that are always new (ibid., p 5). In this sense, Deleuze/Guattari 
advocate for a philosophy, which is constructionist – every creation has to be a 
construction connected to problems without which they would have no meaning 
(ibid., pp 7 and 16). However, for them, the contour of a concept is defined by the 
sum of its components, which come from other concepts „because each concept 
carries out a new cutting-out, takes on new contours, and must be reactivated or 
recut‟ (ibid., p 18). As Deleuze/Guattari further explain, 
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 It is important to point out that the book was written somewhat differently because Guattari worked 
from the manuscript that Deleuze sent to him, making suggestions, corrections, and defining new 
directions. Thus, Robert Maggiori remarked „Guattari is in it throughout, in the way that aspirin 
dissolved in water is everywhere‟ (see Dosse 2007/2010, pp 14-15).   
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„In fact, having a finite number of components, every concept will branch off toward 
other concepts that are differently composed…, answer to problems that can be 
connected to each other, and participate in a co-creation. A concept requires not only a 
problem through which it recasts or replaces earlier concepts but a junction of 
problems where it combines with other coexisting concepts‟ (ibid.).  
Take, for example, the concept of „desiring-machine‟ Deleuze/Guattari introduced in 
Anti-Oedipus (1972/1977) – a concept that simultaneously talks about machinic 
organisation and investment of desire in the social field. A desiring-machine is not a 
metaphor, but rather a binary machine, a social-technical machine that obeys a set of 
rules governing associations (ibid., p 5; Guattari 2009, p 106). According to 
Deleuze/Guattari, when something is produced, it is always a product of a machine 
and thus, they were interested to understand how the machine works, how it 
functions, and how it operates (Deleuze and Guattari 1972/1977, p 2; Deleuze 
1990/1995, pp 21-22). For them, a machine operates in a connective fashion, in 
successive layers or segments but one needs to understand how these connections are 
formed or produced. The machine as a whole is a composite unit and a 
decomposition of the whole reveals that it is composed of heterogeneous elements – 
the essential parts of the machine. These elements „are at once component parts and 
products of the process of decomposition that are spatially localised only at certain 
moments‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 1972/1977, p 40). However, these component parts 
are related to one another and therefore, establish aberrant paths of communication 
between themselves to form the „whole‟. This does not mean that the machine or the 
whole is a unity or totality because the component parts are fragments and partial 
objects that cannot be glued together to form the whole. But rather each component 
coexists and functions in conjunction with other parts. And their conjunctions are 
materialised or actualised through the investment of desire in social, economic and 
political processes. In short, the desiring-machine is a historically determined 
product of desire (ibid., p 29). However, the desiring-machine also produces – it 
produces empty spaces or creates lack. In other words, the desiring-machine 
functions according to the dominant market economy and in doing so, it deliberately 
invests desire in wants and needs, making them dependent upon real production and 




From this account of desiring-machine, it becomes clear that desire is inseparable 
from machinic complexes, it „constantly couples continuous flows and partial objects 
that are by their nature fragmentary and fragmented. Desire causes the current to 
flow, itself flows in turn, and breaks the flow‟ (ibid., p 5). In this sense, for 
Deleuze/Guattari, desire is not an instinctual energy, but rather the drives that result 
from a highly developed, engineered setup rich in interactions (ibid., p 35; Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/2004, p 237). Accordingly, there are two-fold movements: 
decoding or deterritorialising the flow of desire, such as moving the desire to 
produce in all directions, and its violent recoding or reterritorialisation in ancillary 
apparatuses, such as institutions, and forces of law and order (Deleuze and Guattari 
1972/1977, pp 34-35).
22
 Thus, de/re-territorialisation of desire fuses the component 
parts, produce functional synthesis and coordinates. From this point of view, desire is 
productive, it produces an unlimited number of connections and intensities, it 
traverses the entire surroundings and joins with flows of every sort, introducing 
therein breaks and captures (ibid., p 292). Hence, in contrast to the investment of 
need or interest, desire becomes invested in the entire social field and in so doing, it 
constructs an infrastructure (social formation) within which one can pursue her 
interests, take actions and realise her freedom in a rational way (ibid., pp 28-29). Put 
differently, it is desire that aggregates and connects the component parts, and 
determines their co-existence and co-functioning to form a complex arrangement. 
The desiring-machine, therefore, „is nothing other than a multiplicity of distinct 
elements or simple forms that are bound together on the full body of a society‟ 
(Guattari 2009, pp 112-113; original emphasis).  
 
The point that I want to emphasise is that the concept of „desiring-machine‟ is a new 
concept Deleuze/Guattari created by not just by remaking or reactivating their earlier 
concepts, but also added a number of new components to it. For instance, Deleuze 
has never talked about „machine‟ or „desire‟ in his previous writings; he was more 
interested in „structure‟. In Difference and Repetition, he has described ideas in terms 
of structure and multiplicity, as he explains, „a structure or an idea is a “complex 
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 Here, Deleuze/Guattari used the word „code‟ not in the sense of „codification‟ or „legal code‟, but 
rather as „genetic code‟, which carries and transmits information. Felix Guattari emphasised this 
understanding in a later publication. See Guattari 1975, p 90.  
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theme”, an internal multiplicity‟ (Deleuze 1968/1994, p 183). Further, in the essay 
How Do We Recognise Structuralism?, he points out that a structure is defined by the 
nature of certain atomic elements which claim to account both for the formation of 
wholes and for the variation of their parts (Deleuze 1972/2004a, p 173). Hence, in 
structuralism elements specify each other reciprocally in relations (ibid., p 176). 
Every structure, therefore, is an infrastructure, it is a multiplicity of virtual 
coexistence (ibid., pp 178-179). On the other hand, Guattari was more interested in 
the concept of „machine‟. In the essay Machine and Structure, Guattari argues that a 
machine is inseparable from its structural articulations. However, whereas structure 
positions its elements by way of a system of references that relates each one to the 
others, desire becomes focalised in the totality of structures at a particular point of 
history. Therefore, the term „machine‟ is more appropriate because the components 
of the structure are organised through the machinic organisation of desire (Guattari 
1971, pp 111 and 117). And this organisation takes place in a plane of consistency 
that establishes diagrammatic conjunctions between elements. In other words, 
consistency affirms coherence, the consistency of process whenever a multiplicity 
unfolds, but this consistency depends on the de/re-territorialising power of desire, 
which remains inscribed in machinic complexes (Guattari 1972, pp 120 and 128). In 
conversation with Catherine Backes-Clement, Deleuze affirms,  
„…I was working solely with concepts, rather timidly in fact. Felix has talked to me 
about what he was already calling “desiring machine” …So I myself thought he‟d 
gone further than I had. But for all this unconscious machinery, he was still talking in 
terms of structures, signifiers, the phallus, and so on‟ (Deleuze 1990/1995, p 13).   
From this point of view, for Deleuze, desire or drive becomes a part of the 
infrastructure (ibid., p 19; see also, Deleuze and Guattari 1972/1977, p 63).
23
 What 
we can discern from this discussion is that the concept of desiring-machine has a 
number of components – desire, deterritorialisation/decoding, movement, 
flow/transmission, reterritorialisation/recoding. The concept also relates to a host of 
other concepts. For Deleuze, there is no place for ideology in the desiring-machine, 
but rather what matters is the „organisation of power‟ in the infrastructure that 
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 The influence of Guattari is clearly visible here, in the sense that „Guattari‟s idea of machine 
replaced the idea of structure and provided Deleuze with a possible way out of structuralist thinking, 
something that he had already started in The Logic of Sense‟ (Dosse 2007/2010, p 11; see also 
Lecercle 2002, p 180; Alliez 2011, p 38).  
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Foucault called „microphysics of power‟, and Guattari „micropolitics of desire‟ 
(Deleuze 1973/2004b, p 263; Guattari 1975; Deleuze 1990/1995, p 86). Thus, 
Deleuze writes, „today, we‟re not asking what the nature of power is, but rather, 
along with Foucault, how power exists itself, where it takes shape, and why it is 
everywhere‟ (Deleuze 2001/2007, p 11).  
 
Deleuze/Guattari‟s distinct style of doing philosophy, that is, to experiment with 
concepts, achieved its height in A Thousand Plateaus. Many of the components, 
concepts and themes developed in previous works reappeared in this extended essay, 
but were redefined and reconfigured to situate them in different contexts. Speaking 
on A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze points out that it is an illustrated book – each 
plateau has to map out a range of circumstances; that‟s why each has an imaginary 
date and an illustration, an image too. It‟s a book of concepts, an open tool box, a set 
of split rings; you can fit any one of them into any other (Deleuze 1990/1995, pp 25-
26). Thus, the themes of „machine‟ and „multiplicity‟ that Deleuze/Guattari 
emphasised throughout their previous works and more specifically, in their 
understanding of desiring-machine, were reintroduced through the concept of 
„rhizome‟ and „assemblage‟.
24
 More precisely, the concept of „machine‟ paved the 
way for introducing the idea of „rhizome‟ and „assemblage‟ because a machine 
operates in a connective fashion; it organises the component parts, produces 
functional synthesis and consistency.
25
 Deleuze/Guattari observe that a rhizome, as 
opposed to tree or root, „assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface 
extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/2004, p 7). It ceaselessly establishes connections between heterogeneous 
elements and in so doing, moves in all directions. A rhizome, in this sense, is a map 
because it has multiple entryways; it operates by variation, expansion, conquest, 
capture, offshoots (ibid., p 23). This movement in their conceptual thinking is 
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 Like the concept of „machine‟, the term „assemblage/agencement‟ appeared in Felix Guattari‟s 
writing much before it becomes a central concept in joint works with Deleuze. Initially, Guattari used 
the term informally to express his frustration in the final stages of preparing the manuscripts for 
publication of Anti-Oedipus (see Dosse 2007/2010, p 12), and later, as a concept (see Guattari 
1973/1984, p 257 and 1974/1984, p 138).     
25
 The terms machine, multiplicity, rhizome and assemblage appeared together for the first in Kafka: 
Toward a Minor Literature. According to Deleuze/Guattari, Kafka‟s writing is a „rhizome, a burrow‟, 
which was later described as „machine‟, „multiplicity‟ or „assemblage‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1975/1986, pp 3, 7 and 37). These terms or concepts, in other words, were used synonymously.      
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significant. It remains the case that although a machine is a multiplicity, the 
challenge is to describe how the components of a machine connect, co-function and 
form alliances. In short, how to demonstrate that a machine operates in a connective 
fashion, or how to describe that a machine is a multiplicity? The way out, for 
Deleuze/Guattari, is the concept of „rhizome‟ – a style of thinking that puts emphasis 
on connection, heterogeneity, assemblage, rupture, and cartography (ibid., pp 7-
15).
26
 However, the point to be stressed here is that while de/re-territorialisation were 
important parts of desiring-machine, as Deleuze/Guattari emphasised in Anti-
Oedipus; in A Thousand Plateaus they become parts of „abstract machine‟ – a 
machine that operates within concrete assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/2004, p 562). In what follows, the movements of de/re-territorialisation were 
resituated to describe assemblages – a complex constellation of heterogeneous 
elements, which is simultaneously and inseparably machinic assemblages of desire 
and collective assemblages of enunciation (ibid., pp 25 and 555). Then, one can 
conceive the desiring-machine as an assemblage of heterogeneous elements, and the 
assemblage is formed through the de/re-territorialising flows of desire because it is 
desire that establishes machinic conjunctions between the elements. Moreover, since 
a machinic assemblage is also an assemblage of enunciation (statement) (ibid., p 
xix), one needs to take statements into account.  
 
It follows, then, that the voices that enter into the make-up of the machine become 
components of the machine (Guattari 2009, p 94). These voices or statements are to 
be found in judgements, expressions, assertions, narratives, and affirmations or, what 
Deleuze/Guattari call „indirect discourses‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 85). 
From this perspective, there are no individual statements, but rather an interlocking 
of different statements or a constellation of heterogeneous voices – an assemblage 
that freely appears in indirect discourses. Put otherwise, indirect discourses explain 
all the voices present within a single voice (ibid., p 88). This suggests that while a 
desiring-machine is formed through a complex assemblage or organisation of desire, 
this desire can be found in acts and statements, which in turn can be found in indirect 
discourses. In other words, to understand how the desiring-machine functions or 
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operates, one needs to find out how desire flows through a multiplicity of voices, acts 
and statements, and in so doing, connects, binds and interlocks them to form a 
complex arrangement or assemblage. A desiring-machine, then, is a deterritorialised 
machinic assemblage – a social-technical arrangement or an „apparatus of capture‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 495) that not only integrates heterogeneous 
material forces, but also captures whatever flows through, whatever passes through 
the machine phylum. Consequently, by entering the machine, the subject of desire, 
the subject of enunciation becomes attached to the machine, thereby makes the 
machine viable (Guattari 2009, p 106). It follows that the desiring-machine is 
inseparable from the process of subjectification; it not only establishes machinic 
conjunctions, but also produces desiring-subjects. This emphasis on subjectification 
brings Deleuze/Guattari once again in close contact with Foucault. However, while 
for Foucault, the subject emerges through subjection to power, a process of 
„becoming‟; Deleuze/Guattari were more interested to understand how this 
„becoming‟ is shaped and produced by an assemblage of heterogeneous elements. As 
Deleuze/Guattari observe, „…the analysis of indirect discourse confirms…that 
subjectifications are not primary but result from a complex assemblage‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1980/2004, p 87). In this sense, the concept of „becoming‟ that 
Deleuze/Guattari elaborate in A Thousand Plateaus (ibid., p 263) relates back to 
desiring-machine (Deleuze and Guattari 1972/1977, pp 16-17).     
 
Further, it is also essential to emphasise the concept of „event‟ because events play a 
crucial part in the operation of desiring-machine. Elaborating on desiring-machine, 
Guattari points out that „temporalisation penetrates the machine on all sides and can 
be related to it only after the fashion of an event‟ (Guattari 1971/1984, p 112). While 
organisation takes place through machinic conjunctions, the links in the process of 
deterritorialisation are the events (Guattari 1972/1984, p 129). This suggests that a 
machine, as an assemblage of symbiosis, is dynamic and diachronic; it is 
characterised by the events of which it is the site. Put differently, since 
heterogeneous parts co-function in a machine, it is a site for the emergence of events 
(Lecercle 2002, p 181). Events, as Deleuze has already elaborated in The Logic of 
Sense, are not things or facts, but rather incorporeal entities, they subsist and inhere, 
and they result from actions and passions. (Deleuze 1969/1990, p 4). The concept 
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was reintroduced in A Thousand Plateaus, though very briefly (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/2004, p 95). It was again moved in a different direction in The Fold: Leibniz 
and the Barque, where Deleuze argues that events are produced in a chaotic 
multiplicity and thus, what remains enveloped or folded in an event are 
heterogeneous, simultaneous components. As he observes, „the multiple is not only 
what has many parts but also what is folded in many ways‟ (Deleuze 1988/1993, p 
3). And these components always retain certain cohesion and are inseparable from 
each other. The multiple is thus inseparable from a unity or an event that envelops it 
(ibid., pp 22-23, 31 and 74). In this sense, to unfold an event means to decompose the 
unity of the whole, to reveal the component parts; it is to increase them, to make 
them grow (ibid., p 8). Unfolding an event is thus crucial for understanding how the 
desiring-machine operates or works because it is composed of heterogeneous 
elements.  
 
The discussion above suggests that Deleuze/Guattari were committed to bring 
movements in concepts, to create mobile concepts that can be moved, set in motion, 
altered, combined, rearranged to describe the zones of continuous variation or a 
series of different contexts (Deleuze 1990/1995, pp 122 and 124). As Deleuze states, 
„style in philosophy is the movement of concepts‟ (ibid., p 140). This commitment to 
experiment with concepts is the hallmark of their distinct style of doing philosophy. 
Hence, their suggestion „so experiment‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 277) is 
the basis of this research. And I carry out this experimentation by „thinking through‟ 
their concepts, which also involves linking and combining them with the thinking of 
a number of other philosophers, specifically Michel Foucault and Georges 
Canguilhem.         
 
‘Thinking through’ Deleuze/Guattari 
 
Given that Deleuze/Guattari were committed to experimenting with concepts, to 
develop experimental philosophy, their philosophical thinking is built upon 
heterogeneous conceptual bits, „each initially introduced in relation to a particular 
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problem, then reintroduced into new contexts, seen from new perspectives‟ 
(Rajchman 2000, p 21). Consequently, these various conceptual bits (somewhat) lack 
coherence because they shift from one work to the next as new concepts are added 
and fresh problems are addressed (ibid.). Thus, the bits, as Rajchman points out, do 
not work together or form a coherent narrative, and this movement from one concept 
to another, this nomadic roaming about, is in itself a kind of empiricism (ibid., p 22). 
And this nomadic roaming through heterogeneous concepts is the most puzzling 
feature of their philosophy because as they move from one problem to another, the 
concepts also undergo continuous variation. By doing this, they have not only 
characterised thinking as open-ended, but also laid down a thousand trails (Colombat 
1991). This was absolutely necessary for them because they were committed to a 
practice of thinking that is both critical and experimental. But this nomadic or 
rhizomatic practice of thought presents a particular problem: how to read their work 
or how to follow their philosophical thinking, especially because, as Patton points 
out, neither there is such as a thing as Deleuze‟s definite philosophy, nor his work 
turns around a single fundamental idea (Patton 2010, p 10). More importantly, as 
Deleuze/Guattari are experimental thinkers, there is always movement and 
discontinuity in their thinking (ibid.). Then, the question how should one follow their 
philosophical thinking resonates with Deleuze/Guattari‟s own questions, „what is the 
best way to follow the great philosophers? Is it to repeat what they said or to do what 
they did, that is, create concepts for problems that necessarily change?‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1991/1994, p 28; original emphasis). 
 
A significant number of legal scholars have engaged with Deleuze‟s philosophical 
thinking. Some have relied on Deleuze‟s sporadic and anecdotal but critical remarks 
on law, rights, and jurisprudence (Deleuze 1967/1989, pp 81-90; Deleuze 1968/1994, 
pp 1-8; Deleuze 1990/1995, pp 152-153 and 169-173; Deleuze 2002/2004, p 19) to 
develop a specifically „Deleuzian jurisprudence‟ or „Deleuzian legal theory‟. For 
instance, relying on Deleuze‟s critique of a dogmatic image of thought and his 
remarks on jurisprudence as creative, Alexandre Lefebvre has attempted to develop a 
„positive philosophy of adjudication or juridical law‟ which, according to him, is 
creative and therefore, is a „new image of law‟ (Lefebvre 2005; see also Lefebvre 
2006, 2007 and 2008). Following the same path (Deleuze‟s critique of a dogmatic 
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image of thought and judgement), Edward Mussawir has moved on to develop a 
„procedural jurisprudence‟ of jurisdiction (Mussawir 2010 and 2011). In a slightly 
different manner, while Paul Patton has argued for a Deleuzian approach to human 
rights (relying on Deleuze‟s remarks on jurisprudence and rights) (Patton 2012; see 
also Lefebvre 2011); Jamie Murray, on the other hand, has drawn from Deleuze and 
Guattari‟s concept of emergence to construct a semiotics of „emergent law‟ or „nomo 
law‟ (Murray 2006 and 2007). There are others who have engaged with Deleuze‟s 
thinking more broadly to reconstruct a Deleuzian philosophy of law, but the 
underlying inspiration remains the same: either Deleuze‟s critique of a dogmatic 
image of thought and judgement or his remarks on law, jurisprudence and rights (see, 
for example, de Sutter and McGee 2012). Some exceptions are obviously there. For 
instance, Claire Colebrook suggests that „thinking with‟ Deleuze may open up new 
avenues to think law otherwise (Colebrook 2009). In this direction, Andreas 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has experimented with the concept of „fold‟, and 
drawn broadly from Deleuze and Guattari‟s thinking to provide a 
Deleuzian(Guattarian)-inspired understanding of law and justice which, according 
him, is spatial, immanent and posthuman (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2010, 2012, 
2013a and 2013b, 2014, 2015). A more sustained attempt has been made by Nathan 
Moore to bring Deleuze and Guattari‟s thinking in critical legal scholarship. He has 
engaged with their thinking and concepts (such as diagram, control society, affect, 
image of thought) more systematically and demonstrated very effectively the 
potential of Deleuze/Guattari‟s thinking in renewing the critical tradition in legal 
studies (Moore 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2012; see also Bottomley and Moore 
2008 and 2012). 
 
My approach, to an extent, is akin to these latter scholars because I have no ambition 
to develop a specifically Deleuzian jurisprudence or Deleuzian legal theory, neither 
do I rely on Deleuze‟s critical remarks on judgement, law and rights, nor on 
jurisprudence. However, my approach also differs significantly from these latter 
scholars. In this respect, I take Ian Buchanan‟s suggestions into account. Buchanan 
suggests that to be Deleuzian one must abandon Deleuze. By this he means to choose 
between two things, both of which result in a turning away: 
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„either one must bring other philosophical systems to bear on his corpus and enter into 
the very critical practice he so loathed or, if this faithfulness reviles, one must take to 
heart Deleuze and Guattari‟s axioms that philosophy progresses only by succession. 
Deleuze‟s work must then be treated as an arrow that has hit its target and now waits 
to be fired once more from a newly strung bow‟ (Buchanan 1999, p 2).   
In this thesis, I follow Buchanan‟s second suggestion, that is, to treat 
Deleuze/Guattari‟s work as an arrow and fire it once more to investigate a different 
problem in a different context: how the bioeconomy operates as a desiring-machine; 
and how law mediates this operation in a global/postcolonial context. Thus, rather 
than „thinking with‟, I „think through‟ (Young 1995, p 173) their concepts. By this I 
am not suggesting that this is the only way of reading Deleuze/Guattari, but rather to 
experiment with their concepts the way they did. As pointed out above, for 
Deleuze/Guattari, a concept is a composite whole and its decomposition reveals 
heterogeneous components that relate to each other. Moreover, a concept and its 
components link up or branch off toward other concepts. Brian Massumi has 
emphasised this aspect of Deleuze/Guattari‟s philosophy, as he says, a concept is by 
nature connectible to other concepts, and when and how to connect or relay one 
concept into another appear in the flow of thought (Massumi 2002, p 20). And, for 
Deleuze/Guattari, creating links or constructing joints is an act of thinking, an act of 
experimentation. Further, like other legal scholars I do not give any undue priority to 
Deleuze, rather I treat Deleuze and Guattari on equal footing because Deleuze has 
acknowledged that the best books he has written are with Guattari.
27
 In addition, 
none of the legal scholars cited above have experimented with Deleuze/Guattari‟s 
concepts to provide an account of how law mediates the movement of desire between 
disparate elements in the bioeconomy in a global/postcolonial context.
28
 Though 
                                                             
27
 It has rightly been pointed out by Francois Dosse that „the tendency today is to forget Guattari‟s 
name and remember only Deleuze‟s. Yet What is Philosophy? cannot be read as a return to “true” 
philosophy by Deleuze without Guattari. Its contents, style, and concepts make it impossible to 
imagine how the book could be “de-Guattarized to make Deleuze its sole author‟ (Dosse 2007/2010, p 
15). Moreover, in a number of occasions Deleuze has clearly asserted the brilliance of Guattari. 
Consider, for example, Deleuze‟s remarks on working with Guattari, „I have never met anyone who is 
so creative, or who produces more ideas‟; on Anti-Oedipus, „the book at times took on a powerful 
coherence that could not be assigned to either one of us‟, and again, „I could tell you who came up 
with this particular theme or that particular idea, but from my perspective, Felix had these 
brainstorms, and I was like a lightning rod‟; on A Thousand Plateaus, „under Felix‟s spells, I could 
perceive unknown territories where strange concepts dwelt‟ (Deleuze 2001/2007, pp 238-240).    
28
 Except Paul Patton‟s attempt to develop a „jurisprudence of colonialism‟ through 
Deleuze/Guattari‟s concepts (Patton 2000 and 2010).   
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postcolonial legal studies scholars
29
 have referred to Deleuze/Guattari sporadically, 
they are yet to „think through‟ their concepts.
30
 „Thinking through‟ Deleuze/Guattari 
thus can contribute meaningfully to scholarships on „Deleuze/Guattari and law‟, law 
and globalisation, and postcolonial legal studies.      
 
The bioeconomy, as narrated above, is comprised of heterogeneous elements, such as 
bio-tech corporations, global institutions, government and inter-governmental 
agencies, academic/research institutions, legal norms (intellectual property and 
biodiversity laws), biotechnologies, bio-genetic resources, and new biological 
materials. It is a combinatory system. Seeing it this way, the bioeconomy can be 
described as a „structure‟ or a „machine‟ in which all the elements co-exist and 
communicate reciprocally in a complex way. As Deleuze observes, „an economic 
structure never exists in a pure form, but is covered by the juridical, political and 
ideological relations in which it is incarnated‟ (Deleuze 1973/2004a, p 181). Since 
the bioeconomy is a combination of disparate elements, its decomposition reveals 
that each element functions in conjunction with others. Simply stated, the elements 
connect and relate to each other. Yet the question is: how does the elements connect 
or what establishes conjunctions between the elements? Certainly, the bioeconomy is 
founded on desire – the desire to produce, to propertise, to appropriate, to capture, to 
normalise appropriation and more importantly, to expand the spaces of bio-economic 
                                                             
29
 It is difficult to provide a detailed account of postcolonial legal studies because it is not a unified 
body of legal scholarship. Different legal scholars have approached the issue of law and 
post/colonialism from different perspectives. I can only direct to some postcolonial legal studies 
literatures that have referred to Deleuze and Guattari (Fitzpatrick 1992; Baxi 2002 and 2007) or, set 
forth the main approaches (see de Sousa Santos 1995; Comaroff 2001; Merry 1991 and 2004; Otto 
1996 and 1999; Cossman 1997; Fitzpatrick 1990, 2001, 2003 and 2014; Fitzpatrick and Darian-Smith 
1999; Ruskola 2002; Orford 2003; Rajagopal 2003; Seuffert and Coleborne 2003; Duncanson 2003; 
Baxi 1992, 2000 and 2003; Anghie 2005; Pahuja 2005 and 2011; Darian-Smith 1996, 2004, 2013 and 
2015).         
30
 The reason could be that Deleuze/Guattari said very little about colonialism or, it might be Gayatri 
Spivak‟s scathing attack on Foucault and Deleuze for devising a theory of the subject that failed to 
consider the relations between desire, power and post/colonial subjectivity (Spivak 1988). However, 
Robert JC Young has shown how Deleuze/Guattari‟s concept of „desiring-machine‟ can be helpful in 
thinking about the operation of capitalist desire in colonial expansion (Young 1995, p 167). Other 
postcolonial studies scholars, such as Graham Huggan (1989) and Arjun Appadurai (1990 and 1991) 
have used the concept of „deterritorialisation‟ in different ways. Moreover, in a sustained engagement 
with Spivak‟s critique, Robinson and Tormey point out that her critique is based on a somewhat 
cursory reading of Deleuze/Guattari‟s work (Robinson and Tormey 2010). And recently, Deleuzian 
and postcolonial studies scholars have demonstrated how Deleuzian philosophy can be brought in 
fruitful conversation with postcolonial theory and contribute to postcolonial studies, see Bignall 2010; 
Bignall and Patton 2010; Burns and Kaiser 2012).  
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production. In what follows, there is a continuous movement of desire in the 
bioeconomy, which establishes conjunctions, aberrant paths of communication and 
functional synthesis between the elements. In this light, it can be said that in the 
bioeconomy, disparate elements co-exist, and their aggregation and co-functioning 
are organised or arranged through the investment of desire.
31
 The bioeconomy thus 
operates in a connective fashion, through machinic conjunctions. Then, the argument 
is that the bioeconomy is a desiring-machine – an infrastructure, a highly engineered 
arrangement in which all the elements function in symbiosis. It is an assemblage or a 
multiplicity. However, as I have indicated, multiplicities remain folded in events. It 
follows that we need to unfold an event to understand how the bioeconomy operates. 
In this vein, I look at the Bt. brinjal controversy in India as an „event‟. An unfolding 
of the event reveals how heterogeneous elements, along with law, co-exist, co-
function, interact and form alliances in the controversy. It is important, therefore, to 
see the Bt. brinjal controversy as an effect of machinic assemblage. 
 
 
Since the aim of this research is to understand how desire moves and flows in the 
bioeconomy, and how law mediates such movements, I shed light on a number of 
issues that remain folded in the event. To be specific, by unfolding the event, I bring 
to attention how desire moves through disparate elements in the controversy. 
Consider, for example, Mahyco/Monsanto‟s desire to produce and propertise Bt. 
brinjal and its future progeny. Certainly, the desire to propertise, new life forms in 
particular, remains folded in the Euro-American idea of materiality. But 
Mahyco/Monsanto‟s property claims over Bt. brinjal reveals the movement of this 
desire to a distant location. And this movement was mediated by disparate elements, 
such as the Bt. gene, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) Agreement, the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and the Indian Patent Act. 
To elaborate further, chapter 3 „thinks through‟ the concept of de/re-territorialisation 
and shows how the movement of the idea of materiality brought into existence an 
emergent space of property in India.  
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 Deleuze clearly points out that desire should not be confused with interest because interests depend 
on desire for their determination and distribution (Deleuze 1973/2004b, p 263).   
36 
 
Consider also, ESG‟s desire to contest unauthorised appropriation through the 
discourse of biopiracy. Two competing modalities remain folded in ESG‟s desire. On 
the one hand, ESG‟s desire to govern access and utilisation of bio-genetic resources 
through legal norms, which is clearly evident in its invocation of the CBD and the 
Biological Diversity Act. This desire to govern through law is nothing new, but 
rather remains folded in governance mechanisms, such as the CBD and its local 
counterpart, the Biological Diversity Act. The argument, then, is that these 
governance mechanisms have legitimised the desire to appropriate and by doing so, 
deterritorialised and spatialised the desire to normalise. To emphasise further, can we 
link up the analytics of „governmentality‟ and „normalisation‟ with the concept of 
„expansion‟ (de/re-territorialisation)? Chapter 4 thus attempts to combine 
Deleuze/Guattari‟s line of thought with Foucault‟s and Canguilhem‟s to show how 
the desire to appropriate is normalised, deterritorialised and spatialised through the 
expansion of governance.   
 
 
Consider, on the other hand, ESG‟s desire to contest. What exactly ESG is 
contesting? Is it unauthorised appropriation or something else? The point is that 
contestation is never singular; it always exists in relation with other forces. What this 
means is that the discourse of biopiracy emerged in direct opposition to the 
expansive strategies of the bioeconomy. That is, the desire to expand the spaces of 
bio-economic production through appropriation and propertisation. This suggests that 
the ESG has mobilised the discourse of biopiracy to contest a specific 
power/knowledge regime that expands through the TRIPs Agreement, which is 
accommodated, integrated and reterritorialised in a distant location by institutions, 
such as the Department of Science and Technology (DST) and the DBT.  ESG‟s 
discourse of biopiracy in the Bt. brinjal controversy, from this point of view, is a 
differential power/desire. In particular, ESG‟s desire to contest brings to light how 
differentiated relations of power/desire operate in the bioeconomy. Although 
Deleuze has emphasised the primacy of desire over power, he points out that power 
arrangements would be a component of the assemblage. This does not mean power 
assembles; on the contrary, the assemblage of desire would disseminate power 
formations according to one of its dimensions (Deleuze 2001/2007, p 125). Chapter 
5, then, attempts to integrate Foucault‟s analysis of power with Deleuze/Guattari‟s 
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understanding of desire to demonstrate how the two (power and desire) co-function, 
move together, become co-extensive and deterritorialised.  
 
 
Consider, however, ESG‟s desire to heal injustice through rights claim, an important 
aspect of its discourse of biopiracy. Interestingly, the ESG has mobilised rights 
discourse through the CBD and the Biological Diversity Act. Thus, while ESG‟s 
desire to contest may, at first sight, appear a different becoming, it has never become 
different because the claims and demands were articulated through the component 
parts of bioeconomy. This not surprising, however. Because the legal mechanisms 
through which ESG has mobilised its contentious claims are designed to produce 
transformed subjects. ESG‟s desire to heal injustice through legal rights, then, is not 
a different becoming, but rather becoming a part of the bioeconomy – an emergent 
subjectivity. To substantiate this observation, chapter 6 once again brings Foucault in 
close contact with Deleuze/Guattari, specifically by linking Foucault‟s analysis of 
subjectivity with Deleuze/Guattari‟s concept of „becoming‟. 
 
 
A brief elaboration above shows how desire connects disparate elements in the 
controversy. This research, therefore, seeks to examine two questions. First, how the 
bioeconomy operates as a desiring-machine – a smaller machine operating within the 
larger capitalist machine (Deleuze 1973/2004b, p 267). And second, how law 
mediates such operation in a global/postcolonial context. To briefly emphasise the 
latter, the desire to propertise, to normalise appropriation, to contest, and to produce 
transformed subjects move through disparate legal mechanisms and practices. In fact, 
in the bioeconomy, desire depends on law for its articulation and movement. 
Therefore, it is law that mediates the movement of desire, which establishes 
machinic conjunctions between an array of elements situated in dispersed locations, 
and by doing so, spatialises materiality, normalisation, power and subjectivity. This 
in turn suggests that the Bt. brinjal controversy has „multiple dimensions‟. To 
describe the dimensions, the thesis formulates four sub-questions: 
 How does the desire to propertise bring into existence an emergent 
space of property? 
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 How do governance mechanisms normalise, deterritorialise and 
spatialise the desire to appropriate? 
 How do differentiated relations of power/desire operate in the 
bioeconomy? And where do we situate ESG‟s desire to contest? 




Overview of Chapters 
 
Chapter 1 provides a detailed description of the event – the Bt. brinjal controversy. 
Since unfolding means developing infinite tiny folds that are agitating in the 
background, the chapter begins with a brief outline of the emerging bioeconomy in 
India. The discussion reveals that official policy prescriptions and bio-economic 
discourses clearly assert the desire to produce, to propertise and to appropriate, and at 
the same time, put emphasis on the role of law and legal norms. After narrating the 
actualisation of this desire in the production of Bt. brinjal, the chapter dwells upon 
the actual controversy in which a number of highly charged narratives are 
circulating. While the first narrative made the issue of risk and uncertainty 
surrounding modern bio-technical science as the primary target of criticism, the 
second narrative brought to attention the issue of uncertainty in the regulatory 
governance or the legal regulation of risk. These narratives of uncertainty, the 
chapter points out, are primarily based on facts, and this reliance on facts, both in 
techno-scientific and legal discourses, produces a „factish epistemology of law and 
science‟. Leaving this factishm aside, the chapter delves into the third narrative – the 
allegation of biopiracy, which claims that a number of global/local entities 
appropriated local germplasm illegally to produce the Bt. brinjal. Specifically, the 
chapter highlights the desire to appropriate and the operation of biodiversity law that 
remain folded in the discourse of biopiracy. Thus, by unfolding the event, the chapter 
brings into view how heterogeneous elements co-exist, co-function, interact, form 
alliances and work in symbiosis in the controversy. The chapter, however, reiterates 
that a number of other issues remain folded in the event, such as the desire to 
propertise, to contest, and to produce transformed subjects. Accordingly, the chapter 
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concludes by observing that the Bt. brinjal controversy has „multiple dimensions‟, it 
is a multiplicity.     
 
So there are multiple dimensions. And these dimensions come into view as the thesis 
moves on to examine how law mediates the movement of desire and by doing so, 
spatialises materiality, normalisation, power and subjectivity. Since this mediation, 
movement and spatialisation are occurring in a global/postcolonial context, the thesis 
follows a very specific methodological approach to construct the dimensions of the 
„multiple‟. Chapter 2 thus delineates the methodological approach of this research. In 
this vein, the chapter discusses how the term „multiple‟ or „multiplicity‟ is used and 
theorised in contemporary „law and globalisation‟ scholarship. The chapter observes 
that law and globalisation scholars provide interesting and provocative perspectives 
on how law operates in the global legal order. However, they have used the term 
multiple or multiplicity to denote plural or many legal orders, fields, levels and 
spaces. By contrast, the chapter proposes to illustrate and think about the „multiple‟ 
or the „many‟ through the concept of „multiplicity‟. As a topological concept, the 
term „multiplicity‟ puts emphasis on constructing the „multiple‟ by adding elements 
successively through conjunctions. To this end, the chapter emphasises the 
importance of „thinking rhizomatically‟ – a practice of thinking that moves in all 
directions to link and connect disparate elements, thereby organises, arranges and 
stabilises the relations between the „many‟. By doing so, rhizomatic thinking 
constructs an assemblage – a constellation of heterogeneous elements that relate to 
each other. This approach also paves the way for linking up and combining one 
concept with another. The chapter, then, sets forth an approach through which the 
thesis connects an array of elements through conjunctions (including disparate 
concepts) and actualises their relations in extensive series. In other words, the 
approach provides a way to multiply and expand the dimension of the controversy. 
And, to make the dimensions legible, the chapter highlights Deleuze/Guattari‟s 
emphasis on drawing a map or cartography of various interacting lines, movements 
and flows. This methodological understanding, the chapter argues, has implication 
for how we understand the globalisation of law because, in the global legal order, the 
law not just operates, regulates or governs at multiple scales or levels, but rather 
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operates through conjunctions. In addition, the chapter outlines the research method 
that this thesis adopts, that is, case study and discourse analysis.    
 
Having outlined the methodological approach, the subsequent chapters narrate the 
dimensions of the bioeconomy, Bt. brinjal controversy in particular. To this effect, 
chapter 3 discusses how Mahyco/Monsanto‟s desire to produce and propertise Bt. 
brinjal and its future progeny brought into existence an emergent space of property in 
a distant location. The focus of the chapter is on relations, especially tracing the 
movement of the idea of materiality, which establishes connections between 
heterogeneous elements. In this direction, the chapter pays attention to Euro-
American material and intellectual property law in which the idea of materiality is 
territorialised. What remains folded in the idea of materiality, the chapter shows, is 
the desire to propertise. The chapter moves on to illustrate how this idea of 
materiality or the desire to propertise is deterritorialised by the TRIPs Agreement. 
And then, reveals its reterritorialisation in India‟s patent law. To emphasise further, 
the chapter looks into Mahyco/Monsanto‟s desire to propertise emergence. The 
point, however, is that this de/re-territorialisation was mediated by dispersed 
elements. The chapter thus suggests that de/re-territorialisation is a „movement in 
process‟, which brings into view continuity, consistency, dispersion and mediation.   
 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on another dimension of the controversy – the issue of governing 
appropriation through legal norms. ESG‟s discourse of biopiracy, to an extent, 
highlights how the desire to appropriate operates in the bioeconomy. Indeed, the 
bioeconomy intends to grow and expand its operations by normalising appropriation 
through a juridical order, a point emphasised by Canguilhem in a different context. 
The chapter observes that the desire to appropriate moves through global/local 
governance mechanisms, such as the CBD and the Biological Diversity Act. After 
all, the desire to normalise appropriation remains folded in governance mechanisms. 
In order to elaborate this observation, the chapter links up Deleuze/Guattari‟s 
emphasis on „expansion‟ with Foucault‟s analysis of governmental intervention, 
which equally has an expansive dimension. More precisely, Foucault has emphasised 
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that the purpose of a governance mechanism or a framework of law is to create a 
secure environment, to normalise movement so that the spaces of the market can be 
expanded. Bringing different lines of thought together, the chapter sets out to 
demonstrate how the CBD has expanded the spaces of bio-economic production by 
normalising appropriation through the expansion of governance. In what follows, the 
chapter shows how the idea of bioeconomy emerged and gained traction during 
CBD‟s negotiation process. And, to be more specific, how a new global legal 
mechanism was devised to normalise appropriation „at a distance‟. In consequence, 
the CBD not only legitimised the desire to appropriate, but also deterritorialised and 
spatialised the desire to normalise. The chapter substantiates this understanding by 
throwing light on the Biological Diversity Act, which has normalised the desire to 
appropriate in India. Viewing it this way, the chapter concludes that the CBD is an 
„apparatus of capture‟ – it has legitimised the desire to normalise and at the same 
time, prescribes mechanisms to normalise the desire to appropriate. 
 
 
Chapter 5 looks more closely into ESG‟s allegation of biopiracy. The discourse of 
biopiracy emerged in direct opposition to the expansive strategies of the 
bioeconomy. Certainly, the desire to expand moves through the CBD and the TRIPs 
Agreement. ESG‟s contestation, then, is a differential desire. And so, the biopiracy 
discourse brings to attention how differentiated relations of desire operate in the 
bioeconomy. To flesh out this insight, the chapter combines Foucault‟s analysis of 
power relations with Deleuze/Guattari‟s emphasis on desire. Specifically, Foucault 
has shown that power moves through legal norms, traverses heterogeneous spaces 
and equally, invites resistance. Taking these observations into account, the chapter 
moves on to explore how power and domination operate or move through the TRIPs 
Agreement. Remarkably, some scholars view the TRIPs regime as an effortless 
extension or a unidirectional movement of power and domination from a global 
institution with an identifiable centre to the periphery. Instead, the chapter suggests 
that we need to look at the mediated relationality of power. That is, how the TRIPs 
Agreement mediates the desire to expand a specific space of power/knowledge 
across the globe. Yet this expansion is not effortless. Rather, it depends on other 
institutions to integrate, accommodate and mediate the desire in a distant location. 
The chapter, therefore, shows how two institutions in India – the DST and the DBT, 
42 
 
have expanded the space of power/knowledge. As a differential desire, the biopiracy 
discourse moves in opposite direction because it emerged to contest the expansionist 
tendencies of the bioeconomy. In this sense, the desire to contest is a counter-power, 
which comes to light as the chapter narrates how contentious claims and demands 
were mobilised through heterogeneous spaces. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes 
on a different note. It remains the case that ESG has invoked the component parts of 
the bioeconomy (CBD and Biological Diversity Act) to articulate claims and 
demands. Thus, what remains folded in ESG‟s desire to contest is the emergence of 
desiring-subjects.   
 
 
Chapter 6, the last chapter, narrows down the focus on ESG‟s desire to heal injustice 
through rights discourse. The argument is that an emergent subjectivity remains 
folded in ESG‟s articulation of claims and demands in terms of legal rights. Even 
further, this emergent subjectivity is a becoming – not becoming different, but rather 
becoming a part of the desiring-machine. To carry this observation forward, the 
chapter invokes Foucault‟s analysis of subjectivity and links it up with 
Deleuze/Guattari‟s concept of „becoming‟. For Foucault, subjectivity emerges 
through subjection, specifically through techniques and mechanisms, which ensure 
subjection and in doing so, transform the subjects. Subjectivation, then, is a process 
of becoming a transformed subject. Keeping this insight in mind, the chapter once 
again looks into OECD and DBT‟s policy prescriptions which, rather counter-
intuitively, are intended to transform the economic behaviours and activities of the 
subjects. However, the analysis moves in a slightly different direction because the 
main aim is to understand how a multiplicity shapes emergent subjectivity in the 
bioeconomy. In this spirit, the chapter brings diverse threads together to demonstrate 
that an assemblage of desire created a condition for the emergence of desiring-
subjects. The chapter emphasises this understanding by looking into ESG‟s desire to 
redress injustice through „benefit-sharing‟ arrangement and „prior informed consent‟. 
These legal mechanisms, prescribed by the CBD and the Biological Diversity Act, 
are designed to normalise appropriation. And so, what remains folded in them is the 
desire to produce transformed subjects, so that the spaces of bio-economic 
production can be expanded. Consequently, ESG‟s mobilisation of rights discourse 
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through the component parts of the bioeconomy, the chapter argues, is an 
assimilation in the assemblage or becoming a part of the infrastructure – an emergent 
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The bioeconomy is comprised of heterogeneous elements. So my argument is that 
these elements co-exist, co-function, interact, connect and relate to each other. 
Following Deleuze/Guattari, I have suggested that we can think about the 
bioeconomy as an „infrastructure‟ or a „machine‟ in which each element functions in 
conjunction with another. If we accept this understanding, then it can be argued that 
the bioeconomy operates in a connective fashion, through machinic conjunctions. 
Thus, we can say roughly that the bioeconomy is an „assemblage‟ – a constellation of 
disparate entities, or a „multiplicity‟ – an organisational relationship that belong to 
the many. However, as emphasised in the Introduction, multiplicities remain folded 
in events. This chapter, therefore, narrates the operation of the bioeconomy by 
unfolding an event – the Bt. brinjal controversy. Events, according to Deleuze, are 
initiatives, they grow and become, and it is the mixtures of bodies that determine the 
dimensions of an event (Deleuze 1969/1990, p 6). Accordingly, one needs to unfold 
an event to understand how the bioeconomy operates because unfolding brings into 
view the relations between actual things, bodies and happenings (Fraser 2006, p 
129). This in turn suggests that unfolding is not the contrary of folding, nor its 
effacement, but rather the continuation or the extension of its acts (Deleuze 
1988/1993, p 35). As Deleuze further elaborates, „unfolding sometimes means that I 
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am developing – that I am unfolding – infinite tiny folds that are forever agitating in 
the background …‟ (ibid., p 93). The next section thus provides a brief outline of the 
emerging bioeconomy in India. Then, I discuss in detail the production of Bt. brinjal. 
In my discussion, I mainly focus on statements or discourses because, for 
Deleuze/Guattari, certain statements are socially devoted to the accomplishment of 
certain actions. Hence, statements simultaneously express incorporeal 
transformations and immanent acts (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 87). The 
subsequent section moves on to examine existing narratives of the controversy in 
political and scientific discourses. To be specific, some sections of the political, 
scientific, and academic community have made the lack of scientific and legal 
certainty in the regulatory governance of Bt. brinjal as their primary target of 
criticism. By doing this, they have mobilised ample intellectual and critical energy to 
detect the facts and prejudices hidden beneath the production of Bt. brinjal and 
produced a linear narrative of risk discourses. While these swiftly demystifying 
narratives of facts and certainty in scientific, political and academic discourses are 
enlightening, I argue that these narratives are premised on a science/society axis. 
After assessing the critical equipment deployed by the critics, I show that these 
commentators are making a similar gesture, in the sense that they have naturalised 
facts and certainty in the regulatory governance of biotechnology prematurely. 
Consequently, these scientific and legal discourses produce a „factish epistemology‟ 
of law and science. To move beyond this factishm, I focus on ESG‟s allegation of 
biopiracy. Leaving aside facts and certainty, ESG‟s allegation brings into view how 
heterogeneous entities situated in disparate locations formed alliances to appropriate 
bio-genetic resources in the production of Bt. brinjal. In other words, the discourse of 
biopiracy reveals that the Bt. brinjal controversy is not simply a matter of facts and 
certainty, but rather involves interaction between disparate entities, and more 
importantly, law‟s mediation of interactions and relations in the bioeconomy. 
However, I argue that this revelation is partial because a number other pressing 
issues remain folded in the controversy, such as the desire to produce and propertise, 
and the desire to normalise appropriation through legal norms. Moreover, ESG‟s 
desire to contest not only shows how differentiated relations of desire operate, but 
also provides indication of the production of emergent subjectivities in the 
bioeconomy. The Bt. brinjal controversy, therefore, has „multiple dimensions‟. I 
conclude the chapter by suggesting that since unfolding means developing infinite 
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tiny folds that remain folded, one needs to construct the dimensions by adding 
elements successively through conjunctions.     
 
1.2: The emerging Bioeconomy in India 
 
There is some weight in the OECD‟s prophetic claim that developing countries such 
as India will play a growing role in future biotechnology research and development 
(OECD 2009, p 138). The bioeconomy, in terms of OECD‟s projection, is a 
promising enterprise and India is a promising new market for manufactured bio-
materials. In other words, India provides lucrative opportunities for global bio-tech 
corporations to conquer and invest in new territories for capital accumulation. 
Accordingly, there is a growing investment in biotechnological research that brings 
disparate global/local entities together, in terms of co-operation and collaboration, 
technology transfer, and sharing of technical knowledge and expertise. This 
interaction and collaboration has another dimension – increasing the utilisation of 
biogenetic resources in the production of commercially profitable transgenic crops 
which, however, depends on juridical institutions and legal mechanisms relating to 
access, appropriation and propertisation of bio-genetic resources. 
 
 
While biotechnological research and innovation in India are nothing new (see, for 
example, Rao 2002), the ongoing mediation between global/local bio-tech industries, 
and transformations in intellectual property and biodiversity laws make visible that 
India intends to become a global player in the bioeconomy. Thus, in a recent report, 
the Working Group on Biotechnology proposes to transform India into a producer of 
„biovalue‟ (DBT 2011). The Report points out that the main strategy of the 11
th
 Plan 
(2002 – 2007) was to make India globally competitive in the emerging bioeconomy 
and toward this end, it formulated policies to globalise biotechnological research and 
promote bio-industry and trade, global connectivity for collaborative innovation, and 
public-private partnership and regulation. The 11
th
 Plan was thus aimed at laying a 
foundation for progress in basic and translational work in all sectors of 
biotechnology including bio-engineering and design, bio-resources mapping and 
47 
 
prospecting, gene discovery and manipulation, molecular crop breeding, and 
intellectual property and patent law (ibid., pp 1-2). Keeping this techno-scientific and 
bio-economic impetus in mind, the National Biotechnology Development Strategy 
2007 brought a paradigm shift in biotechnological research and development and 
created an ecosystem for bio-innovation. Between 2007 and 2011, the DBT has 
implemented 2410 research and development projects, out of which 22 per cent were 
in agriculture and allied areas of biotechnology, and 19 per cent were in bioresources 
and bioprospecting (ibid., p 2). The direct result of this strategic initiative is the 
development of a number of genetically improved or modified varieties of crops 
through public sector research, such as insect resistant chickpea, rice, and brinjal, 
drought tolerant groundnut and sunflower, mustard with hybrid vigour and protein 
rich maize (ibid., p 5). Similarly, during this period, 312 national/international 
patents were filed and 110 patents have been granted, 105 technologies developed, 
21 transferred to industry and 5 commercialised (ibid., p. 3). The Report notes that 
the Indian Biotech industry recorded 21 per cent growth and touched US$ 4 billion 
mark and in the next 5 to 10 years, it is expected to reach a market size of US$ 10 
billion (ibid., p 13). Charting this unprecedented progress in bio-economic activities 
and their accumulative potential and promise, either by way of profit or intellectual 
property rights (biological patents), the Working Group on Biotechnology unveiled 
its overall strategy for the 12
th
 Plan (2012 – 2017). The basic mantra of this strategy 
is to accelerate the pace of research, innovation and technology transfer, so that 
biotechnology as a strategic area can reach globally competitive levels and expand 
the overall growth of the bioeconomy (ibid., p 118). Keeping in mind global 
developments, the Report‟s emphasis is on putting in place a system of mapping 
intellectual properties arising out of growing investments in bio-innovation and thus, 
the Report states, „we have to harness the leads we generate, the ideas we create for 
bio-economy‟ (ibid., p 12). The overall growth of the bioeconomy, therefore, would 
depend not just on the production of biovalue, but rather on legal mechanisms that 
would transform these knowledges into intellectual wealth or properties. In other 
words, intellectual property law and to a greater extent, patent law will play an 
important role in accelerating the overall growth of the bioeconomy because it is 
widely believed (as well as commented upon) that strong intellectual property 
protection remains the lethal force behind America‟s global bio-tech success story. 
As one commentator remarks, „the Indian biotechnology sector is poised for a 
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tremendous growth and IP protection is necessary for India to make it to the top as a 
global competitor‟. In line with this argument, a recent World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) led study on India reveals that a stricter patent regime does 
indeed stimulate patenting activity in research-intensive industries in developing 
countries, and many bio-tech corporations have taken initiatives to promote 
intellectual property as a policy (Verma and Muralidhar Rao N.D., p 16). Similarly, 
at the BIO India conference held in Mumbai, the biotech industry expressed the view 
that policies and in particular, strong intellectual property protection and regulatory 
mechanisms, are necessary to promote innovation, collaboration and investment in 
the biotech sector.
34
 More importantly, the US bio-industry representatives urged the 
Indian government to respect intellectual property and other legal rights. What is 
significant about these discourses is that the DBT and the biotech industry believe 
that to transform India into a globally competitive producer of bio-technical 
knowledge, India needs to attract commercial capital in the bio-tech sector and forge 
collaborative relationships with global bio-tech corporations. However, the 
realisation of this ambition depends on „legislative stewardship‟ that would not only 
transform bio-genetic resources and associated knowledges into intellectual 
properties, but also provide legal protection to global intellectual properties in India.  
 
 
These developments indicate that India is on the verge of becoming a knowledge-
driven economy, and biotechnological knowledge will contribute to a significant 
share of national and global economic output. However, this transition from a 
colonial loser to a postcolonial winner – producer of proprietary biotechnological 
knowledge, depends on several other factors. On the whole, the rate and pace of 
biotechnological research and innovation, private capital investment decisions, and 
increasing interactions between global/local bio-tech firms, government and inter-
governmental agencies, and public/private research institutions will depend on legal 
arrangements. To be more specific, legal mechanisms are necessary to normalise the 
uninterrupted supply of raw materials to the bio-tech industry for appropriation. 
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Equally important is strong intellectual property protection because new 
biotechnological inventions are „bio-assets‟ or „biovalue‟ that must be protected and 
traded through exclusive property rights. To begin with, this means greater access to 
bio-genetic resources and their transformation into industrial raw materials and 
intellectual properties. It also entails the reformulation or re-definition of local 
intellectual property law in line with global standards, or the localisation of global 
intellectual property standards, so that propertisation and exploitation of newly 
manufactured living organisms (such as transgenic plants and seeds) can be 
normalised through legal norms. Thus, in the past few years, we have seen the 
proliferation of new or the re-definition of old legal mechanisms, specifically in the 
arena of intellectual property rights and biodiversity laws. For instance, radical 
changes were made in the Indian Patent Act 1970 in 2002 and 2005 to bring 
artificially manufactured life forms within the scope of patentable inventions. 
Similarly, the Biological Diversity Act 2002 not only prescribes mechanisms for the 
appropriation and utilisation of bio-genetic resources by global/local bio-tech 
industries, but also normalises the commoditisation and propertisation of these 
resources though intellectual property rights. In the next section, I discuss how these 
vision, rhetoric and discourses are actualised in the production of Bt. brinjal.  
 
 
1.3: Production of Bt. Brinjal 
 
Brinjal (Solanum melengena Linn) or Aubergine or Eggplant (as it is known in other 
parts of the world) belongs to Solanaceae family. It is a popular vegetable throughout 
Asia (Samuels 2012) and widely cultivated in India. Brinjal is a versatile crop, 
adapted to different agro-climatic conditions and can be grown throughout the year 
(Abdul Ahad et al. 2010). The major brinjal producing states in India are West 
Bengal, Orissa, Gujarat, Bihar, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Karnataka, Assam, Haryana and Tamil Nadu (Kumar et al. 2011). Along 
with tomato and onion, brinjal is the second most important vegetable in India. 
Brinjal is an affordable vegetable, so it is consumed in a wide variety of popular 
dishes throughout India (Shelton 2010). It is featured in the dishes of virtually every 
household in India, regardless of food preference, income level and social status 
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(Bandopadhyay et al. 2012).  Brinjal accounts for 8.4 percent of total vegetable 
production and covers 8.14 percent of land under vegetable cultivation (Kumar et al. 
2011). A number of cultivars are grown in the country, consumer preference being 
dependent upon fruit colour, size and shape (Abdul Ahad et al. 2010). Low in 
calories (24 kcal/100 gm) but high in nutrition and water content, brinjal is a very 
good source of fibre, calcium, phosphorus, folate, and vitamins B and C 
(Bandopadhyay et al. 2012). Brinjal is also believed to have certain medicinal 
properties and used in ayurvedic medicine for treating diabetes, hypertension and 
obesity (ibid.; Shelton 2010). Moreover, many folk songs (such as Konkani songs in 
Maharashtra and Bihu folk songs in Assam) often allude to brinjal, and its 
significance in religious rituals has also been recognised. For instance, traditional 
varieties cultivated in the Udupi District in Karnataka (such as Mattu Gulla) are 
offered to the main deity at the Sode Matha Temple (CEE/MoEF N.D., p 2). Brinjal 
thus plays an important role in social, cultural and economic life. Though there is a 
difference of opinion, the widely accepted view is that brinjal/eggplant was 
domesticated in the Indian subcontinent, and India is a centre of diversity for brinjal 
(Duanay et al. 2001; Samuels 2011). A wide variety of traditional landraces (such as 
Mattu Gulla from Karnataka) and other popular varieties are available in many 
regions (Bhat and Vasanthi 2008). The National Gene Bank in New Delhi, India has 
2782 landraces of brinjal and 530 wild and weedy accessions from all over the 
subcontinent (Sharma et al. 2010). In India, a large number of brinjal varieties are 
grown by small, marginal and resource poor farmers throughout the year.  
 
It is widely reported in the scientific literature that pests cause severe damage to 
brinjal crops throughout their life cycle. Most serious and extensive damage is 
caused by fruit and shoot borer (FSB; Leucinodes orbonalis). Thus, growers in India 
are generally dependant on insecticides as their main method of control, spraying 
upwards of 40 times per season for the control of FSB (Shelton 2010). However, it is 
estimated that FSB causes yield loses of 60 – 70 per cent even after repeated 
insecticidal sprays, resulting into significant crop loses and hazards to human health 
and biodiversity (Chaudhary and Gaur 2009).  In order to improve the productive 
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inefficiency (biological and economic) – a genetically transformed and improved
35
 
„new life form‟ known as Bt. Brinjal, was produced by Mahyco in 2002 with the 
assistance of Monsanto‟s proprietary Bt. gene. However, in 2003, a collaborative 
relationship was established between Mahyco/Monsanto and a number of other 
entities (such as TNAU-C and UAS-D) to develop a pro-poor variety of Bt. brinjal. It 
is worth pausing on the two material transfer agreements that provide the basis for 
the collaborative relationship. The first agreement was reached between Mahyco and 
TNAU-C in March 2005.
36
 A month later, a similar agreement was also finalised 
between Mahyco, UAS-D and Sathguru Consultants, a mouthpiece of the USAID.
37
 
The first Agreement states that TNAU-C approached Mahyco and agreed to supply 
eggplant germplasm „developed, owned and controlled‟ (referred as TNAU material) 
by itself for transformation so that a genetically modified variety of brinjal can be 
produced. Mahyco, in return, agreed to produce a pro-poor transgenic variety by 
backcrossing its „proprietary‟ insect tolerant eggplant lines into „TNAU Material‟ in 
a laboratory setting. The resultant progeny (referred as „Products‟) was tested for the 
presence of Bt. gene. In terms of the Agreement, Mahyco and TNAU „perceive a 
common objective in the development and delivery of pro-poor varieties of insect 
tolerant Bt. eggplant, with a view to facilitate technology access to resource-
constrained farmers‟. The Agreement further points out that „the term Bt. 
gene…shall mean the DNA molecule encoding a Bt. Protein, which upon 
incorporation into the genome of an eggplant plant confers tolerance to certain 
insects in the resulting transgenic plant and progeny thereof‟. Moreover, the 
Agreement prohibits TNAU from backcrossing the Bt. gene into any other eggplant 
germplasm or public bred germplasm or third party germplasm.  
 
In the second agreement, Mahyco, UAS-D and Sathguru Consultants rehashed the 
„pro-poor rhetoric‟ of the collaborative effort under the ABSP II, the main mission of 
which is to support the production and commercialisation of bio-engineered food 
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crops in developing countries.
38
 In line with the previous agreement, Mahyco 
vigorously reinforced its property rights over Bt. protein produced by Cry1Ac gene 
contained in the transgenic brinjal plant. In particular, the insertion of Cry1Ac gene 
into the genome of brinjal plant and finally, the production of a transgenic brinjal 
plant by recombinant DNA technique (known as genetic modification) has been 
described as EE-1 Event and refereed as MHSCL Technology. By way of 
clarification, the Agreement mentions that MHSCL Technology shall mean certain 
eggplant event containing the Bt. gene including the MHSCL proprietary germplasm 
in the crop specie transformed using the recombinant DNA technology to exhibit 
insect tolerance for the purpose of further breeding activities and commercialisation 
of transgenic product. The property rights that Mahyco claims, therefore, also extend 
over any active fragment, modification, deletion, or mutation, including seeds or 
other parts of the genetically modified eggplant. In addition, the Agreement reiterates 
that intellectual property, which Mahyco (i.e. MHSCL Technology) and Monsanto 
(i.e. Bt. gene) own and control, will be infringed by making, using or selling the bio-
engineered brinjal plant containing the MHSCL Technology or Monsanto 
Technology. The Agreement states that UAS-D shall not reverse engineer, isolate, 
modify or use the Bt. gene or other recombinant DNA that is part of the MHSCL 
Technology and also, shall not transform the transgenic brinjal plant using the 
MHSCL Technology, including the Bt. gene. In this direction, the Agreement further 
points out that any technology, proprietary information, know-how, data, intellectual 
property, trade secrets, germplasm, biological and other physical material owned or 
held by and exchanged between the parties shall be treated as „confidential 
information‟ whether disclosed in writing or other tangible form, including samples 
of the material. This means that the Cry1Ac gene and brinjal germplasm – a 
biological material in its natural and artificially improved form, shall be treated as 
informational as well as economic objects because these materials are exchanged 
between and owned by the parties. The UAS-D, therefore, shall use its best efforts to 
prevent the theft or loss of Monsanto and/or MHSCL Technology, and make sure 
that the farmers will only use the bio-engineered brinjal plant to produce commodity 
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eggplant crop within the territory.
39
 More importantly, the Agreement demands 
adequate assurance of protection for commercial and intellectual property rights, 
including effective legal protection for Bt. gene, MHSCL Technology, and bio-
engineered brinjal plant by implementation or amendment of legislations. The 
legislation, in other words, would provide protection for „patented technology 
incorporated in living organism‟. This reference to „patented technology‟ means that 
legal protection should be provided to Monsanto‟s intellectual property rights over 
Bt. protein, which is naturally produced by Cry1Ac gene inserted into the genome of 
brinjal plant. It also means that Monsanto/Mahyco‟s rights over bio-engineered 
brinjal plant and its future progeny carrying their proprietary technology should be 
protected through intellectual property rights. Thus, the Agreement states, if the laws 
and regulations in the territory do not provide an assurance of effective legal 
protection, Mahyco may terminate the agreement.  
 
Two things I want to highlight at this point before moving on to discuss the actual 
controversy. First, this collective of heterogeneous entities kept the widely advocated 
pro-poor rhetoric of the bioeconomy intact. At the same time, however, TNAU-C 
and UAS-D supplied eggplant germplasm „developed, owned and controlled‟ by 
themselves for improvement. Further, Mahyco not only produced the Bt. brinjal by 
crossing with its „proprietary insect tolerant lines‟, but also reinforced 
Monsanto/Mahyco‟s ownership over bio-engineered products, such as isolated DNA 
molecules or protein sequences, Bt. brinjal and its future progeny. Second, this 
collective agenda by heterogeneous entities to produce and commercialise bio-
engineered brinjal plant invisibly pushed India to create a juridical-economic order to 
protect intellectual property rights over artificially manufactured bio-materials. In 
other words, by appropriating the pro-poor rhetoric of the bioeconomy, this 
collective of heterogeneous global/local entities produces a particular juridical-
economic rationality that transforms biological resources (herein eggplant 
germplasm) into material objects that should be exchanged, protected, and available 
for commercial exploitation exclusively through juridical norms. 
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1.3: Debate between Science and Society 
The description of the production of Bt. brinjal suggests that heterogeneous entities 
situated in dispersed spatial locations established connections, formed alliances, and 
co-functioned under the ABSP II Project with a collective agenda – to produce and 
market a bio-technically manufactured brinjal plant. The UAS-D requested 
permission twice from the DBT to conduct multi-location field trials of Bt. brinjal in 
the States of Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Goa.
40
 In 2007, the RCGM (Review 
Committee on Genetic Manipulation) and the GEAC (Genetic Engineering Approval 
Committee) examined the application of UAS-D and approved the request to conduct 
confined field trials. But in 2009, the RCGM in a letter to UAS-D stated that in light 
of the policy decision, the primary focus of genetically modified (GM) crop trials 
should be on biosafety issues and not on agronomic performance. Therefore, UAS-
D‟s request has not been approved because the UAS-D developed Bt. brinjal through 
technology transfer from Mahyco and the biosafety assessment of Mahyco‟s Bt. 
brinjal is still under review. However, on 14 October 2009, the GEAC, comprising 
mainly bureaucrats and scientists, gave the final nod to the environmental and 
commercial release of Bt. brinjal in India.  
 
As a specific instance of bio-economic production, the decision to commercialise Bt. 
brinjal received mixed response from the public, politicians, media, scientists, civil 
society actors and the judiciary. The debate as it unfolds remains exclusively tied to 
technoscientific advancement, socio-economic progress and scientific certainty – the 
capacity of science to distinguish reliable from unreliable facts. On the one hand, 
some scientists, politicians and biotech industry players were very quick to rehash 
the well-established rhetoric of modern biotechnology to assure the public that Bt. 
brinjal is safe for consumption because it contains Cry1Ac gene, which is isolated 
from soil bacterium bacillus thuringiensis and incorporated in several edible crops 
(such as Bt. corn, potato, tomato, and rice) in other parts of the world. For instance, 
C Kameswara Rao
41
 has argued,  
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„The safety and efficacy of so-called “Bt. technology” … has been investigated for 
repeatedly by the mandatory regulatory regimes of every one of the 25 countries that 
commercialised these crops in the past decade-and-a-half. Genetically modified food 
is widely available in the United Sates, and will soon be in Europe, too. … If anything, 
the Indian Government should be cheering on this kind of innovation‟.
42
  
Similarly, just before the commercial release of Bt. brinjal, K V Thomas (then 
Minister of State for Agriculture) stated that „in the near future we expect many GM 
crops that have been modified for better availability of vitamins, iron, micronutrients, 
quality proteins and oils, which would secure the nutritional security of the masses‟ 
(Grain 2010). Likewise, shortly before GEAC‟s decision, Mahyco‟s managing 
director claimed on the company‟s website that Bt. brinjal „has the same nutritional 
value and is compositionally identical to non-Bt. brinjal, except for the additional Bt. 
protein which is specific in its action against the BFSB‟ (ibid.).   
 
On the other hand, opposing this techno-economic logic, another section of the 
scientific and political community, in addition to civil society organisations, have 
expressed serious concern over the health and safety issues associated with the 
commercial and environmental release of transgenic brinjal, and brought to attention 
the risks and uncertainty of bio-technical science. Consider, for example, the media 
report that according to Pushpa Bhargava,
43
 the GEAC not only ignored the 
dissenting opinions of three of its members, but also ignored enormous scientific 
literature in a haste to clear the first genetically modified food crop because the 
clearance of Bt. brinjal was pre-planned.
44
 In other words, the release was „not driven 
purely by scientific and social merit, but rather by political and financial incentives‟ 
(Bhargava 2010, p 177). Consider again, Jairam Ramesh‟s strong message (then 
Minister of Environment and Forests) to Sharad Pawar (then Minister of Agriculture) 
that the government has every right and, in fact, has a basic responsibility, to take the 
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final decision when critical issues of human safety are involved.
45
 He further adds 
that „I cannot go against science but in this case science is inadequate‟. In this 
scenario, it is my duty to adopt a cautious, precautionary and principle-based 
approach until scientific tests can guarantee the safety of the product.
46
 Therefore, 
„my decision to impose a moratorium is responsible to science and responsive to 
society‟.
47
 Consider once again, the report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee 
on Agriculture that slammed the government for clearing GM crops without proper 
scientific scrutiny of their impacts. It stated that transgenic food crops would be 
fraught with unknown consequences and has recommended a fresh roadmap for 
ensuring food security without the use of GM food so that the biodiversity, livestock 
health and safety of human health is not jeopardized or compromised.
48
 In a similar 
way, the Supreme Court appointed TEC in its interim report unanimously 
recommended a 10-year moratorium on field trials of all GM food crops.
49
 
Addressing health, environmental and other socio-economic issues, the final report 
of the TEC suggested that a moratorium should be in place until an independent 
committee of experts and stakeholders examines the potential impact of herbicide 





Confronted with scientific uncertainty, opponents have pointed out a number of 
flaws in the regulatory mechanism of biotechnology. Thus, the opponents argue, as 
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science-based risk assessment is biased and remains in a state of uncertainty, a 
precautionary approach should be adopted.
51
 While the opponents are guided by the 
„heuristics of fear‟ (Jonas 1985), the proponents insist on well-documented scientific 
facts, such as extensive agronomic efficacy and benefits, and biosecurity evaluation 
of Bt. brinjal (Kolady and Lesser 2006; Chaudhary and Gaur 2009; Rao 2009a and 
2009b). Since the biosafety data was evaluated by two expert committees, the 
proponents argue that the concern over risk and uncertainty is not based on objective 
science, but rather on social values. For proponents, this is an inadequate 
understanding of bio-technical science because instead of relying on scientific 
experts, the moratorium was imposed due to political expediency (Rao et al. 2011, p 
60) and therefore, it is an encroachment of politics into the „republic of science‟ – an 
idealised and self-governed community of scientists which, according to Polanyi, 
upholds and exercise the authority of science over the public (Polanyi 1962, p 60). 
Thus, proponents contend that politically corrupted opinions have no place in the 
realm of objective science because important scientific decisions, such as biosecurity 
and safety, should be left in the hand of science experts to decide and are not for 
public and political judgements. For example, P C Kesavan, (MSSRF, Chennai) has 
argued in favour of releasing the Bt. Brinjal after conducting necessary tests. Some 
others, such as H S Gupta (Indian Agricultural Research Institute, Delhi) and V S 
Chauhan (Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology, New Delhi) were of 
the opinion that the debate over scientific uncertainty and insufficiency in risk 
assessment are based on pure assumptions and not on scientific facts (Yadugiri 
2011). Echoing the view of scientists, agriculture minister Sharad Pawar moved on to 
argue that opposition to GM crops should not be based on unfounded apprehensions, 
and that government should give adequate and fair opportunity to scientific efforts to 
develop GM crops by allowing field trials.
52
 Similarly, the Scientific Advisory 
Committee to the Prime Minster (SAC-PM) lamented that there is a lack of science-
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There is nothing new in this debate, of course, since we are well aware that modern 
technologies always go through some sort of social assessment. What requires our 
attention, however, is that this bland conventional wisdom harbours deep and far-
reaching differences of meaning and vision (Wynne 2002). First of all, we can say 
that in this debate both proponents and opponents have explicitly or implicitly 
supplemented risk discourses with those of ethics (Levidow and Carr 1997). While 
proponents have argued that society is at risk of failing to realise the potential of 
nature‟s bounty, by delaying or impeding biotechnological solutions to feed the 
world; opponents have used the term „risk‟ to highlight the unwanted side-effects or 
potential harm that are unacceptable. In this account, for proponents, agro-
biotechnology becomes a utilitarian ideal – a moral or ethical imperative that not 
only reifies technological possibility and economic benefits, but also imposes a 
specific model of socio-natural order. Opponents, on the other, have deployed the 
language of risk to scrutinise the legitimacy of technological development – a form 
of moral responsibility or mode of ethical rationale that is concerned with 
environmental, economic and scientific uncertainties.
54
 We can also say that in this 
debate, risk is presented and defined as a scientific issue and in straightforwardly 
biophysical terms (Anderson 2001; Jasanoff 2000). Consequently, science-based risk 
assessment and precautionary approach become the normative criteria to deal with 
problems of uncertainty. Thus, while technocratic experts direct our attention to 
available scientific data to remove misunderstanding surrounding bio-technical 
inventions; the counter-experts point out uncertainties, inadequacies and ambiguities 
in tests conducted so far. From this point of view, the concern over risk voiced by 
concerned publics can be eliminated by further tests and field trials. In this dominant 
narrative, scientific tests are presented as the generator of certainty, when it is 
properly conducted (Collins 1987, p 709). Accordingly, the technocratic experts 
become the nation state‟s modernising agents, actively engaged in shaping and 
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supporting the state bureaucratic ideal (Nowotny 2000, p 10). A corollary of this is 
that experts as well as counter-experts stress the reliability of their scientific 
knowledge and believe that more information or intense scientific knowledge will 
provide route to better control of risks and help to settle the disagreements about 
uncertainty (Pinch 1981, p 132; Campbell 1985, p 429; Wynne 1992a, p 116; 
Levidow 1998).  
 
Nothing surprising in this. The point, however, is that scientific knoweldge has been 
institutionalised as a decision technology by jealously guarding the power of experts 
to define the public understanding of risk and warding off various manifestations of 
„pseudo-science‟ (Wynne 1988, p 148; Jasanoff 1987, p 196). One implication of this 
cognitive presumption of risk is that scientific experts define risk in a way that is 
traceable, measurable, and amenable to their own method of scientific investigation 
of defined uncertainties. This institutional exaggeration of the power of scientific 
knowledge to presume public perceptions of risk is imbued with, and shaped by, 
imaginations of publics as intellectually vacuous and threatening and thus, more 
wide-ranging, multivalent and rich human meanings, which constitute public 
concerns are dismissed as emotive fantasy and excluded from official institutional 
discourses of technology appraisal, as if they were solely instrumental simple-realist 
questions of controlling risk pragmatically defined by the prevailing science (Wynne 
2008, p 23; Wynne 2002, p 462). The reduction of the complex multidimensional 
understanding of risk by publics to scientifically defined risk and uncertainties, 
Wynne points out, is a serious mistake with far-reaching ramifications; and one 
perpetrated not only by scientific and policy institutional powers, but also by too 
many social scientists. He further adds that the issues of public understanding of 
science, and of public risk perceptions, are not so much about public capabilities in 
understanding technical information and therefore, are not predominantly concerns 
about being illegitimately disqualified and excluded from expert debate and 
decisions, on a propositional knowledge-question such as „what are the risks?‟. 
Neither are they a naïve demand for certainty, nor of ethics per se, as some ethical 
experts demonstrate. Rather, public concerns are more about the endemic 
predicament of institutional science, that is, whether the forms of innovation, 
development, exploitation and regulation are sufficiently trustworthy to defend the 
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public interest. In other words, the concern is about the hegemonic imposition of 
technoscientific knowledge, and scientific spokespersons or institutions, which 
define and dominate the policy agenda (Wynne 1992b; Wynne 2001; Wynne 2008). 
Indeed, it becomes explicit that in the Bt. brinjal controversy, the debate has 
overlooked more complex „social dimensions of uncertainty‟ and in so doing, 
systematically ruled out certain „less tangible social risks‟ (Jasanoff 2000, pp 278-
279), which are thought to be incompatible with the neutrality of science policy 
making. The debate, in other words, posed the issue of risk in reductive terms, as one 
of whether or not to release Bt. brinjal on the basis of science-based risk assessment, 
ignoring broader social issues, such as food security, appropriation and propertisation 
of bio-genetic resources, the dominance of multinational corporations, and post-
colonial power relations between developed and developing nations.     
 
Finally, if we are to take seriously the insistence of Michel Callon and others that 
socio-technical controversies mix together sciences, technologies, and societies 
without restraint, then the present controversy can be described as a „hybrid forum‟, 
in the sense that there are spokespersons of science representing things of nature, 
others lobbying for biotech industries, and still others representing the publics 
(Callon et al. 2001/2009; Latour 2011, p 4). The imposition of the moratorium, 
public consultation and mobilisation of public concerns are certainly a victory for 
concerned citizens over the promised salvation by benevolent scientific experts – a 
result of our collective experimentation and therefore, a step towards democratising 
expertise. However, it can be argued that in this trickling down model of science 
production, experts have assembled to take action through scientific knowledge but 
without adding much to it, except its final application and realisation – a modernist 
way of imagining rational decision (Latour 2011, p 12). This is mainly because the 
clash between these two opposing poles revolves, to put it in the words of Bruno 
Latour, around the „matters of fact‟ – between disputable (theories, opinions, 
interpretations, values) and indisputable (science, objectivity, risk) ingredients of 
modernity (Latour 2004a, p 244).
55
 The issue, as Latour remarks, is that whenever 
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there is a conflict between facts and moral and ethical values, facts as opposite to 
values are used surreptitiously to impose preferences that the user does not dare 
admit or discuss frankly (ibid., p 100). The danger in such a case is that decisions are 
taken too quickly, in too small a committee, with too few people; certain facts or 
values are renounced or denied their dues, and some voices are missing from the roll 
call (ibid., p 106). Thus, what we notice in this complicated choreography of risk 
science is that an obfuscating obsession with scientific certainty produced a singular 
narrative of science-based risk discourse that oscillates between the axis of risk, 
certainty, and objectivity resulting in an increased intermingling of science, politics 
and society, on the one hand, and a division between scepticism and progress, 
deviant and objective science, on the other.  
 
1.4: Factish Epistemology of Law and Science 
 
Much like the scientific and political community, academic commentators attentive 
to the normative uncertainties and politicisation of risk science, astonishingly 
projected science as the main actor and the stage upon which the transgenic brinjal 
controversy has unfolded (Shah 2011; Gupta 2011). While Shah and Gupta have 
questioned and critically assessed the epistemological basis of the consequentialist 
frame and role of science in anticipatory risk governance, which is at once 
compelling and illuminating, they failed to point out that the transgenic brinjal is not 
just a progeny of bio-technical science but rather, arises out of an assemblage of 
heterogeneous elements. Though their attempt to provide a better understanding of 
the politicisation of risk science is noteworthy, they have failed to come out of the 
usual narrative of scientific certainty – a familiar terrain of science-based risk 
discourses already explored by many scholars in the context of Bt. cotton 
controversy in India and elsewhere (Newell 2002 and 2003; Scoones 2002 and 
2003).
56
 Considering these existing scholarly interventions, there is no effort on their 
part to register a different account of the controversy in postcolonial India. They 
have argued rightly that we need to move beyond the familiar terrain of science-
                                                                                                                                                                            
and values, objectivity and subjectivity, neither marching towards modernity, nor has it produced a 
better society but many beautiful ruins (Latour 1998a). 
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based risk assessment to a „society‟ oriented causes and objectives. However, their 
effort to offer a different narrative of the controversy remains marginal. Quite 
simply, their society-oriented approach remains embedded within the narrow 
confines of risk and scientific certainty or, to borrow from Bruno Latour, within the 
„matters of fact‟ (Latour 2004b, p 227). The ambiguous term „fact‟ refers to 
something objective and out there waiting to be revealed (Latour and Woolgar, 
1979/1986, p 175). Facts, in other words, are constructed and fabricated to generate 
scientific certainty and thus, do not reveal what sort of agencies or entities are 
occupying the spaces of the controversy surrounding non-humans, such as Bt. brinjal 
(Latour 2004a, p 95; Latour 2005, p 110). At the most basic level, Shah and Gupta 
never directed their attention to the conditions – for instance, an unexpected 
gathering, mode of production and the manufacture attached to a bio-material object 
– that made the production of Bt. brinjal possible (Latour 2004a, p 231; Latour 
2004b, p 244). These commentators offer very little or, as Latour has argued, only 





Similarly, academic commentators attentive to legal issues involved in the 
controversy, mainly focused on the transparency and certainty in the regulatory 
governance of biotechnical science, i.e., the legal basis for the assessment of health 
and safety issues of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in general and Bt. 
brinjal in particular. After assessing the current legal basis of GEAC‟s controversial 
science-based risk assessment, some commentators argue that the MOEF‟s decision 
to place a moratorium on the commercialisation of Bt. brinjal creates a precedent that 
will increase uncertainty in the regulatory governance of agricultural biotechnology 
in India (Chowdhury and Srivastava 2010). Accordingly, they conclude, as 
agricultural biotechnology is an area of long-term research investment, it is important 
to create legal certainty and transparency in regulatory policymaking. By legal 
certainty, they mean predictability, applicability and coherence of the regulatory 
system (ibid.). The crucial point for these commentators is to achieve certainty, 
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predictability and coherence in the applicability of legal rules, and this can be 
achieved by creating an objective regulatory system for the overall growth of 
commercially viable and thriving agro-biotech industry devoid of any social and 
economic concerns.  
 
While this argument for certainty and predictability in the regulatory governance of 
agricultural biotechnology is attractive and may persuade policy-makers and 
legislators, it is inevitably driving or pushing us to adopt and revive a particular 
brand of juristic thinking that is essentially based on facts. Though not delineated 
explicitly, this view is symptomatic of the normative understanding of law as an 
efficient instrument to perfect the market, in the sense that the law should be 
construed and applied to remove the obstacles to market exchange.
58
 If we push a 
little further, the inspirational evocations of this legal thinking, however, come from 
one of the major, if not the major, conceptual or analytical apparatuses of modern 
law, i.e., legal positivism/formalism.
59
 Legal positivism stresses that it is the facticity 
that makes something law (Green 2003) or the truth of legal proposition consists of 
facts about legal rules (Dworkin 1978, p vii). For analytical-normativist, the law as a 
formal system is autonomous, rationally determinate and logically organised social 
institution, labelled by Luhmann as „self-referring‟ system because it finds 
justification in its general form and proceed to produce itself from social facts 
without paying any attention to other social institutions, such as the economy, 
politics, or morality (Luhmann 1988, p 160; also Teubner 1993). As an epistemically 
autonomous social institution, the legal system is a closed or „gapless system of rules 
of positive law‟ that should be applied mechanically to „concrete fact situation‟ 
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(Weber and Rheinstein 1954, p xliii) in order to achieve certainty, uniformity, 
determinacy and predictability of legal rules – a „mechanical jurisprudence‟ in the 
words of Roscoe Pound (Pound 1908).
60
 To put it differently, these „mechanical 
sociologists‟
61
 (Pound 1921, p 161) are committed to produce a constructivist social 
epistemology of law because they view „law as essentially a matter of social fact‟ 
(Green 2003). However, their overt emphasis on the stability, specificity and 
consistency of rules, on the one hand, and instinctive trend towards fact-finding to 
achieve legal certainty,
62
 on the other, produce „rule-fetishism‟ (Frank 1930) or, as 
Fuller puts it, an „utopia of legality‟ in which all rules are perfectly clear and 
consistent (Fuller 1969, p 41). They posit certainty as the sole end of law (Wade 
1940-41, pp 188-189; Pound 1921, p 84) and therefore, „assume that tightly specified 
rules increase legal certainty‟ (Braithwaite 2002, p 50). Certainty, we are told, comes 
from observing rules and this juristic thinking is „largely influenced by the 
positivistic conception of scientific method, according to which the latter consists 
exclusively in observing facts and extracting from them laws and uniformities‟ 
(Cohen 1931, p 357). Thus, it is not surprising that in the spirit of legal 
positivism/formalism, these commentators argue in favour of creating a predictable, 
coherent and uniform system of legal rules that will provide certainty in the 
application of law to the matters of fact – a juristic tendency that refuses to recognise 
the slightest creative capacity in jurisprudence resulting in virtual denial of social and 
economic reality (Bourdieu 1987, p 851).
63
 But if we accept the critical stance of 
socio-legal scholars toward legal certainty, then the appealing aspect of the argument 
presented by these commentators can be summarised in the following way: „formal 
law and legal certainty is part of the drama of regulatory governance‟ of agricultural 
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biotechnology, „the trivial or murderous drama of breaking eggs to make omelettes‟ 
(Kennedy 2001, p 8637).  
 
Implicit in the arguments on Bt. brinjal controversy highlighted above is the 
assumption that the regulatory state can manage the uncertainty in regulatory science 
and legal rules popularised in the narrow discourse of risk through its preoccupation 
with „science and law as mechanisms of ascertaining the facts of the matter as 
accurately as possible‟ (Jasanoff 2008, p 775). This striking proposition in scientific 
and legal discourses brings into view the epistemic authority of law and science, 
which transmutes factual normalcy into legal normalcy – an „ontological 
glorification‟ of facts promoted by juridical and scientific institutions (Bourdieu 
1987, p 846).  At issue, after all, is what I have pointed out above: since scientific 
certainty depends on the construction of facts, uncertainty in scientific discourse is 
inevitable because facts are constructed, created, and fabricated. Likewise, if we 
accept that law as a normative system of gapless rules is essentially a matter of social 
fact, and certainty in law comes from exclusively observing facts, then like scientific 
discourse, uncertainty in legal discourse is inherent because facts are made, 
produced, constructed, and fabricated. In what follows, facts become the 
cornerstones of juridical and scientific edifices and therefore, overt emphasis on 
them in the controversy produces „factish‟
64
 epistemology of law and science in 
isolation from intrusive social factors and concerns.  
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 October 2009, Jairam Ramesh (then Minister of Environment and Forests) 
took an unprecedented decision to conduct a series of public consultations with 
scientists, agricultural experts, farmers‟ organisations, consumer groups, NGOs and 
lay individuals in seven cities in India – Kolkata, Bhubaneshwar, Ahmedabad, 
Hyderabad, Bangalore, Nagpur, and Chandigarh (MoEF 2010b). In a letter addressed 
to Sharad Pawar (then Minister of Agriculture), he justified his decision to conduct 
public consultations by stating that, 
  
„in a democracy like ours, we have to take decisions that have far-reaching 
consequences with the greatest degree of caution, with the greatest degree of 
transparency and after ensuring that all stakeholders have been heard to their 
satisfaction. This is what I have sought to ensure ever since the GEAC 
recommendations reached me‟ (MoEF 2010a).  
 
He further stated, „my objective is to arrive at a careful, considered decision in the 
public and national interest. This decision will be made only after the consultation 
process is complete and all stakeholders are satisfied that they have been heard to 
their satisfaction‟ (MoEF 2010b). Minister Jairam Ramesh conducted the 
consultation process in the month of January and February 2010.
65
 It is important to 
point out that engaging the public in technology assessment is not new. It has been 
experimented extensively in Europe and in a limited extent in other developed 
countries (such as US, Japan, South Korea). However, in India the trend is more 
recent. This is not to say that the culture of protest or countervailing processes of 
grassroots activism for people‟s participation in governmental decision-making is 
new in India. Indeed, as Sheth points out, significant countervailing processes in the 
form of political and social movements at the grassroots have been active in different 
parts of India for over three decades, working on disparate issues, albeit all 
concerning the struggles of the economically marginalised and the socially excluded 
poorer populations. These micro-movements expanded the arena of politics beyond 
the representational institutions of elections and political parties and made the issues 
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of participatory democracy a part of their ongoing struggles (Sheth 2005, p 1). But 
the present political exercise to engage the public in decision making over a 
controversial biotechnological innovation is unprecedented in terms of political 
intent, national importance, resource mobilisation and participation.  
 
 
The first consultation was held on 13
th
 January 2010 and the last chapter of this 
consultation process took place on 6
th
 February 2010 in Bangalore. The consultation 
process offered a much needed platform to the public to express their concerns, 
insights and opinions. Nearly 6000 participants registered for the seven consultations 
and an estimated 2000 more attended or demonstrated outside the venues. More than 
9000 written submissions were presented to Minister Jairam Ramesh. He personally 
chaired more than 25 hours of heated consultations. Some of these concerns were not 
limited to Bt. brinjal but extended to the larger issues of genetically modified (GM) 
crops, dependency on multinational seed corporations, seed sovereignty, loss of 
biodiversity and associated knowledge and practices, and appropriation and 
ownership of bio-genetic resources (MoEF 2010c). Interestingly, in the Bangalore 
session, the ESG contented that Mahyco/Monsanto and their collaborator UAS-D 
have appropriated six local or traditional varieties of brinjal germplasm to produce 
the Bt. brinjal (by inserting the Bt. gene and backcrossing). The ESG pointed out that 
since these local brinjal varieties are „cultivars‟ and „folk varieties‟ in terms of 
Section 41 of the Biological Diversity Act 2002, prior approval of the NBA is 
necessary to obtain any biological resource occurring in India or knowledge 
associated thereto for the purposes of research or commercial utilisation.
66
 In the 
present case, no prior approval was obtained and therefore, any appropriation of 
these local varieties by way genetic manipulation or modification and commercial 
utilisation by the respective parties is illegal and amounted to an act of „biopiracy‟. 
The ESG further brought to attention a Gazette Notification issued on 26 October 
2009. The Notification excludes 190 plants (including brinjal plant) from protections 
prescribed by the Biological Diversity Act 2002 because in terms of Section 40 of 
the Act, these plants are „biological resources normally traded as commodities‟. This 
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exclusion from protection, the ESG has argued, is nothing but a gateway of plunder 






Further, in a letter to the Karnataka State Biodiversity Board (KBB), the ESG alleged 
that Bt. brinjal has been produced by a collaborative initiative between 
Mahyco/Monsanto, UAS-D and Sathguru Consultants without authorisation from the 
NBA, which is a blatant violation of Sections 7 and 18 of the Biological Diversity 
Act, 2002.
68
 Thus, according to ESG, this violation denies the local communities 
who have cultivated and protected these varieties from time immemorial from their 
due right to benefit from the commercial gains that would be made from the access 
and use of these biological resources. The ESG demanded a comprehensive enquiry 
to fix the responsibilities and liabilities, establish the nature and extent of 
unauthorised access, and initiate criminal proceedings against the violators according 
to the law. Taking this allegation into account, the KBB in its 13
th
 Board Meeting 
discussed the issue of unauthorised appropriation. The Board expressed the opinion 
that any Bt. crop which endangers local and traditional varieties raised by farmers 
and others for centuries will not be acceptable. Hence, the Board decided to refer the 
matter to the NBA for opinion because the issue of commercialisation and the 
involvement of foreign firm were of paramount concern.
69
 The NBA directed the 
KBB to gather detailed information from the alleged violators and submit it to 
NBA‟s fact finding committee for examination.
70
 Furthermore, responding to a 
request for clarification, the NBA clearly intimated to the KBB that if Mahyco has 
incorporated the Bt. gene into local brinjal varieties and transferred the resultant 
product to UAS-D, then the collaborators have violated section 3 of the Biological 
Diversity Act, which mandates prior approval of the NBA is necessary for obtaining 
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any biological resources occurring in India.
71
  After thoroughly investigating the 
issue,
72
 the KBB confirmed in a letter to the NBA that six local brinjal varieties are 
accessed by the collaborators without prior approval for the KBB or the NBA.
73
 
Thus, in its 18
th
 Board Meeting, the KKB observed that the decision to initiate legal 
proceedings against the violators remains with the NBA.
74
 Taking note of KBB‟s 
finding, the NBA decided to proceed legally against Mahyco/Monsanto and other 
collaborators, and informed ESG that its complaint is under „advanced stage of 
lodging‟.
75
 However, the ESG has challenged KBB‟s decision to not initiate criminal 
proceedings in a letter to the Chief Minister of Karnataka.
76
 The ESG alleged that 
KBB‟s decision goes against the statement of the Chief Minister of Karnataka in the 
media that Karnataka will not tolerate any violation of laws protecting biodiversity, 
farmers‟ rights, and biopiracy as they threaten seed sovereignty of the country. In 
addition, the ESG has filed a PIL suit at the High Court of Karnataka in 2012. 
Highlighting the shocking state of biodiversity conservation in India, the PIL urged 
the Court to direct attention to widespread biopiracy and violation of laws, such as 
the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 and the CBD, 1992.
77
 What is implicit in ESG‟s 
allegation of biopiracy is that the production of Bt. brinjal is not a simple affair of 
facts and certainty as it is depicted in the linear narrative of regulatory governance of 
risk. Rather, the production involves appropriation of local bio-genetic resources by 
heterogeneous entities situated in dispersed locations. Further, the allegation of 
biopiracy reveals how law mediates the relations between dispersed elements in the 
bioeconomy. This is clearly evident in ESG‟s invocation of the CBD and the 
Biological Diversity Act, which not only govern the access and utilisation of bio-
genetic resources, but also prescribe legal mechanisms through which unauthorised 
appropriation can be challenged and contested.  
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As emphasised in the Introduction, for Deleuze/Guattari, production is always an 
effect of machine. More importantly, production is always desiring-production 
because it is desire that connects, assembles, couples and creates chains. Although it 
is not yet apparent how desire moves through disparate elements and by doing so, 
establishes machinic conjunctions between them, the unfolding of the event reveals 
the co-existence and co-functioning of, and interaction between, heterogeneous 
entities. In this vein, I have provided a detailed description of Bt. brinjal and narrated 
the controversy surrounding its production. The science/society debate in the 
controversy revolves around science-based risk assessment and certainty in legal 
regulation. This concern with risk and uncertainty, I have argued, is based on facts 
and therefore, techno-scientific and legal discourses in the controversy produce a 
„factish epistemology‟ of law and science. To move beyond this factishm, I have 
dwelt upon ESG‟s allegation of biopiracy, which potently laid bare the unauthorised 
appropriation of bio-genetic resources. Although it remains implicit in ESG‟s 
allegation, the discourse of biopiracy provides an indication of how the desire to 
appropriate operates in the bioeconomy. This desire becomes more apparent in my 
discussion of the emerging bioeconomy in India. To be more specific, the narratives 
of the bioeconomy that we find in official discourses show how desire operates – the 
desire to appropriate bio-genetic resources, to produce „new biologicals‟, to 
transform them into intellectual properties, to change intellectual property legislation, 
and to transform India into a global player in the production of „biovalue‟. A clear 
manifestation of this desire can be found in the production of Bt. brinjal, specifically 
the „desire to produce‟ through which dispersed elements formed alliances and 
worked in symbiosis. And the „desire to protect and propertise‟ through legal norms 
that remain folded in Mahyco/Monsanto‟s property rights claim over the Bt. gene, 
Bt. protein, Bt. brinjal and its future progeny. Equally important is to emphasise 
ESG‟s desire to contest biopiracy. Two competing modalities remain folded in 
ESG‟s desire. On the one hand, the ESG has invoked CBD and Biological Diversity 
Act to govern access and utilisation. This provides an indication of how the desire to 
normalise appropriation operates through governance mechanisms. On the other, I 
look at ESG‟s desire to contest as a differential desire or counter-power, which 
brings into view how differentiated relations of power/desire operate in the 
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bioeconomy. However, instead of viewing ESG‟s contestation as becoming different, 
becoming resistant or becoming contentious, I would argue that what remains folded 
in this becoming is emergent subjectivities, that is, the desire to produce transformed 
subjects. An unfolding of the event thus reveals how desire co-functions and moves 
through disparate elements. In the bioeconomy, therefore, each element functions in 
conjunction with others and it is desire that establishes machinic conjunctions 
between them. Put otherwise, the elements of the bioeconomy relate to each other 
through the continuous movement of desire. The bioeconomy is thus a desiring-
machine. It has „multiple dimensions‟ which, however, demands a piece by piece 
construction – the dimensions need to be constructed by adding elements 
















CHAPTER 2  




„The essential thing, from the point of view of empiricism, is the noun multiplicity, 
which designates a set of lines or dimensions which are irreducible to one another.‟ 
Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet
78
 
„To attain the multiple, one must have a method that effectively constructs it, no 
typographical cleverness, no lexical agility, no blending or creation of words, no 
syntactical boldness, can substitute for it.‟ 
 







In chapter 1, I have provided a detailed account of the event – the Bt. brinjal 
controversy. My analysis of the event shows that heterogeneous elements co-exist, 
co-function, work in symbiosis and relate to one other in the controversy. These 
elements are the component parts of the bioeconomy, which operate in a connective 
fashion, through machinic conjunctions. So the controversy has „multiple 
dimensions‟. And these dimensions come into view once we look into how law 
mediates the movement of desire between dispersed elements and in doing so, 
spatialises materiality, normalisation, power and subjectivity. However, as the 
second quote above suggests, to attain the multiple, one must have a method because 
the multiple – Deleuze/Guattari refer to „multiplicity‟ – needs to be constructed. 
Simply stated, one needs a method to construct the multiple. This chapter, therefore, 
delineates the methodological approach through which this thesis constructs the 
dimensions of the „multiple‟. Since mediation, movement and spatialisation, which 
are fundamental in describing the dimensions, are occurring in a global/postcolonial 
context, section 2 discusses in detail how the multiple or multiplicity is understood 
and theorised in contemporary „law and globalisation‟ scholarship. I show that while 
law and globalisation scholars have adopted a variety of approaches (extension and 
diffusion, global/transnational/spatial legal pluralism, fragmentation, and general 
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jurisprudence) to understand and provide an account of the globalisation of law, 
global legal order, and global legal processes, the multiple or multiplicity has been 
theorised in terms of the plural and equated with the „many‟. Thus, by multiple, law 
and globalisation scholars understand plural or many legal orders, fields, levels, and 
spaces. By contrast, I emphasise and think about the „multiple‟ through the concept 
of „multiplicity‟. As a topological concept, the term „multiplicity‟ puts emphasis on 
constructing the „multiple‟ by adding elements successively through conjunctions. 
Section 3, therefore, details a Deleuze/Guattarian understanding of multiplicity, 
which puts emphasis on thinking, composition and mapping. Through this 
understanding, I demonstrate that to compose and describe a multiplicity, one needs 
to follow three interrelated steps: think rhizomatically, construct an assemblage, and 
draw a map. Following this discussion, section 4 outlines the method of analysis this 
study adopts, specifically a qualitative research approach. In this direction, I put 
emphasis on case study methods and discourse analysis, and discuss why these two 
methods are followed in this research.         
 
2.2: Approaching Globalisation and Law 
 
Some may argue that the term „globalisation‟ does not need introduction because 
scholars from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds have already elaborated on the 
term in extensive detail. There is no consensus among scholars, however. By 
globalisation, scholars refer to social, economic, cultural and spatial processes that 
are taking place not just within nations, but occurring on transnational or global 
level. Thus, for some, globalisation reveals various generative processes that have 
increased interdependencies (Featherstone 1990, p 6); or led to the intensification of 
world-wide social relations (Giddens 1990, p 64), transnational connections 
(Hannerz 1996, p 4), and global interconnections and flows (Tsing 2000). For others, 
globalisation signifies deterritorialisation, homogenisation and heterogenisation of 
production (Appadurai 1990 and 1996, p 188); fluidity, indeterminacy and 
hybridisation (Pieterse 1995); time-space compression or glocalisation (Robertson 
1995 and 2012); and privatisation, deregulation and de-nationalisation of 
transactions, policy and authority (Sassen 1998, 2000 and 2004). The term also 
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entails, as Kearney points out, the reconfiguration of relationships and sharp 
boundaries between centres and peripheries, giving rise to a multidimensional global 
space with unbounded, often discontinuous and interpenetrating sub-spaces (Kearney 
1995, p 549). Echoing this understanding, some scholars insist on spatialities, 
materialities and complexities of the global. For these scholars, globalisation is a 
complex material and spatial phenomenon. Hence, these scholars put emphasis on 
networks of activity, interaction, and exercise of power (Held 1995, p 20; Held et al. 
1999, p 16), multiple processes and overlapping orders (Sassen 2000), materially 
heterogeneous networks of elements (Law and Hetherington 2000), and topological 
and relational practices (Amin 2002) that have brought dramatic transformations in 
the spatial organisation of relations and transactions. The term „globalisation‟, 
therefore, means less about territorial boundaries and states, and more about 
interconnections, interactions, networks, movements and flow. The global comes to 
constitute its own domains, and many individuals and organisations that come 
together to enact the global appear to possess and demonstrate a global character 
(Law and Urry 2004). Thus, the global is usually assumed to be complex because of 
its high degree of interconnectedness (Law 2004), prompting some scholars to 
conceive of the global as an assemblage of multiple determinations (Collier and Ong 
2005, p 12) or, of territory, authority and rights (Sassen 2008). On the other hand, 
postcolonial studies scholars articulate globalisation as the extension of neoliberal 
market ideology over an increasing swath of nations. In this sense, globalisation, 
especially in its neoliberal form, signals at the very outset the legitimisation of 
economic and cultural domination in the name of development and progress – a 
continuation of the legacy of colonial expansion (Krishna 2009, pp 2-4). Postcolonial 
studies, from this point of view, interrogate the global through the local and provide 
a more nuanced view of globalisation that developed from its understanding of the 
complexities of imperial relationships (Ashcroft 2009, p 89).  
 
This brief discussion suggests that different scholars conceive of and conceptualise 
globalisation differently. This diversity and pluralism is equally evident in the legal 
literature on globalisation, in the sense that legal scholars have adopted diverse 
approaches to study the impact of globalisation on law. In legal studies, however, the 
central focus remains on global or transnational legal regulation and process. This 
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means that legal scholars recognise that law is heavily implicated in the process of 
globalisation (Flood 2002; Haliday and Osinsky 2006). This is clearly visible in the 
development of new legal forms and regimes (Snyder 2004) or, in the enhanced role 
for law, lawyers and legal institutions in transnational political and economic matters 
(Garth 2008). Noting this paradigm shift, one legal scholar argues, globalisation is 
not outside the law, but rather it is as much a product of the law as it influences the 
law (Michaels 2013). On this score, by globalisation of law, some scholars refer to a 
specialised set of legal phenomena set into the globe (Shapiro 1993); to transnational 
legal processes and law making (Merry 1992; Koh 1996), to the globalisation of 
regulation (Drahos and Braithwaite 2001) or to the globalisation of a specific legal 
langua (Kennedy 2006). For others, the globalisation of law signals the emergence of 
transnational legality and a transnational legal or normative space (de Sousa Santos 
1987; Aleinikoff 2008; Lhuilier 2013); the internationalisation of legal fields (Trubek 
et al. 1994); a global law without a state (Teubner 1997a); transnational governance 
or regulatory regimes (Zumbansen 2012), and even the emergence of transnational 
legal communities (Cotterrell 2008). These are interesting and provocative 
perspectives, which clearly demonstrate ambitious developments in our 
understanding of global legal processes. The sheer diversity of perspectives, 
however, makes a coherent analysis difficult. Nevertheless, I single out four different 
approaches to look more closely how the term „multiple‟ or „multiplicity‟ is used in 
contemporary law and globalisation scholarship. In particular, my discussion 
highlights that these scholars theorise „multiple‟ in terms of many or plural legal 
orders, scales, fields, levels and spaces.    
 
2.2.1: Extension and Diffusion 
 
According to some legal scholars, diffusion of law is an integral part of globalising 
processes (Shapiro 1993; Westbrook 2006; Twining 2006). For Shapiro, 
globalisation of law means extension and diffusion of certain legal rules and 
practices throughout the world, especially commercial and human rights law 
(Shapiro 1993, p 39). Thus, a single set of legal rules becomes globalised through the 
globalisation of markets and business practices of multi-national corporations. 
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Accordingly, by globalisation of law, one can refer to the extension of American 
commercial law practices and individual rights and their diffusion, reception or 
incorporation in transnational business practices, global human rights documents, 
and in legal practices of other jurisdictions. In this sense, globalisation of law is 
nothing other than a vertical integration of different markets and legal systems, 
which occurs through the expansion of international trade and movement of 
corporate capital (ibid., p 40). This understanding is reiterated by David Westbrook, 
though very differently. According to Westbrook, laws are influencing one another in 
many ways and thus, by diffusion of law, he evokes a spatial imagination in which 
law is somehow transported from one place to another (Westbrook 2006, p 492). For 
him, diffusion is a modernising process that brings change or transformation in law, 
which occurs through the expansion of legal norms and their adoption in a legal 
system. Hence, diffusion comes into view when a legal system changes according to 
the examples and models provided by other legal systems. A pivotal aspect of 
diffusion, as Westbrook observes, is a sense of core and periphery, of leading and 
developing nations (ibid., p 499). There are other perspectives that provide an 
account of diffusion by looking into how certain legal ideas are incorporated and 
integrated in national legal fields, mainly through the practices of lawyers and 
judges. For instance, by pointing out a shift in the application, production and 
interpretation of law in multiple national legal fields in several parts of the world, 
Trubek et al. argue that this shift or transformation has occurred through the practices 
of legal professionals (lawyers, judges, arbitrators, administrative officials, legal 
academics), who transmit, incorporate and integrate global legal knowledge in 
national legal practice (Trubek et al. 1994). In a somewhat different manner, Anne-
Marie Slaughter talks about „judicial globalisation‟, which emphasises judicial 
interaction, cooperation, cross-fertilisation and exchange of legal ideas between 
different judicial institutions across borders. These interactions, according to her, are 
shaped by the globalising forces of commerce, international treaties, face-to-face 
meetings among judges, and judicial training in many fledgling democracies – 
highlighting the vertical relations between national and international tribunals and 
horizontal relations across national borders (Slaughter 2000). Globalisation of law, 
therefore, is about diffusion – the outward movement of law, its expansion and 
crossing of levels – a process that often involves reciprocally interacting agents of 




2.2.2: Global/Transnational/Spatial Legal Pluralism 
 
Diffusion of law as a process, according to William Twining, is integrally linked to 
legal pluralism because both typically involve interaction between two or more 
normative orders (Twining 2006, pp 512-513). The term „legal pluralism‟ suggests 
the co-existence of two or more legal systems or orders in the same social field 
(Moore 1973; Griffith 1986; de Sousa Santos 1987; Merry 1988). An early 
understanding of legal pluralism was proposed by Leopold Pospisil. For Pospisil, 
every human society possesses as many legal systems as there are functioning 
subgroups. Accordingly, there is a multiplicity of legal systems within a given 
society that necessarily differ from each other in some respects, which Pospisil 
describes as different „legal levels‟ (Pospisil 1967, pp 3 and 9). John Griffiths, 
however, argues that legal pluralism is a descriptive concept rather than a normative 
system in which more than one rule is applicable to the same situation. As an 
attribute of a social field, it refers to the normative heterogeneity attendant upon the 
fact that in any social field more than one legal order is observable because social 
action always takes place in a context of multiple, overlapping semi-autonomous 
social fields (Griffiths 1986, p 38). In this direction, Sally Merry points out that 
plural normative orders are found in virtually all societies and therefore, research on 
legal pluralism places at the centre of investigation the relationship between the 
official legal system and other forms of ordering (Merry 1988, p 873; see also 
Griffiths 2002). An important aspect of legal pluralism, from this point of view, is 
that two or more legal orders coexist and are participating in the same social field. 
While this understanding of legal pluralism reveals the existence of different legal 
spaces within a legal system, de Sousa Santos argues that in addition to revealing 
their coexistence, one needs to analyse how these legal spaces interact and intersect 
with each other and in so doing, produce different legalities (de Sousa Santos 1987, p 
287). For de Sousa Santos, law operates not just on a single scale, but rather different 
legalities are operating simultaneously on different scales – local, national and 
transnational. And their interaction and intersection not only bring into view different 
regulation patterns, but also produce „interlegality‟ (ibid., p 288). Thus, according to 
de Sousa Santos, we live in a polycentric legal world in which multiple networks of 
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legal spaces are superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed, and legal pluralism is the 
key concept through which one can understand the intersection between different 
legalities (ibid., pp 297-298).  
 
The relative coupling of different legalities, together with the understanding that law 
operates on different scales, prompted de Sousa Santo to conceptualise the 
globalisation of the legal field as „postmodern plural legality‟. The debate on legal 
pluralism, de Sousa Santos points out, has broadened because law now operates on 
suprastate, global legal orders, which coexist in the world system with both state and 
infrastate legal orders (de Sousa Santos 2002, p 92). Thus, a number of updated or 
reconceptualised versions of legal pluralism are clearly visible in recent legal 
scholarship. For instance, keeping an eye on the globalised legal theatre, Francis 
Snyder asserts that globalisation is „governed by a totality of strategically 
determined, situationally specific, and often episodic conjunctions of a multiplicity 
of sites throughout the world…The totality of these sites represents a new global 
form of legal pluralism‟ (Snyder 1999, pp 334-335; Snyder 2004, p 625). While for 
Snyder, global legal pluralism involves a variety of institutions, norms, and dispute 
resolution processes located and produced at different structured sites around the 
world (Snyder 1999, p 342); Paul Schiff Berman, on the other hand, proposes a 
jurisprudential theory which he calls „cosmopolitan pluralism‟ – a conceptual 
framework for understanding a situation in which multiple legal and normative 
orders overlap, interact and conflict (Berman 2012, pp 10-11). The main concern of 
these strands of pluralist thinking is to provide a better understanding of multiple 
legal orders. Accordingly, the main preoccupation is with governing globalisation, 
making sense of networks of legal sites, and managing disputes or conflicts. 
Scholars, however, argue that as an analytical concept, global legal pluralism is 
limited in its application because it not only defines every type of legal order in 
relation to the state (Michaels 2013), but also propounds an instrumental version of 
pluralism devised to govern problematic interactions among different layers of legal 




This dissatisfaction prompted some scholars to look for a new term to provide an 
account of transnational legal relations originating outside the territorial jurisdiction 
of the nation-state. The term „transnational law‟, therefore, emerged to address legal 
norms that do not clearly fall within the traditional conception of national or 
international law (Shaffer 2012, p 232) – a theory of law beyond the state (Calliess 
2002; Michaels 2013). In this sense, transnational law is „global law without a state‟ 
(Teubner 1997a, p 3), which goes beyond „traditional thinking about inter-state 
relationships by pointing to the myriad forms of border-crossing relations among 
state and non-state actors‟ (Zumbansen 2006, p 738). However, since globalisation 
has already entered into the lexicon of legal scholars, the term has become a „proto-
concept‟ (Scott 2009) for describing the „status and role of law in an increasingly 
inchoate, globe-spanning web of regulatory regimes, actors, norms and processes‟ 
(Zumbansen 2011, p 3). In other words, the basic focus of transnational law remains 
on the change in the legal or regulatory landscape – regulation of transnational legal 
relations, transnational dimensions of regulatory problems, and transnational legal 
practices, systems, regimes, architecture, processes, orders and governance (Calliess 
2002; Zumbansen 2009, 2011 and 2012; Cotterrell 2008, 2009 and 2012; Shaffer 
2012). Thus, for some scholars, to adequately understand the „new pluralistic world 
of law, created by legal transnationalism‟ (Cotterrell 2009, p 485), one needs to 
devise a pluralistic conceptual framework that can deal with the plurality of legal 
regimes emerging in transnational arenas (Gunther 2008). Peer Zumbansen, 
therefore, advocates for „transnational legal pluralism‟ which, according to him, is a 
methodological approach to study evolving transnational regulatory governance 
(Zumbansen 2010). Transnational legal pluralism, as Zumbansen contends, focuses 
on „actors, norms and processes‟ as building blocks of transnational governance and 
regulation (Zumbansen 2009, 2012 and 2015). Thus, transnational legal pluralism is 
concerned mainly with illustrating the transnational nature of law, norms creation, 
and forms of legal ordering occurring in global regulatory spaces. In short, 
Zumbansen‟s proposed analytical framework seeks to capture the shift from state-
based, nationally defined regulation, to transnational processes of norm creation and 




While transnational legal pluralist idioms have shed much light on norms and actors 
engaged in the transnationalisation of law, a number of scholars have pointed out that 
these studies often conflate transnational or transnationalised law with the 
globalisation of law (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 2007); that they 
remain confined to the analyses of transnational law and regulatory governance; and 
that they fail to trace the significance of transnationalised legal forms through 
various socio-political and pluralist legal fields, such as nation state legal order, 
which itself is plural. Thus, they contend that transnationalised laws vary 
considerably in the geographical scope of validity and actual spatial extension. The 
globalisation of law, therefore, refers to the spatial expansion or spreading of 
transnationalised law, legal processes and governance; it indicates the mobility of 
law. This suggests, according to them, that one needs to pay attention to spatial 
coverage of transnational legal process; the chains of interdependent actors or 
networks through which laws spread transnationally; and the actual physical space in 
which such transnational legal forms, regulations, relations and interactions operate 
and occur. There is thus a plural set of legal conditions or multitude of social fields – 
global, sub-national, national and local, the understanding of which is incomplete 
without a spatial analysis of plural or multiple legal constellations. Hence, law and 
space occupy the central position in legal pluralism and their spatial distribution 
become visible in the map of transnationalised plural legal orders (Benda-Beckmann 
et al. 2005 and 2009; Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 2007). More recently, 
Anne Griffiths has reiterated this understanding in her review of legal pluralism, as 
she argues, under „current conditions of globalisation, law is highly mobile and cuts 
across local, regional and national boundaries, engendering more transnational forms 
of law and ordering‟ (Griffiths 2013, p 269). These fluid and shifting domains raise 
questions about how law is spatialised – an instance of legal pluralism that not only 
provides an understanding of how legal spaces are embedded in broader social and 
political disputes, but also highlights the multispatial contextualisation of law (ibid., 
pp 270 and 284). In this direction, Sally Merry observes, „if we add space to global 
legal pluralism, it produces an even more useful way to theorise this complex legal 
field‟ (Merry 2008, p 159). Therefore, a spatial version of legal pluralism, according 
to her, provides a way to conceptualise the state as embedded within a global regime 
of law; it emphasises how law is different in different kinds of spaces, and recognises 
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Closely linked to pluralist concepts is the idea of fragmentation. According to 
Gunther Teubner, transnational law of economic transactions (lex mercatoria) has 
developed far beyond the nation-state and this development can be seen in various 
sectors of world society that are developing a global law of their own (Teubner 
1997a and 1997b). He suggests that there are a number of inchoate forms of global 
law, such as global labour law and human rights law, none of which are created by 
states. There is thus a normative transformation – a transition from nationally 
organised legal order to a gradual emergence of global law – a legal order, which is 
highly fragmented and contradictory (ibid.; Teubner 1992 and 1998; Fischer-Lescano 
and Teubner 2004; see also Koskenniemi 2006, p 13). And this fragmentation brings 
into view collision and conflict not between distinct nations but between different 
rules, normative orders, and legal principles. However, this legal fragmentation 
depends upon more fundamental processes of fragmentation within a global society. 
Thus, there is no normative unity of global law, but rather a confusing variety of 
autonomous legal fields (Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 2004, pp 1002 and 1004). 
The emergence of global law, therefore, reveals decentralisation and dispersion of 
legislative sovereignty, multitude of fragmented legal orders, and contradictory 
multiplicity of law‟s identities. It exposes the impressive architecture of layers of 
rule-making authority that not only irritates law‟s binding arrangements, but also 
destructs law‟s sovereign bodies (Teubner 1997b and 1998). The immediate 
consequence is the emergence of global legal pluralism, which not only expresses 
deep contradictions between colliding sectors of a global society, but also redirects 
normative consistency towards operative „inter-legality‟ (Fischer-Lescano and 
Teubner 2004, pp 1004 and 1008).  
 




Interlegality – the interaction and intersection of different legalities (de Sousa Santos 
1987) or, interwovenness of fragmented legal orders (Teubner 1992), has equally 
become a central theme in William Twinings‟s understanding of law in global 
context. However, instead of proposing or reconceptualising a specific concept, 
Twining provides a broader analytical jurisprudential framework for analysing the 
implication of globalisation on law (Twining 2009a and 2009b). According to him, 
globalisation presents challenges to our understanding of law, which cannot be 
grasped through conventional conceptual framework and legal vocabulary. He points 
out that the picture of law in the world today is more complex because it involves 
developing, nascent and resurgent forms of legal orderings. The traditional focus of 
Anglo-American legal theory, that is, on municipal state law and public international 
law, therefore, is inadequate. What is required, then, for Twining, is a conceptual 
clarification, more particularly the construction of a conceptual framework and meta-
languages that can transcend legal cultures (Twining 1996, pp 7 and 9). This, in turn, 
prompts him to restate the nature and role of jurisprudence – the enterprise of 
understanding and theorising law. And this theorising involves a variety of tasks: 
surveying the legal field or some parts of it, constructing and clarifying conceptual 
frameworks, models, and ideal types, and constructing general concepts, principles, 
and taxonomies (ibid., pp 11-12). On this view, according to Twining, theorising is 
an activity directed to the posing, reposing, answering and arguing about general 
questions relating to law, which „takes place in and is influenced by the general 
characteristics of the legal milieu and its prevailing climate of opinion in a given 
time and place‟ (Twining 1974, p 150; 1996, p 13; 2009a, p 8). From this point of 
view, theorising performs a specific task – it keeps the discipline of law in a healthy 
state (ibid.). It is at this juncture, Twining argues, that we need to adopt a global 
perspective to adequately interpret and address legal issues arising in the context of 
globalisation. This means, for him, to revise and extend the cannon of juristic 
thought that is available in our heritage of legal texts and thinkers. What is needed, 
therefore, is a global jurisprudence, which can be found in the idea of „general 
jurisprudence‟ – a term he uses to refer to „discourse about two or more jurisdictions 
or legal orders from the micro-comparative to the universal‟ (Twining 2002, p 5).
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 The term „general jurisprudence‟ has also been used by other legal scholars, such as for Costas 
Douzinas and Adam Gearey, „critical jurisprudence‟ is a form of general jurisprudence, which adopts 
a much wider conception of legality and addresses all those issues that classical philosophy examined 
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The purpose of general jurisprudence, from this point of view, is to construct 
overviews of legal phenomena in the world as a whole – a global mapping of law 
that deals with all levels of legal ordering and their interrelations. In this respect, it 
seems clear that general jurisprudence has to come to terms with normative and legal 
pluralism because a global mapping of law includes not only municipal and 
international law, but also global, regional, transnational and local orderings (ibid.; 
Twining 1996, pp 38 and 40). 
 
To Twining, reviving the idea of general analytical jurisprudence is nothing but the 
development of a localised globalism in jurisprudence. Accordingly, Twining 
suggests that this development requires reinterpretation of texts within the existing 
juristic canons and the exploration of their geographical reach and cross-cultural fit. 
In other words, for him, a revived conception of general jurisprudence is not just 
about reviving the juristic thinking of traditional analytical jurisprudence, but is also 
about constructing key concepts from this thinking and expanding them to provide an 
account of transnational legal discourse. This is clearly visible in his elucidation of 
the term „general jurisprudence‟: as he notes, the term „general‟ in general 
jurisprudence means a theorising that significantly traverses legal traditions, cultures 
or even jurisdictions (Twining 2009b, p 32). Hence, Twining claims, general 
jurisprudence is universal, since it is the same in all places, at all times and embraces 
more than one perspective (Twining 2005, p 7). In short, as opposed to particular or 
local, general jurisprudence is a flexible term that has the capacity to encompass a 
variety of legal cultures, levels, processes, and jurisdictions, which should be 
examined through concepts, models or frames derived from analytical jurisprudence 
(Twining 2009a, p 18; Twining 2005, p 8). Put differently, in the emerging global 
legal order the contexts, levels and processes are many – international, transnational, 
regional, sub-national, supra-national, national and local. A global perspective on 
law, therefore, must be concerned with all levels of relations and legal ordering in the 
world as a whole (Twining 2009b, p 24; Twining 2009a, p 15). This prompts him to 
explore both legal concepts (such as duty, responsibility, person, rights, contract, 
used in the formulation of laws) and analytical concepts used in describing, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
under the titles of law and justice (Douzinas and Gearey 2005, p 10). Here, however, I limit my 
discussion to Twining‟s proposed framework.  
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analysing, explaining and evaluating legal institutions and phenomena (Twining 
2005, p 9). The crux of this exploration, however, is to find out how concepts travel 
far and well, and how this travel takes place across legal cultures, languages, 
jurisdictions, levels, and even fields of law (ibid.). This suggests that Twining is 
primarily concerned with developing a „vocabulary and conceptual apparatus for 
studying and generalising about law transnationally and cross-culturally‟ (Twining 
2009a, p 35). In this respect, he takes into account a number of concepts already 
elaborated by other legal scholars to construct a „framework that may be useful for 
giving general accounts of legal phenomena and analysing them from a global 
perspective‟ (ibid., p 64). Hence, he not only talks about „mapping law‟ which, 
according to him, provides an overview or total picture of law in the world as a 
whole, but also explores the idea of „diffusion‟, „interlegality‟ and „levels of law‟ 
(ibid., pp 67 and 69). The central point is that there are different levels of normative 
and legal ordering that co-exist, overlap, intersect, and interpenetrate, and therefore, 
the idea of normative legal pluralism is essential for understanding the migration and 
diffusion of laws, and the complexities of interlegality (Twining 2009a, pp 69-70; 
Twining 2002, pp 245-251).  
 
The discussion above shows how law and globalisation scholars use the term 
„multiplicity‟ and theorise the „multiple‟. While these scholars do not form a specific 
school of legal thought, my discussion suggests that there are notable points of 
convergences in their respective theorisation of the „multiple‟. Each scholar has 
attempted to develop a new understanding and provide new perspectives on 
global/transnational legal regulation and processes. More precisely, all suggest that 
in the emerging global legal order law operates at multiple levels, scales or through 
different layers. Put differently, the background of their analysis of global legal 
processes is the idea that globalisation has brought a paradigm shift in the operation 
of law. Thus, what we notice is that multiple (semi)autonomous, fragmented or plural 
legal orders, fields or spaces situated across different levels are operating and 
interacting with each other. This interaction, co-existence and intersection of 
multiple or plural legal orders, according to these scholars, bring into view diffusion, 
inter-legality, global, transnational and spatial legal pluralism. Howsoever interesting 
these insights are, a number of other narratives, according to postcolonial legal 
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studies scholars, are missing from these accounts. For instance, according to Susan 
Silbey, globalisation is a form of postmodern colonialism in which the distribution, 
consumption, production and interpenetration of Western cultural products into the 
peripheries of the world system are organised through legal devices to constitute a 
form of domination (Silbey 1997, p 219). Similarly, Eve Darian-Smith argues that 
analysts of law and globalisation often fail to address the extent to which Western 
legal concepts, categories, and discourses become dominant in a global world. And, 
as a result, the full implication of asymmetrical power relations between North and 
South, West and East, developed and developing nations remain somewhat 
unquestioned in legal literature on globalisation (Darian-Smith 2000, pp 817-818). 
Surely, this inattention calls for new approaches which, for Sundhya Pahuja, should 
not only explore norms and concepts, but also examine how certain regulatory 
practices reproduce old oppressions in new forms (Pahuja 2003, p 73). In a similar 
vein, while Adam Gearey focuses on „legal imperialism‟, that is, on how certain 
economic and power relations are privileged and preserved by international 
institutions (Gearey 2005, p 12); Eve Darian-Smith advocates for „radical legal 
pluralism‟ which not only explores the complexity of legal processes operating at 
multiple scales  (supranational, transnational, international, global and local), but 
also pays attention to interactions, contradictions and inequalities produced through 
such processes (Darian-Smith 2013a, pp 4-6). She therefore challenges the state-
centred understanding of law that underpins much of the contemporary law and 
society scholarship and suggests to focus on „laws, societies and contexts‟ to 
overcome ethnocentric biases in modern Western law (Darian-Smith 2013b, p 524). 
Thus, she argues for „new ways of thinking‟ to understand the relations between law 
and globalisation which, for her, entails a „global socio-legal perspective‟ (ibid., p 
526). While her approach might be more flexible and broader, there is little 
difference between her proposed framework of analysis and other scholars discussed 
above, in the sense that she intends to provide a global perspective on law by looking 
into spatial scales, multiple levels or fields, and relations of legal interactions (ibid., 
pp 525-526). Ultimately, however, what remains less explored and under theorised in 





2.3: Multiplicity  
 
The discussion above reveals that in contemporary literature on law and 
globalisation, legal scholars have focused on multiple, plural and heterogeneous legal 
levels, spaces, fields, and processes that overlap, interact, and intersect with each 
other. Thus, in law and globalisation scholarship, the understanding of the multiple 
becomes inseparable from the plural. Put differently, as opposed to one, the term 
multiple or multiplicity has been used to signify plural or many autonomous and 
semi-autonomous legal fields. In contrast, by multiple I refer to „multiplicity‟ – a 
term Deleuze used to articulate his philosophical thinking or image of thought, as he 
observes, „I see philosophy as a logic of multiplicities‟ (Deleuze 1990/1995, p 147). 
This is an empiricist logic, which starts with a completely different evaluation of the 
states of things because empiricism, as William James points out, explains the 
wholes by parts (James 1909, pp 7-8). However, this does not mean that there are 
several states of things, neither that each state of things is in itself multiple, but 
rather, that it is necessary to define things in the making, to see how things evolve 
and grow through conceptual decompositions (ibid., pp 263-264). Empiricism, 
therefore, is linked to a logic – the logic of multiplicities (Deleuze and Parnet 
1977/1987, pp vii-viii). The point, then, is how to think about the multiple, not in 
terms of an opposition between the one and the many (monism and pluralism), but 
rather through multiplicities, which implies a theory and practice of thinking about 
the organisational and differential relations that belong to the many (Deleuze 
1968/1994, pp 182-183; Deleuze 1973/2001, p 95). Thus, for Deleuze, „there is 
nothing that is one, there is nothing that is multiple, everything is multiplicities‟ 
(Deleuze 1973/2001, p 99).  
 
It becomes evident that Deleuze puts forward a very different understanding of 
multiplicity. The term was first introduced by Deleuze in Bergsonism (1966/1988) 
and later developed jointly with Guattari. In Bergsonism, Deleuze points out that a 
decomposition of the composite reveals two types of multiplicity. One is represented 
by space or by homogeneous time. It is a multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, 
of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative difference, and for him, it is a numerical 
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multiplicity, which can be divided into the one and the many. The other type is an 
internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organisation, of heterogeneity, of 
qualitative discrimination, which Deleuze terms qualitative or continuous 
multiplicity (Deleuze 1966/1988, p 38). Qualitative multiplicity has three properties: 
continuity, heterogeneity, and simplicity (ibid., p 43). The latter, according to 
Deleuze, belongs to the sphere of duration or whole, and contains a fairly large 
number of elements. The whole, however, is not an aggregate of many parts, but 
rather a zone or a space of continuity, „which designates a set of lines or dimensions 
which are irreducible to one another‟ (Deleuze and Parnet 1977/1987, p vii). In a 
multiplicity, therefore, what counts are not the elements, but a set of relations which 
are not separable from each other (ibid., p viii). Deleuze further explains that in 
continuous multiplicity there are two movements of actualisation: contraction and 
expansion (Deleuze 1966/1988, p 66). Movements are attributed to things and hence, 
in continuous multiplicity, we only find expansion because heterogeneous elements 
move through lines. In this sense, for Deleuze, multiplicity begins with a certain idea 
of movement and lines (ibid., p 79). Therefore, as against the predictive relation of 
the one and the many, a multiplicity is an affirmation that heterogeneous bits or parts 
constitute a unity and yet this unity does not unify the parts (Deleuze and Guattari 
1972/1983, p 42). Thus, rather than viewing „multiplicity‟ as an aggregate of 
numerous units, the term refers to the formation of a whole in which heterogeneous 
elements come together through lines and movement which, however, are irreducible 
to any sort of unity. As Deleuze/Guattari observe, 
„Let us return to the story of multiplicity, for the creation of this substantive marks a 
very important moment. It was created precisely in order to escape the abstract 
opposition between the multiple and the one, to escape dialectics, to succeed in 
conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to cease treating it as a numerical fragment 
of a lost Unity or Totality…and instead distinguish between different types of 
multiplicity‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 36; original emphasis).   
The crucial point here is that Deleuze/Guattari put emphasis not on quantitative but 
on qualitative multiplicity. What this means is that while a multiplicity contains 
heterogeneous elements, the issue at stake, however, is to identify and describe their 
dispersion, their movements, their relations, and their dimensions (ibid., p 37). This 
emphasis on movement, dispersion and dimension is important, for it suggests that 
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the notion of multiplicity that Deleuze/Guattari propose is spatial in character. This 
understanding is very much evident in Difference and Repetition. Though Deleuze 
used the term multiplicity in a Bergsonian sense, its use was deeply influenced by 
mathematician Bernhard Riemann. More precisely, he points out that every idea is a 
multiplicity or variety. In this Riemannian usage of the word „multiplicity‟, the 
utmost importance must be attached not to the combination of the many and the one, 
but rather to an organisation belonging to the many (Deleuze 1968/1994, p 182). 
Significantly, by referring to Riemann, Deleuze appeals to qualitative, continuous, 
non-numerical multiplicity which, in a Riemannian sense, can be understood as 
„manifolds‟ (Patton 1994, p xii). Therefore, the term multiplicity, as used by 
Deleuze/Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, pp 36 and 526), needs to be 
viewed as deeply topological or spatial because Riemann defined mathematical 
objects as continuous manifolds, whose elements, such as „points‟, may function 
mathematically as spaces. Hence, for Riemann, a continuous manifold is a 
conglomerate of local spaces or subspaces, which allows one to define any space as 
continuous by referring to the relationships between spaces, not necessarily 
subspaces but also other spaces, specifically through the notion of „neighbourhood‟. 
From this point of view, Riemann considers continuous manifolds as having infinite 
dimensions (for details, see Plotnitsky 2006 and 2009).  
 
Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari gave a philosophical inflection to this understanding, 
which is evident not just in their conception of philosophy, but also the way they 
conceptualised multiplicity. For instance, as discussed in the introduction, every 
concept is not only inseparable from its heterogeneous components, but also relates 
back to other concepts. It means that a concept has zones of neighbourhood, which 
define its „endoconsistency‟ (internal consistency between components) and 
„exoconsistency‟ (external consistency with other concepts) (Deleuze and Guattari 
1991/1994, pp 19-20). The components of a concept, therefore, are inseparable from 
each other. Hence, ordering these components, linking them to other concepts or 
relating one concept to another by zones of neighbourhood is nothing but the 
construction of a bridge on the same plane, as Deleuze/Guattari note, „we go from 
one concept to another by a kind of bridge‟ (ibid., p 19). Therefore, „zones and 
bridges are the joints of the concept‟ (ibid., p 20) and creation of these joints is an act 
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of thinking. Deleuze further explains that new concepts have to be brought in all the 
time to trace uncharted channels, new connections, and new pathways but this does 
not mean that concepts cannot be repeated. Quite the contrary, a concept‟s power 
comes from the way it is repeated, that is, from the way one concept links up with 
another concept (Deleuze 1990/1995, pp 147 and 149). This linkage is essential 
because the creation of bridge or joints, according to Deleuze/Guattari, is an act of 
thinking. Thus, „it‟s not a matter of bringing all sorts of things under one concept but 
rather of relating each concept to variables that explain its mutations‟ (ibid., p 31). 
As a consequence, Deleuze/Guattari point out, every concept has components and 
therefore has a combination. It is a multiplicity (Deleuze and Guattari 1991/1994, p 
15). This is a clear manifestation of their philosophical thinking, which is conceptual 
and at the same time, it is spatial, in the sense that they were committed to bring 
movements not just in concepts, but also in thinking.  
 
This spatial logic becomes clearer in their conceptualisation of multiplicity as 
continuous, non-metric and intensive which, according to them, must be defined by 
the number of lines and dimensions it has (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, pp 270 
and 275). Since variations and dimensions are essential characters of a multiplicity, 
the latter is composed of heterogeneous elements (ibid., p 270), but this composition 
is in no way homogeneous. It is rather a mixing, weaving and interlacing or 
patchwork – a piece by piece construction through successive additions of fixed and 
mobile elements that occurs in an open smooth space. However, „smooth‟ does not 
mean homogeneous; on the contrary, for Deleuze/Guattari, it is literally a 
Riemannian space in which an amorphous collection of juxtaposed pieces can be 
joined together in an infinite number of ways (ibid., p 526). A smooth space, from 
this point of view, possesses a greater power of deterritorialisation – a „movement by 
which “one” leaves the territory‟ (ibid., pp 530 and 559). But movement is a 
translation in space (Deleuze 1983/1986, p 8) and thus, each time there is a 
movement, there is qualitative variation and transformation which, according to 
Deleuze/Guattari, is a mode of spatialisation (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 
532). A multiplicity, therefore, is non-metric, qualitative and continuous when 
relations or links are established between elements located in heterogeneous spaces 
so that one becomes part of another. As Deleuze/Guattari observe,  
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„It follows that two neighboring observers in a Riemann space can locate the points in 
their immediate vicinity…. Each vicinity is therefore like a shred of Euclidian space, 
but the linkage between one vicinity and the next is not defined and can be effected in 
an infinite number of ways…. It is possible to define this multiplicity without any 
reference to a metrical system…. In short, if we follow Lautman‟s fine description, 
Riemannian space is pure patchwork. It has connections, or tactile relations. 
…Heterogeneous, in continuous variation, it is a smooth space, insofar as smooth 
space is amorphous and not homogeneous‟ (ibid., pp 535-536; original emphasis).       
The above observation suggests that the notion of multiplicity that Deleuze/Guattari 
propose is equally a conceptualisation of spatiality, which requires a very different 
operation in thought.
81
 Since a multiplicity, from a Deleuze/Guattarian point of view, 
implies a qualitative order, it requires one to focus on linkages, connections, 
encounters and series of movements through which the „many‟ or the „multiple‟ 
come together and acquires their own status, not as a unit, but rather as an 
assemblage/arrangement. This means that a multiplicity is not just a mere 
aggregation of heterogeneous units, levels, fields, processes, norms or actors because 
„it is not the elements or the sets which define the multiplicity‟ (Deleuze and Parnet 
1977/1987, p 34). Instead, the components of a multiplicity are connectives or 
coordinates that open up „new points of connection‟ (Rajchman 2000, p 56). These 
connections, in other words, open up new lines and tracks, the multiplication of 
which must be grasped and discerned by combining, recombining and knotting 
together heterogeneous elements. But to connect heterogeneous elements, to multiply 
their relationship, to discern such multiplication, one needs a conjunction and for 
Deleuze, this conjunction is „AND‟. As Deleuze points out, „multiplicity is never in 
the terms, however many, nor in all the terms together, the whole. Multiplicity is 
precisely in the “and”, which is different in nature from elementary components and 
collections of them‟ (Deleuze 1990/1995, p 44). From this point of view, „AND‟ 
becomes a logical connector and accordingly, it brings into view new connections, 
lines, directions, and flows. Since multiplicities remain folded or enveloped in an 
event, one needs to decompose or unfold the event to discern how „AND‟ constitutes 
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 This understanding has influenced a number of geographers to argue for a post-
structuralist/representational geography or spatiality, which views space as manifold, relational or 
multiplicity (see, for example, Doel 1999 and 2000). More precisely, as Doreen Massey observes, „the 
very concept of multiplicity entails spatiality‟ (Massey 2005, p 91).  
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the multiplicity because „AND brings in all relations, there are as many relations as 
ANDS‟ (ibid.).  
 
In the introduction, I have emphasised this understanding through the bioeconomy. I 
have argued that the emerging bioeconomy is a multiplicity, not just because it is a 
combination of heterogeneous elements, but rather it is an organisation or 
arrangement that belongs to the many. However, as pointed out above, what matters 
in a multiplicity is not only the co-existence and co-functioning of elements, but their 
dispersion, relations and linkages. Thus, in the bioeconomy heterogeneous elements 
situated in dispersed spaces relate to each other, but these relations need to be 
established through successive addition of elements because a multiplicity is a piece 
by piece construction. Hence, I have argued that the „many‟ or the „multiple‟ in the 
bioeconomy operate or function through conjunctions. However, since a multiplicity 
must be defined by dispersion, expansion, movement and dimensions, I construct, 
multiply and expand the dimension of the controversy by establishing conjunctions 
between the „many‟: desire AND production, AND propertisation, AND 
appropriation, AND normalisation, AND capture, AND power, AND contestation, 
AND subjectivity, AND becoming. The point here is that a multiplicity comes into 
view not just because the „many‟ co-exist and co-function in the bioeconomy or the 
Bt. brinjal controversy, but because of the conjunctions, which multiply, ramify and 
expand relations between the „many‟ in extensive series.  
 
The conjunctive synthesis, elaborated above, has implication for how we understand 
law‟s spatialisation, and how we theorise the operation of law in the global legal 
order. Certainly, disparate legal entities co-exist, co-function, interact, and work in 
symbiosis in the global legal order. And yet, this does not mean that we always need 
to describe the „global legal order‟ in terms of inter-national, trans-national, multiple, 
plural or fragmented legal orders. Because such theorisations only reveal law‟s 
inevitable transition, paradigmatic shift, situatedness, linear incremental progression, 
as well as the changing geopolitics of the production of law. Thus, instead of 
focusing on how law operates, regulates and governs at multiple legal orders, fields, 
levels, spaces or scales, we can look at how law operates through conjunctions. That 
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is, how law establishes conjunctions and produces functional synthesis between 
disparate elements, and by doing so, multiplies and expands legal relations. After all, 
law‟s spatialisation is not simply a matter of geographical reach, diffusion or scale of 
its operation, but rather how it establishes conjunctions between an array of elements 
situated in dispersed locations and to this effect, how it re/organises, re/configures, 
and re/stabilises the relations between the many. However, to carry this 
understanding forward, one needs to adopt a practice of thinking that brings 
movement in thought.        
 
2.3.1: Rhizomatic Thinking 
 
The construction of a multiplicity requires movement in thought because 
„multiplicities are rhizomatic‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 8). A rhizome, 
according to Deleuze/Guattari, „has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle 
(milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills‟. It is made of lines and 
constitutes linear multiplicities (ibid., p 23; original emphasis). In a rhizome, „there 
are only lines‟, and these lines of flight or deterritorialisation (ibid., pp 9-10) run 
through a multiplicity to connect and combine disparate entities to bring new effects. 
From this point of view, a rhizome assumes diverse forms, extends in all directions 
and ceaselessly establishes connections. In this sense, a multiplicity has neither 
subjects nor objects, but only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions. 
Significantly, for Deleuze/Guattari, rhizome implies a style of thinking that allows 
one to construct a multiplicity through conjunctions: „and…and…and…‟ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983, p 57). This suggests that the rhizome encourages one to move 
thinking in all directions to provide insights into how relationships between disparate 
entities grow, multiply and expand. In other words, rhizomatic thinking provides an 
account of the multiple, not by continuously adding a higher dimension, but by 
following the principles of connection, heterogeneity, assemblage/agencement, and 
cartography/mapping (ibid., pp 10-28).  
 
A key principle of rhizomatic thinking is to establish connections between disparate 
elements. Accordingly, it follows lines of flight or movements of deterritorialisation, 
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and in so doing, arranges the „many‟ in semiotic chains to form an „exclusive 
alliance‟ (ibid., pp 12 and 57). Drawing and reweaving disparate entities together, 
therefore, is an essential attribute of rhizomatic thinking which, however, does not 
totalise or unify them, but rather measures and maps out their dispersion and paths of 
becoming part of the infrastructure or desiring-machine. So, in this thesis, I arrange 
the components parts of the desiring-machine through conjunctions and thus, the 
only unity I pay attention to is that of co-functioning, of symbiosis, of alliances 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1977/1987, p 69). The rhizome, as Colman points out, „is a 
concept that maps a process of networked, relational and transversal thought‟ 
(Colman 2010, pp 232-233). Thus, instead of focusing on one particular element, I 
look for linkages and connections between disparate elements. At the same time, I 
link and combine one concept with another through conjunctions to multiply and 
expand the dimension of the controversy. And so, my thought is not fixed, rather it 
moves through conjunctions. For instance, in chapter 3, I link the concept of de/re-
territorialisation to the idea of materiality in Euro-American material and intellectual 
property law to provide an account of how an emergent space of property comes into 
existence in a distant location. Similarly, in chapter 4, I combine the concepts of 
„governmentality‟ and „normalisation‟ with „expansion‟ to demonstrate how 
appropriation becomes deterritorialised, normalised and spatialised. Likewise, 
chapter 5 brings the concept of power/desire in conversation with de/re-
territorialisation, although implicitly, to provide insights into how „differentiated 
relations of power/desire‟ operate in the bioeconomy. I expand this analysis through 
the concepts of „becoming‟ and „subjectivity‟, and thus, chapter 6 shows how 
emergent subjectivities are produced and shaped by co-existence and co-functioning 
of heterogeneous elements. What remains implicit in this composition is a rhizomatic 
writing which, as Colman observes, is not simply a process that assimilates things, 
but rather gives form to evolutionary environments where relations alter the course 
of how flows and collective desire develop (ibid., p 235). This observation is 
important, as it suggests that rhizome is a vocabulary that emphasises how 
heterogeneous bits and pieces connect and could evolve in creative mutations. 
Thinking rhizomatically, from this point of view, implies that one needs to adopt a 
style of composition in which thinking operates as a logical connector – it moves 
here and there, connects this and that to develop relational ideas and actualise these 
ideas in extensive series. Consequently, there is always movement in thought, which 
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indicates a continuous process of deterritorialisation and spatialisation. The 
composition, therefore, becomes a description that not only narrates this movement, 
but also articulates the spatialisation of thought.  
  
2.3.2: Assemblage   
 
Rhizomatic thinking adopts a style of composition in which elements are added 
successively to construct the multiple. But the point is that this continuous addition 
of elements multiplies, increases and expands the dimension of the multiple. And, for 
Deleuze/Guattari, „an assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a 
multiplicity that changes in nature as it expands its connections‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980/2004, p 9). This suggests that by moving here and there, linking this 
and that, rhizomatic thinking forms an „assemblage‟. As pointed out in the 
introduction, while the term „agencement/assemblage‟ appeared first in Guattari‟s 
writing, in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1975/1986) the term was used 
synonymously with „machine‟ and „rhizome‟. Since a machine is constituted by 
disparate elements, the constituent parts relate to each other. A machine, therefore, 
operates in a connective fashion, it is „an assemblage of symbiosis, defined by the 
co-functioning of heterogeneous parts‟ (Deleuze and Parnet 1977/1987, p 70). 
However, what establishes functional relations between these parts is desire. Deleuze 
has emphasised this understanding, often in great detail, in a number of occasions. 
For instance, in Dialogues, Deleuze and Parnet point out that desire assembles, 
connects, creates chains, mobilises forces, organises and develops forms, and 
produces intensities. Desire, in other words, constitutes a machine – an assemblage 
of heterogeneous elements. Every machine, therefore, is an assemblage of desire, not 
in the sense of mechanical functions, but rather grouping or assembling of disparate 
terms. In retrospect, every assemblage is a machine and thus, „we must describe the 
assemblage in which such a desire becomes possible, gets moving and declares itself‟ 
because „desire only exists when assembled or machined‟ (Deleuze and Parnet 
1977/1987, pp 78-79, 89, 92, and 96-97; original emphasis). Deleuze has elaborated 
this understanding further in „D as in Desire‟ in L’Abecedaire; as he explains, desire 
is constructivism – it is a process of constructing an assemblage, which is nothing 
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other than putting several factors into play (Deleuze 1988-1989/1996).
82
 Thus, I have 
argued that the emerging bioeconomy is a „desiring-machine‟, it is a multiplicity, but 
to understand how desire constitutes the machine, we need to construct an 
assemblage because desire only exists when assembled.   
 
 
Initially, the term assemblage was used to give a sense of the connections between a 
concept and the text or a state of affair and the statement that often come in 
unpredictable ways (Deleuze and Guattari 1975/1986, pp 81-88). However, 
elaborating the concept, Deleuze and Parnet point out that an assemblage is a 
multiplicity which is made up of many heterogeneous terms and which establishes 
relations between them. The assemblage‟s only unity is that of co-functioning: it is a 
symbiosis (Deleuze and Parnet 1977/1987, p 69). Thus, in A Thousand Plateaus, 
Deleuze/Guattari observe,  
 
„In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and 
territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and 
destratification. Comparative rates of flow on these lines produce phenomena of 
relative slowness and viscosity, or, on the contrary, of acceleration and rupture. All 
this, lines and measurable speeds, constitutes an assemblage. A book is an assemblage 
of this kind and as such is unattributable. It is a multiplicity – but we don‟t know yet 
what the multiple entails when it is no longer attributed, that is, after it has been 
elevated to the status of a substantive‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 4; original 
emphasis).  
 
The term „assemblage‟, as we find in the above passage, has four components or 
constituent elements: state of things, statements or enunciation, territories or spaces, 
and movements of de/re-territorialisation. Thus, Deleuze concludes that it is within 
these components that desire flows (Deleuze 1988-1989/1996). This suggests that an 
assemblage is a social-technical machine, which is spatial, in the sense that it is an 
arrangement or agencement of an array of elements. An assemblage, however, does 
not mean simple arrangement, organisation or random collection of things, but rather 
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 L’Abecedaire is an eight-hour series of interviews between Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet filmed 
by Pierre-Andre Boutang in 1988-1989. These were broadcasted on the Arte channel between 
November 1994 and spring 1995 with Deleuze‟s permission.  
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it is a process of arranging, organising, and fitting together (Wise 2005, p 77; 
Livesey 2010, p 18; Phillips 2006). By arranging complex constellations of things, 
statements, expressions, qualities, and spaces that come together, an assemblage 
creates new ways of functioning. As Deleuze/Guattari explain, „we will call an 
assemblage every constellation of singularities and traits deducted from the flow – 
selected, organised, stratified – in such a way as to converge (consistency) artificially 
and naturally; an assemblage, in this sense, is a veritable invention‟ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980/2004, p 448; original emphasis). And certainly, „it can be explained 
only if one takes apart to examine both the elements that make it up and the nature of 
its linkages‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 1975/1986, p 53). Accordingly, I have argued that 
the emerging bioeconomy is a deterritorialised machinic assemblage, but to 
understand how this assemblage is formed, one needs to arrange the component 
parts, describe how desire flows through them, and „follow‟ the lines of de/re-
territorialisation because lines of deterritorialisation, Deleuze/Guattari suggest, are 
the cutting edges that carry the assemblage away (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 
98). 
 
2.3.3: Deleuze/Guttarian Cartography 
 
Rhizomatic thinking is open-ended, it flows in all directions, connects an array of 
elements and in so doing, it produces a multiplicity, constructs an assemblage. From 
this perspective, a multiplicity has neither subject nor object, but there are only 
connections, chains, lines of flight or movements of deterritorialisation. Put 
differently, a multiplicity or an assemblage is constituted by lines, movements and 
spaces. However, to show how these lines, movements and spaces converge, one 
needs to make a map, a cartography of the assemblage because „unlike tracings, the 
rhizome refers to a map that must be produced or constructed‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983, p 48).  
In a most straight forward way, maps as spatio-cultural artefacts represent the earth‟s 
surface, in the sense that „maps are more or less permanent, more or less graphic 
artefacts supporting the descriptive function in human discourse linking territory to 
other things‟ (Wood and Krygier 2009, p 421). In this view, maps are generally 
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understood to have an ability to embody and affirm the existence of a bewildering 
variety of things. Thus, a map says, „this is here‟ and „that is there‟, and in so saying, 
it affirms the existence of things and their locations. In effect, then, a map is actually 
a system of propositions, an argument about existence (ibid., p 429). Hence, a map 
can be used as a tool that „helps us to navigate, plan, and control the world out there‟. 
It can be „employed to chart explorations, administer cities, foster trade, bound 
nations, regulate property transfer, locate people, places or events, and to link us to 
the world‟ (Perkins 2009, p 126). Maps, therefore, portray relevant information 
accurately that a map reader can analyse and interpret, and it is this science of 
mapmaking, from which the discipline of cartography emerged after the World War 
II (ibid.). The general understanding is that cartography as a practice largely consists 
of representing the surface of the earth and as an academic pursuit, it is concerned 
with theorising how best to represent spatial data (Kitchin and Dodge 2007, p 331). 
 
Deleuze/Guattari, however, used the word „map‟ in a diagrammatic sense because „a 
map fosters connections between fields‟ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/1987, p 13). A 
map or a diagram, according to Deleuze, is a set of various interacting lines. He 
further explains, that  
„There are of course many different kind of lines…Some weave through a space, 
others go in a certain direction. Some lines, no matter whether or not they‟re abstract, 
trace an outline, other don‟t.…We think lines are the basic components of things and 
events. So everything has its geography, its cartography, its diagram‟ (Deleuze 
1990/1995, p 33).  
And untangling these lines means, in each case, preparing a map, a cartography, a 
survey of unexplored lands (Deleuze 2001/2007, pp 338-339).
83
 From this 
standpoint, a map has multiple entryways, in the sense that lines and connections 
always come back to the same entry point. Thus, it is a method that tracing should 
always be put back on the map because tracing translates the map, it expresses what 
one journeys through and in doing so, organises and stabilises the multiplicity 
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 Implicitly or explicitly, this understanding has inspired a number of cartographers who view 
mapping as a process of constant de/re-territorialisation that unfolds, connects and relates disparate 
parts spatially distributed. See, for example, Corner 1999; Kitchin and Dodge 2007; Kitchin, Gleeson 
and Dodge 2013.    
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(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, pp 12-15; Deleuze 1993/1997, p 61). Since 
different sorts of lines constitute different configurations of space, rhizomatic 
thinking arranges the components of an assemblage along lines or movements of 
de/re-territorialisation. In this sense, Deleuze/Guattari invoke a cartography of an 
event or assemblage in which disparate elements relate to each other. 
Deleuze/Guattarian cartography, therefore, operates at two levels: on the one hand, it 
organises or arranges the component parts in terms of their co-existence, symbiosis 
and co-functioning. And on the other hand, it „posits a plane of experimentation, a 
mapping of extensive relations and intensive capacities that are mobile and dynamic‟ 
(Gatens 1996, p 169). In an assemblage, each part is in constant relation with other 
parts, and thus, these parts are inseparable from the relations they create which, in 
turn, increase their capacity to move, act, affect and being affected. A 
Deleuze/Guattarian cartography, from this point of view, maps relations and 
connections between the „many‟. To put it differently, the emerging bioeconomy is a 
multiplicity, a deterritorialised machinic assemblage. However, as pointed out above, 
the multiple needs to be created and rhizomatic thinking produces the multiple, 
constructs an assemblage by adding elements successively and through conjunctions, 
which are actualised in extensive series. This suggests that map-making is an 
essential element of rhizomatic thinking (Stivale 1984, p 22). Thus, whenever one 
traces the lines, movements, connections and interactions, a new map must be 
constructed, a map of the machine or assemblage (Guattari 1979/2011, pp 170-171). 
This thesis, therefore, maps and charts the conjunctions, spaces and pathways 
through which the components parts of the bioeconomy connect, move, interact and 
relate. In other words, this thesis produces a cartography, constructs a map, which 
brings into view the dimensions of the bioeconomy.     
 
2.4: Research Method 
 
In this thesis, I adopt a qualitative research method and practice. Qualitative inquiries 
are „designed to explore the human elements of a given topic, where specific 
methods are used to examine how individuals see and experience the world‟ (Given 
2008, p xxix). Given that qualitative research is followed in a range of social science 
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and humanities discipline, the methods available to the researcher are very broad. 
Thus, „there is no single, accepted way of carrying out qualitative research‟ (Ormston 
et al. 2014, p 2). The choice of methods depends upon a range of factors, such as 
beliefs about the nature of the social world, nature of knowledge and how it can be 
acquired, the purpose and goals of the research, the audience of the research, and the 
positions and environments of the researchers themselves (ibid.). There are, however, 
theoretical leanings and methodological preferences because a number of 
subdisciplines (cultural anthropology, symbolic interactionism, Marxism, 
ethnomethodology, feminism, cultural studies) have played an active role in the 
continued development of qualitative research (Lockyer 2008, p 706). This indicates 
that qualitative research is flexible, in the sense that there is no theory or paradigm 
that is distinctly its own (Denzin and Lincoln 2011, p 6). Rather than privileging a 
single methodological practice over another, qualitative research combines multiple 
theoretical paradigms, methods, empirical materials and perspectives in a single 
study, which add rigour, breath, complexity, richness and depth to the inquiry (ibid., 
p 5). Accordingly, in qualitative research projects, researchers draw on the 
approaches of phenomenology, hermeneutics, feminism, rhizomatics, 
deconstructionism, ethnographies, psychoanalysis, cultural studies, and so on, and 
use various methods to gather and analyse data, such as observation, interviews, 
focus groups, life histories and narratives, analysis of discourse, documents and texts, 
and survey research, among others (ibid., p 6). A qualitative approach, therefore, is 
creative and sensitive to the context in which the data is analysed, it is typically used 
to explore and add meaning to new phenomena (Given 2008, p xxix). However, 
methods are no more than ways of acquiring data, though they often come together 
with discussions about theory and methodology (della Porta and Keating 2008, p 28). 
Thus, faced with choices, the researcher needs to be clear as to what methods are to 
be used to accomplish what aspects of research and why (Chenail 2011, p 1714). In 
the next two sections, I discuss my chosen research methods, namely, case study and 
discourse analysis.  
2.4.1: Case Study 
 
As emphasised earlier, I look at the Bt. brinjal controversy as an event in which 
multiplicities remain folded. Therefore, the event – the Bt. brinjal controversy is an 
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exemplary case that can be approached through the case study method to understand 
how the bioeconomy operates as a desiring-machine. Case studies, according to 
Robert Stake, „are useful in the study of human affairs‟ (Stake 1978, p 5) because „a 
significant part of what we know about the social and political world comes from 
case studies‟ (Vennesson 2008, p 223). The role of case study as a rigorous 
qualitative method has already been recognised in a number of social science 
disciplines because it enables the researcher to investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon through detailed contextual analysis. As Bromley points out, a case 
study is a „systematic inquiry into an event or a set of relevant events which aims to 
describe and explain the phenomenon of interest‟ (Bromley 1990, p 302). A case 
study, from this point of view, is an empirical inquiry in which one or a few 
instances of a contemporary phenomenon are studied in depth (Blatter 2008, p 68) 
and as a method, it is particularly useful „when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident‟ (Yin 2009, p 18).        
 
„Case studies are performed for various purposes‟ (Fidel 1984, p 273). While some 
researchers use case study as a specific method for field research; for others, it is a 
„qualitative inquiry‟ (Stake 2005, p 443), which allows the researcher to explore a 
phenomenon using a variety of data sources (Baxter and Jack 2008, p 544). Hence, 
there is no consensus on the characteristics of case studies because they are diverse 
in their objectives, characteristics and results (Blatter 2008, p 68; Vennesson 2008, p 
225). However, as a qualitative method, it is an in-depth strategy that enables the 
investigator to closely examine and understand complex issues within a specific 
context. Thus, in some case studies, a single case is investigated in-depth through 
direct observation, interviews, or available documents to provide comprehensive 
understanding and theoretical implications. In others, multiple cases are studied and 
analysed over a period of time to generate concrete findings, hypotheses and 
problems. In this respect, the selection of a case is important because for a sustained 
investigation the case must be unique and interesting. The term „case‟ has multiple 
overlapping meanings and can be approached from a variety of viewpoints (Ragin 
1992). Robert Yin points out that a „case‟ is generally a bounded entity (a person, 
organisation, behavioural condition, event, or another social phenomenon). 
Correspondingly, a case serves as the main unit of analysis, the boundary of which, 
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in contextual, spatial and temporal dimensions, may be blurred (Yin 2012, p 6). A 
case, therefore, must be significant, unique, interesting, or a revelatory event, which 
can be explored and investigated through compelling theoretical framework (ibid., p 
7).     
 
The use of case study method depends on the research questions that a research is 
trying to address. It becomes pertinent when a research addresses either descriptive 
questions, such as „what is happening or has happened?‟, or explanatory questions, 
such as „how or why did something happen?‟ (ibid., p 5). A case study, therefore, 
investigates conceptually and empirically the „why‟, „what‟, and „how‟ questions to 
bring out and elucidate the nature of the event and its consequences. This suggests, 
as Vennesson observes, that a case is not just a unit of analysis or an observation, 
understood as a piece of data, but rather, a theoretical category. In the sense that a 
case does not have to be contemporary, it can be a past event, which is not spatially 
delimited, but its delimitation can be achieved through theoretical conceptualisations 
or choices made by the researcher (Vennesson 2008, pp 226-227). Viewing in this 
way, it can be said that a case study can be used to provide a context for the 
evaluation of other data, offering insights into broader configurations in which an 
event is implicated, and developing theoretical explanations. However, this depends 
on the nature of case study which, following Robert Stake, can be divided into three 
categories: intrinsic, instrumental and multiple or collective case study. According to 
Stake, an „intrinsic case study‟ is one in which the researcher undertakes to study a 
particular case, not because the case illustrates a particular problem or trait, but 
because the case itself is of interest. „Instrumental case study‟, on the other hand, 
examines a case mainly to provide insight into an issue. Though the case still is 
looked at in-depth, it is of secondary interest. Its contexts are scrutinised and detailed 
because it plays a supportive role, and it facilitates our understanding of something 
else. He further emphasises the „multiple case study‟ which, according to him, 
focuses on a number of cases jointly in order to investigate a phenomenon, 




As pointed out above, in this research I look into the Bt. brinjal controversy as an 
event or a case, both in theoretical and empirical sense, because it is unique, 
interesting and revelatory. It is unique, significant and interesting because it tells a 
story of what has happened and how it happened, which I have elaborated in chapter 
1. It is also revelatory because it shows how heterogeneous elements co-exist, co-
function, connect, interact and relate to each other in the bioeconomy. Thus, the next 
four chapters describe what is happening and how it is happening. Put differently, the 
case brings into view how desire connects and operates through disparate entities, it 
reveals the multiplicities, which remain folded in an event. In short, it highlights how 
the bioeconomy functions as a desiring-machine. The Bt. brinjal controversy as an 
event or a case, therefore, is spatially delimited. Its delimitation, however, is 
emphasised through theoretical and methodological conceptualisations. 
Consequently, it provides theoretical and empirical explanations of the functioning of 
the bioeconomy in a global/postcolonial context. By looking into the Bt. brinjal 
controversy in this way, this research has followed a combined case study method, in 
the sense that it is intrinsic as well as instrumental because the case itself is 
interesting and at the same time, the context of the case plays a supportive role, it 
facilitates our understanding and provides insight of what is happening and how it is 
happening. 
 
A good case study, as Yin suggests, benefits from multiple sources of evidence, such 
as direct observation, interviews, documents, participant-observation (Yin 2012, p 
10). In this research, however, I only analyse documents because of two reasons. 
First of all, the case study is about a past event the details of which are only available 
in textual and virtual forms, such as newspapers, official agreement documents, 
official and unofficial reports, and web sites. Second, a case study is a qualitative 
method of investigation and therefore, „a considerable proportion of all data is 
impressionistic, picked up informally as the researcher first becomes acquainted with 
the case‟ (Stake 1995, p 49). Hence, a researcher has the privilege to pay attention to 
what s/he considers worthy of attention. This suggests that data collection and its 
triangulation are guided by the research questions (ibid., pp 49-50). Since this 
research investigates how desire connects and operates through disparate elements 
and, as pointed out in the introduction, this desire is to be found in discourses, 
103 
 
analysis of texts or documents becomes relevant, which I carry out by following a 
specific research method, i.e., discourse analysis.   
 
2.4.2: Discourse Analysis  
 
In a Foucaultian fashion, Deleuze/Guattari observe that desire is to be found in 
„statements‟ or „indirect discourses‟.
84
 Analysing discourse is thus essential for 
understanding how desire operates in the bioeconomy. In contemporary social 
science, the concept of discourse plays an increasingly significant role (Howarth 
2000, p 1). But what is discourse? In the social sciences, discourses, in general terms, 
are understood as things that make up the social world, including our very identities 
because our experience is largely shaped by a multitude of conflicting discourses of 
which we are a part (Phillips and Hardy 2002, p 2). In its simplest form, by 
discourse, social scientists refer to the data that comes from talk, conversation, 
communications and discursive events. By indirect discourse, however, 
Deleuze/Guattari refer to acts, voices, judgements, affirmations, narratives and 
expressions and this understanding is close to Foucault‟s because for Foucault, 
discourses are voices, words or enunciations, which can be found in language use, 
pronounced or written (Foucault 1970/1981). Thus, discourse, in the most general 
sense, is language as it is used in society expressed either through conversations or in 
documents (Cook 2008, p 216). The study of discourse, therefore, is the study of 
language in use because „social reality is produced and made real through discourses‟ 
(Philips and Hardy 2002, p 3). In other words, discourse analysis takes discourses 
into account to understand social interactions. Since discourses evolve over time, 
discourse analysis places emphasis on processes through which such discourses are 
produced, maintained, disseminated, shared and accepted in society. Discourse 
analysis, in this sense, „refers to the process of analysing signifying practices as 
discursive forms‟ (Howarth 2000, p 10). Discourse analysts treat a wide range of 
linguistic and non-linguistic materials – speeches, reports, events, policy statements, 
recorded conversations, video recordings, ideas, organisations, institutional practices, 
diaries, archival records, judicial pronouncements, legislations as „texts‟ or 
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 As Foucault writes, „Desire says: I should not like to have to enter this risky order of discourse…‟ 
(Foucault 1970/1981, p 51).  
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„writings‟. This suggests that discourses are gleaned from texts or written documents, 
and these texts vary from context to context depending on the purpose and nature of 
research.   
 
Given that discursive activity does not occur in a vacuum, but rather emanates out of 
social interactions, discourse analysis looks for meaning in objects, words and 
practices, and in doing so, analyse texts within a specific context. Discourse analysis, 
from this point of view, differs significantly from conventional analysis of 
interviews, conversations, or documents. While linguistic data such as interviews are 
widely used in qualitative research, there is a belief that the social content of such 
data can be read off without attention to the language itself (Fairclough 1992, p 2). 
Similarly, it can be distinguished from strict conversation analysis because the 
primary focus of discourse analysis is on meaning, and not on grammar, sentence 
structure, or word choice (Cook 2008, p 216). Further, while discourse analysis is 
concerned with text, this concern is directed towards understanding the connection 
between discourse and social reality, to discover social meaning in a particular 
context because „discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities or relations, 
they construct or constitute them‟ (Fairclough 1992, p 3). In this sense, discourse 
analysis also differs from documentary analysis – a well-known technique of data 
gathering that follows the same line of thinking as observing or interviewing (Stake 
1995, p 68).  
 
Since discourse analysis treats events as texts, this research looks into the Bt. brinjal 
controversy not just as a „case‟, but also as a „text‟ because it has a highly textual 
character, in the sense that a multiplicity of discourses remains folded in the event. 
More importantly, what remains enveloped in these discourses is desire, which 
connects and brings heterogeneous elements together to constitute a machine or an 
assemblage. This research, therefore, analyses various texts (patent documents, 
reports and policies, legal agreements, official/unofficial communications, judicial 
pronouncements, legislative texts, political and scientific statements, claims, and 
assertions) to show how desire operates or functions in the bioeconomy through 
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numerous discourses, specifically in productive, appropriative and propertising 
practices, power relations, and subjection.   
 
2.5: Conclusion   
 
In this chapter, my main concern was with the methodological framework, 
specifically with adopting a methodological approach that supports and enriches the 
objective of this research, that is, to describe how the emerging bioeconomy operates 
or functions as a desiring-machine in a global/postcolonial context. In this direction, 
first, I have discussed in detail the understanding and theorisation of the multiple in 
law and globalisation literature. My analysis shows that law and globalisation 
scholars have theorised the multiple in numerical or quantitative terms and in doing 
so, created a dichotomy between the one and the many. In contrast, my theorisation 
of the multiple follows Deleuze/Guattarian approach, which defines the multiple in 
qualitative terms, that is, to think about the multiple in terms of a multiplicity. The 
understanding of multiplicity that Deleuze/Guattari propose requires a very different 
operation in thought and style of composition because one needs to construct and 
describe the multiple by adding elements successively through conjunctions. In other 
words, the construction or composition of a multiplicity is a practice of thinking that 
is rhizomatic. In a sense, thinking moves in all directions to constitute an assemblage 
and draws a map of the multiple by following lines, movements and connections. By 
doing so, it puts emphasis not on quantitative, but on qualitative dimensions of a 
multiplicity. That is, continuity, consistency, expansion and spatialisation that need 
to be actualised in extensive series, and this will become apparent in the next four 
chapters. In addition, this chapter has outlined the method of analysis that this 
research follows. It has already become clear that this thesis constructs a multiplicity 
from an event – the Bt. brinjal controversy – to describe how desire establishes 
machinic conjunctions between an array of elements. Since this desire is to be found 
in heterogeneous discourses, „case study‟ and „discourse analysis‟ become suitable 

























Tracing Connections: Materiality, Movements, and Emergent 


























In 2007, Mahyco filed a patent application (international application or PCT 
application) for Bt. brinjal and its future progeny at the Receiving Office of the 
WIPO in Geneva.
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 In the application, Mahyco claimed that it has invented a new 
life form and therefore, it has intellectual property rights over Bt. brinjal as well as its 
seeds and future progeny. This property rights claim over Bt. brinjal brings into view 
Mahyco‟s desire to produce and propertise new life forms in a distant location. 
Before 2005, in India there were no intellectual property rights over life forms 
produced through bio-technical processes. Thus, a number of changes were made in 
2002 and 2005 in India‟s intellectual property legislation to bring new life forms 
within the purview of patentable inventions. Interestingly, these changes were made 
after 2002, the year Mahyco started the production of Bt. brinjal, which involves 
Monsanto‟s Bt. gene – a proprietary living organism. In this sense, Mahyco‟s desire 
to produce a genetically modified life form and protect it through intellectual 
property rights brought into existence an „emergent‟ space of property in India. I use 
the term „emergent‟ to signify the non-existence of property rights over new life 
forms because, according to Donna Haraway, emergents are categories that did not 
exist before (Haraway 2003, p 298).  
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 Delueze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 23. 
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 Kierkegaard 1843/2006, p 31.   
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 The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) concluded in 1970 provides a single window procedure for 
filling patent application at the Receiving Office of the WIPO in Geneva to protect inventions in each 
of the contracting states of the PCT. At present, 148 contracting states are bound by the PCT and India 
became a party on 7 December, 1998.    
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This chapter, therefore, „traces‟
88
 how an emergent space of property comes into 
existence in a distant location – an exercise in „rhizomatic thinking‟ that focusses on 
„movements in process‟ (continuity, consistency and dispersion) to understand 
emergence. In this respect, the chapter deploys the concept of „deterritorialisation‟ – 
a term that Deleuze/Guattari used to signify movements by which one (thought, 
desire, idea etc.) leaves the territory (Deleuze/Guattari 1980/2004, p 559). Since 
movement is always from one territory to another, deterritorialisation not only means 
initial territorialisation, but also reterritorialisation. To be more precise, de/re-
territorialisation occur simultaneously because there are two-fold movements 
through which desire establishes machinic conjunctions between disparate elements. 
I argue that these two-fold movements brought into existence an emergent space of 
property. Put otherwise, Mahyco/Monsanto‟s desire to produce and propertise was 
mediated by disparate elements. And so, the movements of de/re-territorialisation 
occur in a „smooth space‟ in which heterogeneous entities situated in dispersed 
locations connect, combine, form alliances and work in symbiosis.  
 
 
To emphasise briefly, without the movement of Monsanto‟s proprietary Bt. gene 
from the US to Mahyco‟s laboratory in India, the production of Bt. brinjal would 
have been a distant reality. This observation not only suggests the territorialisation of 
the idea of „materiality‟
89
 in Euro-American material and intellectual property law, 
but also its deterritorialisation through the movement of patented bio-technical 
artefact. Similarly, without reterritorialisation of the idea of materiality in India‟s 
patent law, Mahyco‟s proprietary claim over Bt. brinjal and its future progeny would 
have never moved or reached the WIPO. Further, this de/re-territorialisation would 
not have been possible without the TRIPs Agreement that not only brought the Euro-
American idea of materiality within the global intellectual property regime, but also 
moved the idea to distant locations through the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Likewise, reterritorialisation would not have been possible without the changes in 
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 A few words regarding the tern „tracing‟. Indeed, Deleuze/Guattari made a distinction between 
„tracing‟ and „mapping‟, as Anne Bottomley and Nathan Moore point out (Bottomley and Moore 
2012), but they also insist that „tracing‟ should be put back on the map because it not only charts what 
one journeys through, but also organises the multiplicity. I have emphasised this point in chapter 2.   
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 By „materiality‟ I refer to practices, in the sense that materiality is an analytic that explains the 
practices through which subjects and objects proliferate, be they social, technical, biological or legal. 
For an extensive analysis of different approaches to materiality, see Miller 2005; Trentman 2009. In 
relation to law, see Pottage 2006a and 2012; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2014. 
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India‟s intellectual property legislation. So there are heterogeneous elements 
(Monsanto, Bt. gene, Mahyco, Bt. brinjal, patent law, WTO-TRIPs Agreement) that 
mediated the movements of de/re-territorialisation.  
 
 
In the next section, I discuss the territorialisation of the idea of materiality in Euro-
American property law. Then, I trace its movement or deterritorialisation through 
Euro-American intellectual property law and the global intellectual property regime, 
such as the TRIPs Agreement. From there, I move on to show how its 
reterritorialisation has been achieved, first, by focusing on the changes made in 
India‟s patent law, and then, by throwing light on Mahyco/Monsanto‟s property 
rights claim over Bt. brinjal and its future progeny. In so doing, I emphasise how this 
reterritorialisation is mediated by heterogeneous entities. I conclude the chapter by 
arguing that the movements of de/reterritorialisation should not be equated with 
„extension and incorporation‟ because while the latter pay attention only to 
unidirectional movement; the former signify „movements in process‟, mediated by 
interactions, that bring qualitative transformations. In other words, an emergent space 
of property comes into existence through movements, which is mediated by the co-
functioning of an array of elements located in dispersed spaces.     
 
2.2 Objects, Rights, and Relations 
 
In this section, I discuss the initial territorialisation of the idea of materiality in Euro-
American property law and practice. In 
Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™, Donna 
Haraway observes that 
 
„Property is the kind of rationality that poses as the-thing-in-itself, the commodity, the 
thing that can be exhaustively measured, mapped, owned, appropriated, disposed. 
Something of an unreconstructed and dogged Marxist, I remain very interested in how 
social relationships get congealed into and taken for decontextualized things‟ 




The description of „property‟ that Haraway provides in the above passage might 
sound unconvincing to many normative property theorists. This is because the 
argument that property is a kind of rationality that can be employed to measure, map, 
own, appropriate, and dispose an object not only disturbs the modern rationality of 
liberal philosophical and political traditions, but also disrupts the orthodox views 
held in legal theories and doctrines about persons and things. In contemporary Euro-
American jurisprudence, property theorists start from the premise of Roman law that 
there is a distinction between persons (personae) and things (res).
90
 As Pottage 
points out, „in law, the res was first and foremost a discursive artefact, a “name” that 
was shaped by arguments that abstracted the observable, material, qualities of a thing 
into legal qualities…‟ (Pottage 2011, p 635).  For instance, Pollock argues that „a 
thing is, in law, some possible matter of rights and duties conceived as a whole and 
apart from all others, just as, in the world of common experience, whatever can be 
separately perceived as a thing‟. He further explains, „a thing which belongs to 
nobody is of no legal importance until something happens to bring a person into 
relation with it, and make it the subject-matter of enforceable rights‟ (Pollock 1894, 
pp 318 and 320). A thing, in this view, is inseparable from the legal conception of 
property that confers on legal subjects the right to control their proprietary objects 
(Delaney 2001, p 489). The division between subject and object is thus a 
foundational aspect of the Western understanding of property because the ontological 
separation between the two has long been achieved in the Western philosophical 
tradition. Taking this division as natural and therefore legitimate, normative property 
theory clothes legal subjects with all rights and duties, and treats things as mere 
objects that should move and function within the boundaries of Hohfeldian „jural 
opposites and correlatives‟ (Hohfeld 1913 and 1917).
91
 The ontological character of 
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 Property rights over tangible objects received enormous attention in philosophical, political-
economic, and socio-legal writing. While some have critiqued the right to property over tangible 
objects in some form; others have justified this right on the basis of natural or legal right to own. To 
get a glimpse of these arguments, see Macpherson 1962 and 1978; Pennock and Chapman 1980; Ryan 
1984; Waldron 1988; Harris 1996 and 1997; and Penner 1997. Although these literatures critically 
examined and analysed the right to property from various angles and contributed enormously in the 
development of critical property law scholarship, the division between persons and things remains 
outside their critical analyses. Thus, Pottage argues, „however critical they might be in other respects, 
the distinction between persons and things continues to function as an untheorised premise, much as it 
does in orthodox legal doctrine and theory (Pottage 2004, p 2). 
91
 It would be unfair to direct this accusation only to normative legal theorist alone because early 
anthropologists (with the exception of probably Marcel Mauss and Bronislaw Malinowski; see Mauss 
1925/1954; Malinowski 1926) equally took the Roman law distinction between persons and things as 
pre-given. For instance, Henry Maine in his studies of ancient law has shown that property rights and 
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property, according to this view, is an exclusive right to control material objects, but 
what remains folded inside this right is the right to exclude others, sell, transfer and 
make profit. In short, it is a „bundle of rights‟ over a thing (Honore 1961) that 
remains folded inside the normative conception of property. A classic example of 
this assertion can be found in Kevin Gray‟s following account, „when I sell you a 
quantum of airspace the whole point is that – apart from molecules of thin air – there 
is absolutely nothing there…The key is, of course, that I have transferred to you not a 
thing but a “bundle of rights”, and it is the “bundle of rights” that comprises the 
“property”‟ (Gray 1991, p 259). What is important in this argument is that property is 
not a thing; neither is it a transfer of things from one to another. Rather, it is a right to 
control material objects that give rise to legal relationships between persons.  
 
 
Property rights lay down parameters, they define our right to appropriate, control, 
and transfer material objects. Put differently, law or legal norms justify our right to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
ownership in early Indian village communities differ significantly from the Roman law idea of private 
property. But he left the Roman law distinction between the law of persons and the law of things 
untouched (Maine 1861/1906, pp 258-318). While he has criticised the Roman law classification of 
legal rules into law of persons, law of things, and law of actions in his later works, his criticism was 
not directed toward the distinction between persons and things. Rather, he presented a positivist 
account of property in terms of rights (Maine 1883, chapters X and XI). Similarly, Robert Lowie 
(according to Bronislaw Malinowski, one of the highest anthropological authorities in the United 
States) adopted a narrow positivist approach to examine primitive law and placed the primitive form 
of ownership within the Hohfeldian boundaries of rights and privileges without questioning the 
distinction (Lowie 1920/1929, chapter IX; Lowie 1934, pp 276-283). In a similar fashion, two early 
legal anthropologists, Hoebel and Gluckman have followed Hohfeld‟s analysis of rights and privileges 
very closely, and defined property in terms of „bundle of rights‟ (Hoebel 1949/1958, pp 431-449; 
Hoebel 1954, chapter 4; Gluckman 1965/1972, chapters 3, 4 and 5). It can be said, then, the 
„theoretical work on property by anthropologists has drawn heavily on legal traditions‟ (Hann 2005, p 
111) and left the Roman law distinction between persons and things intact until recently. This is not to 
say that anthropologists (and equally legal theorists) lack critical acumen. The real problem is in the 
approach that legal theorists and anthropologists adopt in examining a particular social, economic or 
legal institution. Sally Falk Moore has pointed out rightly that „many lawyers and law professors view 
law as an instrument for controlling society and directing social change, but most anthropologists are 
concerned with law as a reflection of particular social order‟ (Moore 1978, p 244). Thus, when 
anthropologists borrow normative understanding of law (without critically assessing them) and 
describe property relations in legal theorists‟ narrow instrumental conception of ownership, they 
ultimately reproduce the jurisprudential orthodoxy of the Western law. Similarly, normative legal 
theorists‟ bias toward instrumental function of the Western law keeps them away from the broader and 
contextual anthropological analysis of property relations. The result, as Annelise Riles observes, 
though now anthropologists and legal theorists are sitting across in academic conferences and citing 
one another in print regularly, the distance between them actually increased because they have two 
very different conceptions of the means and ends of knowledge (Riles 2004, pp 775-776). On this 
point, it is worth remembering Greetz‟s observation that „…one would imagine lawyers and 
anthropologists were made for each other and that the movement of ideas and arguments between 
them would proceed with exceptional ease. But a feel for immediacies divides as much as it 
connects…It is their elective affinity that keeps them apart‟ (Geertz 1983, pp 167-168).  
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appropriate and control material objects through the rubric of rights. As Pollock 
writes, „what we call the law of Property is, in the first place, the systematic 
expression of the degrees and forms of control, use, and enjoyment, that are 
recognised and protected by law‟ (Pollock 1961, p 93). Accordingly, the legal subject 
as a right holder relates herself with the object through the language of law. 
However, law recognises such relationship only through the language of ownership. 
For instance, Honore has argued, „the idiom which directly couples the owner with 
the thing owned is far from pointless; where the right to exclude others exists, there 
is indeed (legally) a very special relation between the holder of right and the thing‟ 
(Honore 1961, p 134). In my view, the argument that there exists a very special 
relation between subject and object in law is a mystification. In the eye of the law, 
objects do not exist. Objects come into existence through the idiom of ownership and 
law defines ownership in terms of control, exclusion and appropriation. In other 
words, law merely recognises the ontological status of objects, and in terms of 
normative property theory such existence is only incidental to property relations.  
 
 
From this normative understanding of property rights, we can say that objects 
represent economic value and this value is subject to enforceable legal rights. 
Accordingly, the institutionalisation of control and appropriation become a rational 
enterprise, which assumes that it is essential to control material objects in the interest 
of the economy. Therefore, it becomes necessary to establish a legitimate basis for 
appropriation, and one such legitimate basis is to recognise the rights of legal 
subjects to own and dispose material objects. The right to possess material objects is 
thus an essential attribute of legal subject
92
 and this possessive attribute is protected 
by the notion of ownership for „an orderly relation of exchange‟ (Macpherson 1964, 
p 3). Property rights, in this sense, invest legal subjects with the power to appropriate 
and control material objects. As Davies and Naffine put it,  
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 The primacy of subject as social actors and the bearer of freedoms, liberties and rights, remains 
embedded in much of the liberal philosophical and legal scholarship. For instance, as Pollock puts it, 
„a material object is really nothing to the law, whatever it may be to science or philosophy, save as an 
occasion of use or enjoyment to man, or as an instrument in human acts‟ (Pollock 1894, p 320). 
Similarly, John Finnis, a prominent natural law theorist, observes, „persons, their well-being, and their 
intentions matter in ways that nothing else in our environment does‟ (Finnis 2000, p 1). Hence, 
Delaney argues, „it seems reasonable to suggest that popular conceptions of nature and of human 
relationships to nature are both deeply informed and given expression by legal concepts such as 




„A property right enables the proprietor to exercise control over a thing, the object of 
property, against the rest of the world. Property thus defines the limits of our sphere of 
influence over the world; it defines the borders of our control over things and so marks 
the degree of our social and legal power‟ (Davies and Naffine 2001, p 6).   
 
Right to control and appropriate material objects occupy a special position in the 
semantic structure of normative property theory. And this normative relationship 
between subjects and objects, Pottage argues, „are staged as encounters between 
subjects set against a background of resources or things which, however they might 
be represented or valued, are ultimately decomposable into a finite set of basic 
ontological elements‟ (Pottage 1998, p 337). Property right is thus a legal construct
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that builds on the distinction between subjects and objects. As Mauss points out, „we 
live in a society where there is a marked distinction…between real and personal law, 
between things and persons. This distinction is fundamental; it is the very condition 
of part of our system of property, alienation and exchange‟ (Mauss 1925/1954, p 46). 
The categorisation of subjects and objects into two separate entities brings into view 
the ontological structure of normative property theory that „attached persons 
(personae) to things (res) by means of a set of legal forms and transactions 
(actiones)‟ (Pottage 2004, p 4). Put differently, by attaching subjects with objects 
through legal rights, normative property theory promotes reification or 
objectification, in the sense that objects are seen to assume a particular form and 
meaning through the language of property rights (Strathern 1999, p 13). What we 
notice here is that in Euro-American understandings of property rights, the subject is 
regarded as an entity to which objects are external and this externalisation not only 
gives the legal subject the right to exercise control over proprietary objects, but also 
legitimises the right to treat material objects as „commodity‟.
94
 This commoditisation 
of material objects through property rights makes visible the economistic rationality 
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 Consider here the view expressed by Jeremy Bentham that „property and law born together, and die 
together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases‟ 
(Bentham 1931, p 113). Similarly, Kevin Gray claims that „property is a category wholly constructed 
by law and, like any other legal category, is a fiction. That is, it does not reflect, but rather constructs, 
its objects‟ (Gray 1991, p 252).  
94
 Here, I have used the term „commodity‟ in a broader sense to simply denote objects with economic 
value, leaving the question of how objects acquire exchange values unexamined. One can consult 
Marx‟s Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1 (1867/1976) to understand how objects 
acquire exchange values. Later in the chapter, however, I will use the term in a narrow sense to refer 
to objects or products that are intended for exchange in the market.    
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embedded in the normative figuration of property law. Implicit in this figuration is 
the assumption that subjects possess agency (will, consciousness, freedom, liberty) to 
assert their power to control and exercise ownership rights against others. As 
Strathern argues, „…Western image of control depends on concepts of ownership 
and property‟ (Strathern 1990, p 103). And it is the function of property law to 
rationalise and institutionalise such power and rights. Hence, we can say that 
materiality emerges through legal processes and practices. More specifically, 
normative property theory ascribes materiality to objects through the language of 
rights and ownership. It should be noted, however, that what remains folded in Euro-
American idea of materiality is the desire or drive to appropriate and propertise, that 
is, the desire to transform the material physics of things into objects of legal rights. In 
fact, this drive to propertise becomes more evident as we look into the normative 
framework of modern intellectual property law. 
 
2.3 Materialising the Intangibles through Law 
 
From the beginning of the twentieth century a great bulk of literature focused 
specifically on the creation of ownership over abstract ideas or immaterial objects. 
Though the origin of intellectual property rights dates several centuries back 
(specifically patents and copyrights),
95
 the advancement in the physical and 
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 The idea of intellectual property is not new. Anthropologist Robert Lowie suggests that primitive 
communities, such as Koryak of the Andaman Islands, Kai of North America and Nootka of British 
Columbia jealously guarded the transmission of their valuable intangibles and recognised some form 
ownership rights of singers over their songs, of creators over their magical formulas, and of poets over 
their compositions (Lowie 1920/1929, pp 224-232; Lowie 1928; Lowie 1934, pp 281-282). Following 
Lowie, Hoebel also expressed similar views (Hoebel 1942; Hoebel 1949/1958, pp 447-448). But it 
remains doubtful whether such forms of protection or ownership can be regarded as intellectual 
property in the modern sense of the term because in primitive societies property relations was much 
more complex than the positivistic approach adopted by Lowie and Hoebel to understand primitive 
forms of ownership (as evident in Bronislaw Malinowski‟s critique of Lowie‟s understanding of 
primitive law; Malinowski 1926, p 13). Similarly, Pamela Long (1991) in her historical study of the 
origin of the idea of inventor/authorship points out that some components of the notion of intellectual 
property regarding arts and craft knowledge were present in antiquity. But these components cannot 
be regarded as intellectual property the way we understand it now because the commercial aspects of 
property rights were completely missing. During this period, knowledge was treated as ongoing, 
progressive and cumulative, and by implication cooperative. And therefore, authors or inventors do 
not appear to bestow on her any special ingenuity or credit. Moreover, an explicit separation of 
tangible from intangible aspects of the work was missing. Authors or inventors were not concerned 
with the commercial exploitation of their writings or inventions, and never viewed their creations as 
commodities with a market value. They took pride in their skills and knowledge, and most of the time 
lived their life on wages or other livelihood, such as rewards consisting of more food, greater safety, 
and relief from backbearing labour. According to Long, the proprietary attitude towards craft 
knowledge developed in the medieval period. The understanding that craft processes are intangible 
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biological sciences in the early and mid-twentieth century became the main stimulus 
behind the creation of modern intellectual property law. Taking inspiration from 
Euro-American liberal philosophical tradition and normative property theory, most 
literature provides strong justification for or against the creation of intellectual 
property rights over immaterial objects. As Coombe points out,  
 
„Even today, when the development and expansion of intellectual property protections 
is justified or criticized, the Western philosophical tradition is generally evoked; 
appeals to natural rights, Lockean labour theory of property, and Kantian or Hegelian 
theories of personality abound. Alternatively, economic principles and utilitarian 
rationales are drawn upon to rationalize or question intellectual property laws as 
incentive structures that produce a socially optimal supply of intellectual creations‟. 
(Coombe 1998, p 7; my emphasis) 
 
Economic theories, for instance, put strong emphasis on market and welfare. These 
theories provide cost-benefit analysis and strongly argue that without intellectual 
property rights people will not engage in the creation of immaterial objects and 
therefore, society will lose valuable creative works. Intellectual property rights are 
the best way to provide incentives and reward human creativity. According to these 
theories, protection of abstract objects through intellectual property rights will 
stimulate creativity and invention, and in return, it will bring overall welfare to 
society.
96
 Similarly, legal literature on intellectual property rights is burdened with 
philosophical and economic overtones. Relying on economic theory, some legal 
scholars have focused on the commercial aspects of intellectual property rights. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
property with significant commercial value led to the emergence of patents. More specifically, the 
connection between individual authorship and intellectual property was made, first with regard to 
material invention in the 15th century (the Council of Venice granted patent to Franciscus Petri for 
fifty years in 1416 for structures with pestles for fulling fabrics) and later, to writings in the 16th 
century. Regarding author‟s copyright, Long disagrees with Woodmansee (1984), Rose (1988) and 
Hesse (1990). These scholars locate the origin of author‟s copyright in the 18th century. However, 
regardless of the period of origin, these scholars agree on one fundamental point: the 
institutionalisation of the inventor/author as individual proprietor of her creation, or to abuse Foucault, 
this „privileged moment of individualization‟ (Foucault 1977, p 115) emerged with the rise and 
expansion of a „possessive market society‟ (Macpherson 1964, p 271) in ideas and knowledge. This 
rise and expansion of the market in knowledge can equally be characterised as a moment of 
disconnection – the death of the author and the beginning of writing (Barthes 1977, p 142). In a sense, 
the inventor/author will no longer be known in relation to her unique creation; but rather, her creations 
will be known as intellectual properties that can be appropriated, materialised and exploited to make 
profit. It therefore signals the death of the inventor/author and the beginning of her property.        
96
 See, for instance, Friedman, Landes and Posner 1991; Dam 1994, Landes and Posner 2003, Kaplow 
and Shavell 2002. 
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Though these scholars recognise human effort in the creation of intellectual objects, 
their main justification for protection is to encourage commercialisation of new ideas 
and inventions (Laddie 2004, p 91). Others, mainly normative intellectual property 
theorists, rely on philosophical and political theories and strongly justify intellectual 
property rights on the basis of natural right to property (Hughes 1988; Spector 1989; 
Hettinger 1989; Drahos 1996, chaps 2 and 3). These scholars put great weight on 
human creativity and argue that abstract ideas or intellectual objects are the products 
of human mind or creative endeavour of human labour. Therefore, just as labour 
belongs to human body and mind, the products of labour also naturally belong to an 
individual. It is legitimate for the producer to claim property rights over intellectual 
objects that arise naturally from human body and mind. There are still others, who 
extend the normative understanding of property rights and advocate that creativity 
and inventions are the assets of individual genius and as such, they are private 
properties that must be protected through legal rights. For example, Harris argues,  
 
„The law takes an intangible thing and builds around it a property structure modelled 
on the structure which social and legal systems have always applied to some tangible 
things. By instituting the trespassory rules whose content restricts uses of the 
ideational entity, intellectual property law preserves to an individual or group of 
individuals an open-ended set of use-privileges and powers of control and 
transmission characteristic of ownership interests over tangible things‟ (Harris 1996, p 
44).  
 
Intellectual properties, in this view, are intangible objects and they must be protected 
in the same way as rights over tangible objects are protected through law. Intellectual 
property law, therefore, reproduces the instrumental reason of Euro-American 
property law that rationalises and institutionalises the rights of legal subject to 
control, exploit and make profit from their material objects. What becomes evident 
here is that „in both these moral and utilitarian arguments, scholars address 
intellectual property laws purely abstractly, as promoting reified rights in 





What Coombe suggests is that in contemporary literature on intellectual property 
law, we only find accounts of rights and relations that promote the reification of 
immaterial objects. Take, for example, the argument of Peter Drahos that „we should 
bear in mind that modern intellectual property rights relate to the grant of property 
rights in some things as well as constituting a set of relations between individuals‟ 
(Drahos 1996, p 17). The understanding that intellectual property rights are legal 
rights over some things, which give rise to social, economic and legal relationships, 
is essentially based on normative property theory that I have discussed in the 
previous section. It further suggests, though remains implicit, that in order to claim 
intellectual property rights over immaterial objects, an abstract idea or intangible 
effort must be translated into things (Bainbridge 1999, p 45; Sherman and Bently 
1999, p 47). Davies and Naffine put this argument more eloquently when they say 
that „property is seen as an extension of the person and as a means by which the 
person can relate freely and transparently with others. Property is seen to mediate our 
social relationships‟ (Davies and Naffine 2001, p 6). Interestingly, in these 
arguments, the material physics of things is reinvented in such way as to warrant the 
conventional understanding of property that ascribed to things a materiality of its 
own making and a mode of existence (Pottage 2011, p 636). So the understanding 
that persons relate to each other through intellectual property rights is an extension of 
the Euro-American insistence that individuals must translate their intellectual 
endeavours and efforts into material objects, and control, appropriate and exercise 
rights over such immaterial objects in order to create social, economic and legal 
relations. However, the paradox is that instead of relating persons, Euro-American 
notions of intellectual property rights justify and legitimise control, appropriation and 
exploitation of immaterial objects. As Strathern writes,  
 
        „If property is part of the way in which people in modern industrial economies (Euro-
American societies) connect to the world, then it must both shape and take the shape 
of the way the world is perceived. To the extent that the world is thought of as an 
assemblage of material things, it follows that property can only be claimed over 
material things. Property in this view is the condition of appropriating things from the 




In Euro-American understanding of intellectual property rights, ideas and knowledge 
are regarded as products of intellectual efforts, skills, and practices. Hence, their 
materialisation and translation into tangible objects are treated as creative and 
inventive. Accordingly, the creative and inventive subject is entitled to claim 
property rights and exercise control over her intellectual creations. This proprietary 
rationality embedded in modern intellectual property law brings into view a 
particular form of materiality that treats creativity and invention as objects produced 
by the act of individual genius and therefore, they must be protected, controlled and 
appropriated by the creative genius through intellectual property rights. As Strathern 
observes, „[the] (Euro-American) form of materiality is the condition under which 
perspective, a person‟s point of view, creates an object (“out there”). We could 
conclude that what is material about property is a function of an epistemological 
grasp of the world, that is, of knowing it as an object‟ (ibid.). However, instead of 
treating this transformation as merely an extension of liberal individualism, which 
encourages objectification, we need to view this move to immateriality as a drive or 
desire to appropriate that remains folded in the idea of materiality.    
 
2.4 Deterritorialising Materiality 
 
The discussion above shows how modern intellectual property law territorialised the 
drive to propertise. In this section, I intend to show this drive moves, operates and 
becomes deterritorialised through the global intellectual property regime, especially 
the TRIPs Agreement. Rapid transformation in the past few decades, specifically in 
life sciences research, corporate capital investment in biotechnological „inventions‟, 
and global trade in biogenetic innovations become a powerful impetus behind the 
creation of a global intellectual property regime. The idea of treating intellectual 
property rights as instruments of global trade was first proposed by some developed 
country members during the meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay in 1986 and the 
contracting parties to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) agreed to 
negotiate the proposal in forthcoming trade rounds. More specifically, a handful of 
US corporations formed the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC) to put pressure on 
the US government to include intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round of 
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multilateral trade negotiations and Monsanto was one of them.
97
 As May points out, 
„the IPC essentially drafted the TRIPs agreement while the actual negotiations fine-
tuned the text and made some concessions to developing countries‟ negotiators‟ 
(May 2007, p 28-29). What is significant about the TRIPs Agreement
98
 is that it 
introduced a brand new era of intellectual property regulation based on the concepts 
of protection and exclusion rather than dissemination and competition (Sell 2002, p 
79). In essence, the Agreement is global in its scope and reach, and brought the 
governance of intellectual property within the global trade regime overseen by the 
WTO (May 2000, p 67). The Agreement starts with the language of „international 
trade‟ and „rights‟ and prescribes measures for the effective and adequate protection 
of intellectual property rights, including patents over micro-biological processes and 
products in all member countries of the WTO. Since the Agreement is a legally 
binding global instrument, the member countries are obliged to follow the standards 
of protection prescribed and implement changes in domestic intellectual property 
legislation. These prescribed changes are intended to bring greater convergence 
between the global and the local because the purpose of the Agreement is to remove 
differences and barriers in the conduct of „legitimate trade‟ in intellectual properties. 
While some argue that the Agreement sets out minimum standards of protection that 
member states must observe and enforce (Maskus and Reichman 2005, p 5); others 
point out that the Agreement was formulated by a handful of developed countries 
(US, Europe and Japan) and their corporate elites. Therefore, the TRIPs regime 
prescribes standards which were previously available only in developed states. Thus, 
these scholars argue that in the name of harmonisation and bringing greater 
convergence, these knowledge-economy elites imposed their own intellectual 
property standards to all member states through a binding legal instrument. In so 
doing, the TRIPs regime not only expanded the economic interests, private authority, 
juristic rationality, and power of developed countries and their corporations, but also 
went well beyond earlier global standards (such as Paris Convention 1883) (Sell 
1999 and 2002; May 2000, chap. 3; Ryan 2002; Drahos 2003; Dutfield 2003, chaps. 
1 and 8; May and Sell 2006, p 168). Further, Macmillan observes that given the 
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 Other corporations that were involved in the formation of IPC are Bristol Myers, DuPont, General 
Electric, General Motors, IBM, Merck and Time Warner.  
98
 After eight years of intense negotiation, persuasion, coercion and lobbying, the developed and 
developing countries agreed to the final text and signed the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) in 1994 at Marrakech, Morocco. The Agreement was 
a component to the Final Act establishing the WTO and came into force on 1 January 1995. 
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extensive evidence of developed country dominance and corporate stranglehold over 
intellectual property today, it seems reasonable to argue that the TRIPs Agreement 
was not concerned with international innovation, but rather with the protection of 
corporate investment and its judicialisation through the free trade regime promoted 
by the WTO (Macmillan 2011). Likewise, Alessandrini points out that since high 
technology is one of the most valuable assets in the capital structure of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), the protection of intellectual property becomes a crucial source 
of gains for subsidiaries investing abroad. The TRIPs Agreement, therefore, 
encourages the liberalisation of investment flows through the protection of investor‟s 
technology (Alessandrini 2010, p 157). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
elaborate these critical observations in detail, but I will pursue some of these 
arguments and discuss them at some length in chapter 5. Nevertheless, these 
observations are crucial for understanding how legal norms, practices and 
rationalities developed in some domestic jurisdictions were moved and mobilised to 
create a global intellectual property regime which is deterritorialising in nature, in the 
sense that the TRIPs regime promotes the movement and wider geographical 
dispersion of intellectual property norms and practices. Then, arguably, the 
Agreement reproduced and deterritorialised the notion of materiality embedded in 
Euro-American intellectual property law and this deterritorialising nature becomes 
more evident as we look more closely into some of its provisions.  
 
 
The most crucial aspect of the TRIPs Agreement is that it mandates positive 
legislative action to establish intellectual property rights over ideas and knowledge. 
According to the Agreement, intellectual properties are private property of natural or 
legal persons.
99
 As the Agreement further states, the purpose of protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights is to promote technological innovation, 
transfer and dissemination of technology and technological knowledge in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare.
100
 The understanding that knowledge and 
ideas are economic assets of legal persons and therefore, they must be protected 
through property rights to conduct legitimate trade in technological innovations and 
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 Preamble and Article 1(3) of the Agreement. These provisions were virtually taken from Article 58 
of the European Patent Convention (EPC) 1973.  
100
 Article 7 of the Agreement 
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knowledge globally, is a legal rationality and practice developed mostly in Euro-
American jurisdictions. This expansion of private property rights over knowledge 
and idea, Burch observes, „promotes the vocabulary of rights and property and the 
liberal conceptual framework they help define‟ (Burch 1995, p 215). By placing 
emphasis on individual rights and global trade through alienable property rights 
(May and Sell 2006, p 163), the Agreement clearly expanded and deterritorialised the 
right to control, materialise and exploit intellectual efforts and creativity ingrained in 
Euro-American intellectual property law. The promoters of the Agreement believed 
that intellectual efforts and knowledge are the objects of global trade and securing 
property rights over such objects through a legally binding document is important to 
impose Euro-American proprietary rationality on a global scale. In doing so, the 
Agreement reproduced the Euro-American practices of materialisation in a new 
mould and this becomes evident once we look into how Article 27 of the Agreement 
expanded the rights of global bio-tech corporations to propertise bio-genetic 
resources and their protection through patent rights globally. According to Article 
27(1) of the Agreement, patents are available for new „inventions‟ in all fields of 
technology including biotechnology. However, to qualify for a patent right, such 
inventions must be new, involve an inventive step, and have to be capable of 
industrial application.
101
 So intellectual property rights, such as patents, are available 
for any process or product if they arise from technoscientific research. Since Article 
27(1) states that patent rights are enjoyable and, I add, commercially exploitable 
irrespective of the place of invention, it is not unreasonable to argue that the 
Agreement promotes and protects the commercial exploitation of proprietary 
technoscientific products and processes through a seamless web of property rights 
between the global and the local. In other words, the Agreement in general, and 
Article 27 in particular, deterritorialised the right to control and protection of 
commercial exploitation of intellectual properties.  
More striking is Article 27(3), which for the first time recognised intellectual 
property rights over artificially manufactured biological substances in a global legal 
instrument. More specifically, Article 27(3)(b) of the Agreement made it mandatory 
to grant patents for micro-organisms as well as plants and animals produced through 
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 This language is a virtual reproduction of Article 52(1) of the EPC 1973. Inventive steps and 
industrial applications are defined in terms of „non-obviousness‟ and „useful‟ respectively.  
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non-biological and microbiological processes.
102
 What this provision means is that 
patents are available not only for whole organisms, such as genetically modified or 
altered plants and seeds, but also for artificially isolated living substances, such as 
DNA sequences, viruses, plasmids, and cell lines because they are manufactured 
through bio-technical processes and technoscientific ideas and knowledge are 
embodied in them. The grant of patent rights over „new biologicals‟ (Franklin 2001, 
p 303),
103
 therefore, not just conflates artificial with the natural, and material with the 
biological, but these so-called „life patents‟ (Gibson 2008, p 3) were brought within 
the purview of TRIPs to stabilise, extend and move the definition of patentable 
„subject matter‟ to disparate locations in the globe through a binding legal document. 
Thus, genetically modified plants and seeds, or naturally occurring but artificially 
isolated, manipulated and altered bio-chemical substances, such as bacteria, viruses, 
algae, DNA sequences and cell lines become mandatory „subject matter‟ of patents in 
all member countries of the WTO. The legal rationality underlying Article 27 of the 
TRIPs Agreement comes from judicial rhetoric put forward in some high profile 
court cases, mainly in the US.
104
 For instance, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty the US 
Supreme Court ruled that a bio-technically modified oil eating bacteria is a new 
composition of matter. Since this new life form is novel (non-obvious) and has 
industrial application, it is a product of biotechnological ingenuity and therefore, 
subject to patent rights.
105
 Consider again the observations of the US Court of 
Appeals in Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd. And Genetics Institute 
that „a gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one, and it is well established 
in our law that conception of a chemical compound requires that the inventor be able 
to define it so as to distinguish it from other materials, and to describe how to obtain 
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 This provision of the Agreement resembles very well with Article 53(b) of the EPC 1973.  
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 Franklin uses the phrase „new biologicals‟ to describe new entities, such as cryopreserved human 
embryos, cloned transgenic animals, genetically modified seeds, and patented gene sequences.  
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 It is important to note that during the TRIPs negotiation, the European approach differed from the 
US. As Watal points out, while the US believed that anything made by man is patentable, the EU was 
grappling with strong internal resistance to patents on living organisms. Since the debate had not yet 
been settled in Europe, the WTO members agreed to endorse the minimum criteria (Watal 2001, p 
131).  
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 100 S. Ct. 2204, 65 L. Ed. 2d. It should be noted that before 1980, living organisms were outside 
the field of patents because it was thought that living organisms could not satisfy the criterion of 
novelty. The principle was that „even if humans intervened in their development, living organisms 
exist before human action and, moreover, they can reproduce on their own‟. But in this case, the US 
Supreme Court stated, „anything under the sun that is made by man‟ can be patented. For details, see 





 These court rulings have received standing ovation from the bio-tech industry 
and equally been reiterated by academic legal scholars. For example, Straus argues,  
 
„It should be suffice to note that DNA-sequences, despite their double nature, on the 
one hand, the physical carrier of information – the molecule – on the other hand, the 
information itself, have been and are treated as biochemical substances by virtually all 
courts and patent offices‟ (Straus 2004, p 132).  
 
Like a „traditional mechanist‟,
107
 he further argues that „it also should be recalled that 
the nucleotides themselves represent complex structures and therefore there is no 
substantial difference to be seen between a “normal” chemical formula and DNA 
sequence‟ (ibid.). So according to these observations, there is no difference between 
the organic functionalities of biological substances and the mechanical functions of a 
machine body. Rather, the organic functions of biological substances are similar to 
that of mechanical functions of steam engine and hydraulic pumps. Since there is no 
difference between a DNA sequence and a normal chemical formula, an inventive 
genius can separate and detach biological substance from the living body and claim 
proprietary rights over it just the way we claim proprietary rights over a chemical 
formula. „This conceptualisation of life as essentially chemical, embodied in – and 
promoted through – the discourse of biotechnology‟, Dutfield observes, „is 
undoubtedly appealing to those who esteem modern science for its progressiveness 
and rationality‟ (Dutfield 2003, p 136).  
 
 
Given that modern biotechnology‟s hallmark, as Rabinow points out, lies in its 
potential to get away from nature and to construct artificial conditions in which 
specific variables can be manipulated and remade according to our norms (Rabinow 
1996, p 20), it seems plausible for legal practitioners and some scholars to 
conceptualise living substance as essentially a biochemical formula or compound. 
Thus, it is not surprising that Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement reproduces and 
promotes a particular view of „mechanical jurisprudence‟ inherent in the Euro-
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 927 F.2d 1200 (59 USLW 2575, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016). 
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 I have borrowed the phrase from Donna Haraway. By „traditional mechanist‟, Haraway refers to 
those who find similarities between an organism and actual machines, such as steam engine, hydraulic 
pump, or a system of levers and pulleys (Haraway 1976, p 205). 
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American patent doctrine. In their historical study of the development of modern 
patent law, Pottage and Sherman observe that „the doctrinal sense of the invention 
was modelled on the paradigm of the machine: inventions were things that looked or 
worked like machines‟ (Pottage and Sherman 2010, p 15; also Pottage 2011, pp 630-
631). Later, this paradigm was extended to biological inventions by a single act of 
judicial legislation. Referring to the Chakrabarty decision, they argue that for the US 
Supreme Court, „a “new” organism was every bit as “novel” as a “new” machine‟ 
and consequently, in terms of biological inventions, biotechnology becomes an 
intrumentalising technology in the post-Chakrabarty period. Looked at this way, 
modern biotechnology instrumentalises animate nature and turns organisms into 
manufactures, just the way mechanical and chemical sciences instrumentalised 
inanimate nature (ibid., pp 180-181). Consequently, from the 1980s onward, „patent 
law had firmly taken the stance that biological artefacts are chemical processes‟ 
(Carolan 2010, p 42). The grant of property rights over modified biological materials 
is, therefore, based on the understanding that they are products of intellectual labour 
and patent is necessary to control access to the ideas and innovations embodied in 
them (Parry 2002, p 684).  Or, we can say, adapting Biagioli that isolation, 
manipulation, modification and re-creation of biological substances become 
inventive ideas in the post-Chakrabarty period and as inventive ideas, they have 
secured a firm place in the republic of patent (Biagioli 2006).
108
 Modern patent law, 
from this point of view, reduces living bodies (humans, animals or plants) into 
chemical laboratories in which the inventive genius can isolate and purify biological 
substances through bio-technical processes to produce new biologicals. Purification, 
Carolan suggests, looms large in patent law today because in the eyes of the courts 
and USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office) it implies human 
intervention, manipulation and ingenuity (Carolan 2010, p 43).
109
 Hence, as products 
of bio-technical intervention and ingenuity, new biologicals are defined as 
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 See, for example, Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceuticals Co. Lt. (927 F.2d 1200), in which the 




„inventions‟ and therefore, their commercial value reside in patents. This is because 
patents on new biologicals promise exclusivity in the market, equivalent to the patent 
protection a pharmaceutical firm obtains over a new compound. Accordingly, patents 
on biological substances seem analogous to patents on new chemical entities 
(Eisenberg 2000, p 784). By materialising biological substance through property 
rights, patent law not only defamiliarised, but also denaturalised the „biological‟ from 
and within the biological bodies. And this reductionism suggests patent law already 
has a materialist explanation for life. It leads us to believe that biological substances 
must be made „pseudo-inanimate‟ so that they can become fungible with others types 
of things propertised under the patent law (Garforth 2008, pp 34-35). Caught in the 
materialist credo of production, modern patent law transforms living substances into 
inert matter and in so doing, it has not only made it possible to do things that global 
bio-tech corporations do in their laboratories today (Carolan 2010, p 3), but also 
granted rights to control proprietary biological substances throughout the world. As 
Dutfield points out, „this way of imagining life to base arguments for extending 
protectable subject matter to microorganisms, plants and animals played a significant 
role in the evolution of patent law in various countries from the 1980s, and ultimately 
in the global regime too‟ (Dutfield 2003, p 136). Article 27 of the Agreement thus 
deterritorialised the Euro-American understanding of materiality and this 
deterritorialisation allowed patented biological artefacts as well as legal practices and 
rationalities associated with them to move and flow freely from their territories to 
distant locations in the globe.  
 
2.5: Locating Reterritorialisation 
 
The TRIPs Agreement prescribes a single framework of protection for all member 
countries of the WTO and, consequently, acted as a powerful vector for the 
transmission of specific, culturally determined systems for codifying knowledge 
globally (Parry 2002, p 680). In light of this observation, it seems reasonable to argue 
that the Agreement explicitly replaced locally determined solutions to the question of 
making knowledge and information property with a set of standards developed 
elsewhere (May and Sell 2006, p 163). The Agreement, therefore, attempted to 
deterritorialise the system of intellectual property ownership through the movement 
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of Euro-American idea of materiality. Given the way protection and exploitation of 
new biologicals are extended in Euro-American patent law, and deterritorialised by 
the Agreement, the member countries of the WTO had to accept and reterritorialise 
the materialist underpinnings of Article 27 in their domestic legislations. For 
instance, the European Community (EC) Biotechnology Directive (98/44/EC), issued 
in 1998, states: „an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by 
a technical process is not excluded from patentability since it is the result of technical 
processes used to identify, purify and classify it and to reproduce it outside the 
human body, techniques which human beings alone are capable of putting into 
practice and which nature is incapable of accomplishing by itself‟. Moreover, 
Articles 52 (patentable inventions) and 53 (exceptions to patentability) of the EPC 
1973 were substantially revised in 2000.
110
 The aim of this revision was to take into 
account developments in international law, in particular the TRIPs Agreement and 
this understanding is very much evident in the views expressed by delegates 
attending the revision conference.
111
 Further, in the Second 16(c) Report, the EC 
observes that legal and technical experts felt there were no differences between DNA 
sequences and chemical substances and therefore, there was no objective reason for 
limiting the traditional protection granted by patent law to inventions relating to 
sequences or partial sequences of genes isolated from the human body (COM 2005 
312 final). Interestingly, in these technoscientific and legal discourses, the EPC and 
the EC reproduce and reiterate the instrumental rationality of modern patent law and 
biotechnology mobilised by the US judiciary to propertise new biologicals produced 
by global bio-tech corporations. Since the EU acted as a catalyst for bringing the 
governance of new biologicals in the global intellectual property regime, these 
transformations and arguments are not accidental; rather, they are deliberate steps 
taken by the EU. So what we find here is that there is a reterritorialisation of the 
materialist underpinnings of Article 27 in regional documents. As Blakeney explains, 
global intellectual property rights exist not only as a consequence of domestic 
legislation or jurisprudence, but also because of international, multilateral, bilateral 
and regional obligations (Blakeney 2004, p 3). And in the context of TRIPs, this 
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th
 edition, September 2013.  
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 See, for example, Diplomatic Conference for the revision of the EPC, available at: 
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/archive/documentation/diplomatic-conference.html; 
Conference of the Contracting States to Revise the 1973 European Patent Convention, Munich, 20 to 
29 November 2000 (MR/24/00); and Act Revising the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 
Munich, 29 November 2000.  
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jurisprudence came mainly from a handful of developed countries and was 
deterritorialised through international or multilateral obligation that comes with the 
WTO membership. In other words, global intellectual property law plays an 
important role in changing domestic substantive and procedural rules and this is 
particularly the case with TRIPs Agreement, which prescribes domestically 
enforceable norms for the protection of intellectual property rights as a condition of 
membership of the WTO (ibid.). Put differently, all member countries of the WTO 
are obliged to reterritorialise the materialist underpinnings of global intellectual 
property regime by making changes in their domestic legislations. From this point of 
view, the TRIPs Agreement performs a double act. On the one hand, it 
deterritorialises the Euro-American understanding of materiality or facilitates the 
movement of legal practices and rationalities from one place to another; and on the 
other, forces member countries to reterritorialise these practices and rationalities 
through legal obligation.  
 
 
This reterritorialisation becomes more visible once we look more closely into some 
of the provisions of the Indian Patents Act, 1970 that were changed through 
successive amendments in 1999, 2002 and 2005 to bring India‟s patent regime into 
compliance with the WTO TRIPs Agreement. Before 1999, a patent was available 
only for new and useful process, method and manner of manufacture, and machine 
and substance produced through such manufacture.
112
 However, a method of 
agriculture or any process to make animals and plants disease free, or to increase 
their economic value and production, was outside patent claims.
113
 In addition, 
patents were also not available for substances intended for use or capable of being 
used as food, medicine or drug, and produced through chemical processes.
114
 
Reading these provisions together, it becomes clear that neither the bio-technical 
methods or processes of isolation, manipulation, recombination and re-creation of 
biological substances, nor any new products or biologicals manufactured through 
such processes were patentable. Put simply, isolated and recombined or re-created 
DNA sequences, cell lines, viruses or genetically modified animals and plants were 
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 The Patents Act 1970, section 2(1)(j).  
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 Section 3(h) and (j).  
114
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non-patentable inventions in India before 2002. While the Patents (Amendment) Act 
1999 introduced product patent (though implicitly) for new substances intended for 
use or capable of being used as medicine or drug,
115
 it is the Patents (Amendment) 
Act 2002 that extended the definition of „invention‟ to include new products in 
addition to processes. The Act further added the criteria of „invention step‟ and 
„industrial application‟. In terms of this amendment, microorganisms or living 
organisms (such as single or multicellular bacteria, archaea, protozoa, fungi, algae, 
and pathogens) produced through microbiological or bio-technical processes are 
patentable inventions. Moreover, the processes through which those products are 
manufactured also become patentable because the Act implicitly recognises patents 
over bio-technical or recombinant processes used for improving plants and its 
products.
116
 The Act is explicit regarding the non-patentability of plants and animals 
in whole or any parts thereof (including seeds, varieties and species) produced 
through biological processes.
117
 However, it can be argued that transgenic plants, 
seeds, isolated and recombined DNA sequences and cell lines as products of bio-
technical ingenuity are manufactured through non-biological processes. And if these 
products are manufactured through processes that involve technical advance and 
have economic significance (inventive step), then they might be treated as „new 
inventions‟ and become patentable under the amended Patents Act, 1970.
118
 Leaving 
the technicalities of law aside, we can say that these transformations in India‟s patent 
jurisprudence make visible the reterritorialisation of the materialist underpinnings of 
Euro-American intellectual property law in a distant location. More importantly, this 
practice of de/re-territorialisation promoted through the WTO-TRIPs Agreement is a 
clear indication of the creation of a condition in which legal norms, practices and 
rationalities associated with a patented biological object can move freely between the 
global and the local.  
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 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 added a new sub-section to section 5 of the 1970 Act. The 
Act was passed with retrospective effect from 1 January 1995, the day India becomes member of the 
WTO. However, section 5 was completely deleted by the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005.   
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 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 introduced a new definition of „inventive step‟ (section 
2(1)(ja) of the amended Patents Act 1970), a criteria first introduced by the 2002 Amendment Act. 
The act also substituted the content of old clause (l), which now defines „new invention‟.    
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While one might view this de/re-territorialisation of Euro-American materiality and 
the production of Bt. brinjal as two isolated incidents, these incidents are in fact 
intimately connected to each other. Consider the global bio-tech corporation 
Monsanto, which not only played a major role in framing the TRIPs Agreement that 
simultaneously de/re-territorialised Euro-American materiality, but was also an 
active partner in the production of Bt. brinjal. Recall that gene isolation and 
transformation of the brinjal plant was started by Mahyco under a joint initiative with 
Monsanto in 2002 and the supply of Monsanto‟s patented Bt. gene was part of this 
collaborative relationship. It was also the year India brought radical changes in its 
patent laws to grant intellectual property rights over bio-technical processes and 
products. Though these two incidents might be a mere coincidence, it seems 
reasonable to argue that legal norms, practises and rationalities that came with the 
movement of Monsanto‟s patented Bt. gene invisibly pushed India to transform its 
patent laws and create a hospitable place for proprietary living substances 
manufactured through bio-technical processes. This transformation becomes more 
evident as we look into Mahyco‟s patent claim over new biologicals in India. In 
2007, Mahyco moved to the Receiving Office of the WIPO in Geneva with an 
international application (PCT application) for patent rights over Bt. brinjal (WO 
2007/091277 A2). In its patent application, Mahyco claimed that it has invented an 
insect tolerant brinjal plant by inserting a transgene (cry1Ac gene isolated from 
Bacillus thuringensis) into the genome of the brinjal plant. The transgenic plant was 
produced using the Agrobacterium-mediated transformation method which, 
according to Mahyco, is not only an efficient method for transforming plants, cells 
and tissues to confer insect resistance, but the method is also used for detecting the 
presence of transgene in the modified brinjal plants, seeds and progeny. So the 
method used for producing the insect tolerant transgenic brinjal plant, Mahyco 
claims, is an invention. And since the modified brinjal plant is produced through an 
inventive method and its seeds and future progeny would carry the cry1Ac gene 
isolated from Bt, Mahyco‟s bio-technical ingenuity also extends to them. Hence the 
application claims, both the process and the products (modified brinjal plant, its 
seeds and future progeny) are inventions and therefore, Mahyco has patent rights 
over them. What is interesting about an international application with the WIPO is 
that once a patent application is filed under the PCT, the claim becomes valid in all 
contracting states of the PCT designated in the application and India is one among 
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106 designated countries. Thus, Mahyco‟s intellectual property rights claim over Bt. 
brinjal and its future progeny extends to India and comes within the purview of 
Indian patent law. The point, however, is that the amendments made in 2002 and 
2005, did not just reterritorialise the Euro-American understanding of materiality in 
Indian patent law, but also transformed India into a hospitable place for Monsanto‟s 
patented Bt. gene as well as for Mahyco‟s proprietary claim over new biologicals.  
 
2.6: Emergent Spaces of Property, Propertising Emergence 
 
In the previous section, I have explained how the reterritorialisation of the idea of 
materiality has occurred through interactions and connections between 
heterogeneous entities. The point, however, is that these interactions and connections 
brought into existence an emergent space of property in a distant location, and this 
becomes more apparent not only from Mahyco/Monsanto‟s property rights claim 
over Bt. gene and Bt. brinjal, but also from Mahyco‟s desire to propertise emergence. 
Consider, for example, the ownership of Bt. gene by the global biotech firm 
Monsanto, which prohibits farmers in India from reproducing the genetically 
modified brinjal plant containing the Bt. gene. To put it another way, Monsanto‟s 
intellectual property or patent rights over an artificially manufactured biological 
artefact shall not be infringed either by reproducing the Bt. brinjal in any manner, or 
by isolating, modifying and transforming any parts or fragments of it. Consider also 
Mahyco‟s vigorous intellectual property rights claim over bio-technical process and 
Bt. brinjal in India. Mahyco not only reiterated and defended Monsanto‟s patent 
rights over the Bt. gene, but also reinforced its proprietary claim over brinjal 
germplasm containing the Bt. gene. Mahyco claimed that the MHSCL technology 
(the recombinant process of inserting the Bt. gene into the genome of brinjal plant 
and the modified brinjal germplasm) is a proprietary technology and therefore, its 
intellectual property right extends to any active fragments, mutation, seeds and future 
progeny. Mahyco further demanded effective legal protection by way of intellectual 
property rights over the „patented technology incorporated in living organism‟ (Bt. 
gene), MHSCL technology and bio-technically engineered brinjal plant, either by 
implementation or by amendment of existing intellectual property legislation. This is 
particularly evident in the changes made by 2002 and 2005 amendments, and it 
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becomes clear that these amendments were made to provide intellectual property 
protection to biotechnological processes and products, such as genetically modified 
plants and the future life form it would produce. More importantly, Mahyco‟s 
intellectual property rights claim over future progeny brings into view its desire to 
propertise emergence. In other words, by making proprietary claim over future life 
forms (seeds and progeny), which the modified brinjal germplasm would produce, 
Mahyco not only propertised the regenerative processes and capacities of the 
modified brinjal plant, but also propertised „potentiality‟. According to Strathern, 
potentiality is „the capacity of development as yet unrealised‟ (Strathern 1996, p 17). 
For Mahyco, potentiality of the transgenic germplasm is an asset, and establishing 
intellectual property rights over it, is a way of securing control over potential 
property, which is yet to be realised. As Strathern further notes, there is an emerging 
constellation of (Euro-American) property interests in potentiality – a field 
dominated by a well-established (legal) category, viz. intellectual property rights 
(ibid.). In this sense, the Bt. brinjal is not just an „emergent‟ life form and an 
„emergent‟ property form that were not there before, but it gives rise to potential 
property. Though the birth of Bt. brinjal resulted from the effort to produce an insect 
tolerant brinjal plant, it was a carefully crafted scientific and corporate plan between 
Mahyco and Monsanto to produce a commercial transgenic plant and create new 
market for transgenic food crops in India. However, their desire to propertise 
emergence through intellectual property rights transformed India into an emergent 
space of property. Accordingly, we can say that an emergent space of property comes 
into existence through interactions and connections between heterogeneous entities 




In this chapter, I have traced the connection between materiality, movement and an 
emergent space of property. My aim has been to understand how an emergent space 
of property comes into existence through the de/re-territorialising flows of desire, 
which was mediated by disparate elements. As discussed in chapter 1, existing 
narratives on the production of Bt. brinjal revolve around the risk and uncertainty of 
bio-technical science. These narratives not only neglected Mahyco/Monsanto‟s 
desire to propertise emergence, but also failed to see how an emergent space of 
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property comes into existence through interaction and connection between 
heterogeneous elements. To provide an account of this transformation, I have 
specifically focused on de/re-territorialisation through which the idea of materiality 
moves from one location to another. In particular, I have emphasised the role of 
Monsanto, its proprietary Bt. gene and the TRIPs Agreement in the 
deterritorialisation process. However, I have pointed out that to understand the 
significance of this movement, one needs to look into how the idea of materiality is 
reterritorialised in a distant location. Ultimately, what remains folded in the Euro-
American idea of materiality is the desire to propertise that not only established 
machinic conjunctions between the elements, but also moved through dispersed 
spaces. From this point of view, de/re-territorialisation of the idea of materiality 
spatialised the desire to propertise emergence. This in turn suggests that de/re-
territorialisation denotes movement in process and not simply „extension and 
incorporation‟. While the latter terms pay attention only to unidirectional movement, 
the former brings into view heterogeneity, mediation, movement and interaction, in 
the sense that heterogeneous components co-function, form alliances, relate to each 
other to bring qualitative transformation in a distant location. Thus, I have not only 
pointed out the changes made in India‟s intellectual property legislation, but also 
emphasised Mahyco/Monsanto‟s desire to propertise emergence. In other words, an 
attention to movement in process reveals the mediation between and co-functioning 
of disparate entities. In the next chapter, I discuss another dimension of this de/re-
territorialisation by focusing on the desire to normalise appropriation through 
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In chapter 3, I have shown how an emergent space of property comes into existence 
in a distant location through the de/re-territorialisation of the idea of materiality. 
Specifically, I have emphasised that this de/re-territorialisation process is mediated 
by heterogeneous entities situated in diverse spaces. In this chapter, I discuss another 
dimension of de/re-territorialisation by looking into normalisation of appropriation 
through the expansion of governance. In its allegation of „biopiracy‟,
121
 the ESG has 
pointed out that Mahyco/Monsanto and their collaborators have accessed local 
brinjal germplasm in the production of Bt. brinjal. Since no authorisation from the 
NBA was obtained for this appropriation, it is an act of biopiracy. This argument has 
been reiterated by ESG in a PIL suit at the Karnataka High Court in Bangalore.
122
 
The contention was that the production of Bt. brinjal is an act of biopiracy because it 
is produced without complying „with the provisions of the Biological Diversity Act, 
2002 that governs access to bio-resources in India‟ (ibid.). Indeed, „curtailing 
biopiracy of sovereign bio-resources and knowledge associated with it‟, according to 
the PIL, „is one of the fundamental reasons for ratifying the CBD, 1992 and the 
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enactment of Biological Diversity Act in 2002‟ (ibid.). Thus, for ESG, the issue is 
with governance because appropriation has taken place without complying with the 
CBD and the Biological Diversity Act. 
 
 
In this chapter, I look closely into the issue of governing access and utilisation of 
bio-genetic resources that ESG highlights in its allegation of biopiracy. The 
emerging bioeconomy involves a broad range of economic activities. It is founded on 
the desire to access and appropriate, to capture the potential economic value of bio-
genetic resources, and to expand the spaces of bio-economic production. Hence, its 
viability and expansion rest on unparalleled access to bio-genetic resources and new 
markets in disparate locations of the globe. Thus, the desire to capture and expand 
requires a shift in thinking, new ordering mechanisms, new legal arrangements. In 
short, it requires a new governance mechanism or what Foucault called 
„governmentality‟ (Foucault 1978/1991) that would normalise the appropriative and 
expansionist logic of the bioeconomy. Here, I use the term „expansion‟ in a 
Deleuze/Guattarian sense: as they observe, a rhizome operates by variation, 
expansion, capture and conquest (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 23). Expansion 
and capture, from this point of view, occur through deterritorialisation, which 
denotes movement and flow. Therefore, economy, institutions and legal norms 
expand and become deterritorialised by moving and flowing in every direction. And 
„normalisation‟, as Georges Canguilhem points out, is carrying out appropriation 
according to the norms of law or through establishing juridical order (Canguilhem 
1966/1989, pp 126-127; Canguilhem 1994, pp 351 and 374-375). In what follows, I 
argue that this normalisation and expansion are achieved through global/local 
governance mechanisms, such as the CBD and the Biological Diversity Act. 
However, the point is that expansion depends on movement. The expansion of the 
bioeconomy, therefore, occurs through the expansion of governance and what 
remains folded in governance mechanisms is the desire to normalise appropriation. 
Global/local governance mechanisms, therefore, normalised the movement of desire 
and in so doing, expanded the spaces of bio-economic production. And this 
expansion through movement, I would argue, deterritorialised and spatialised the 




To pursue these arguments, first, I take inspiration from Michel Foucault‟s work to 
elaborate the concept of „governance‟ and demonstrate that governance has a spatial 
dimension. Then, I move on to show that this spatial dimension of governance 
becomes visible once we look more closely into how laws, legal mechanisms and 
practices as tactics of rational intervention move and expand from one place to 
another in the emerging bioeconomy. To carry this understanding forward, I deploy 
the metaphor „governance at a distance‟ proposed by Miller and Rose (1992), and 
demonstrate that the CBD is a global governance mechanism that normalises the 
appropriation of bio-genetic resources at a distance. I locate this normalisation in 
India‟s Biological Diversity Act, 2002. Furthermore, borrowing insights from 
Deleuze/Guattari, I argue that the CBD is not just a „governance at a distance‟ 
mechanism, but rather an „apparatus of capture‟ that prescribes legal arrangements to 
capture the economic value of bio-genetic resources and in so doing, it has expanded 
the spaces of bio-economic production through the normalisation of appropriation. I 
conclude the chapter by observing that in the bioeconomy, expansion, normalisation 
and spatialisation are related to each other because they are parts of a simultaneous 




As emphasised above, the viability and expansion of the bioeconomy require a shift 
in thinking, or governance mechanisms that would normalise appropriation. 
Governance, from this point of view, is a component part of the bioeconomy. The 
term „governance‟ can be understood as „a change in the meaning of government, 
referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or 
the new method by which society is governed‟ (Rhodes 1996, pp 652-653; original 
emphasis).
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 While we do not find the term „governance‟ in Foucault‟s vast corpus 
of philosophical writing, his detailed analysis of the shift in governmental thinking at 
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 According to the Commission on Global Governance, governance „…is a continuing process 
through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be 
taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as 
informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their 
interest (Commission on Global Governance 1995, p 2). For a different social-theoretic perspective on 
governance, see Kooiman and Van Vliet 1993; Stoker 1998.  
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the end of eighteenth century and its continuation to present day neo-liberalism 
(Foucault 1978/1991) is useful for thinking about how governance functions in the 
bioeconomy. Foucault introduced the analytic of „governmentality‟ to offer a 
genealogical account of the shift in the style of governing and in so doing, he paid 
particular attention to economic-juridical rationality underlying such a shift. In his 
oft-cited essay „Governmentality‟, Foucault observes that the „art of government‟ 
discovered in the eighteenth century was concerned mainly with a sort of complex 
comprising of men and things – men in their relations, their links, their imbrication 
with those other things such as wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory 
with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc. (ibid., p 93). In other 
words, things must be disposed and for government it is not a question of imposing 
law on men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics rather than 
laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way 
that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved (ibid., 
pp 94-95). What we notice here is that the appearance of new problems and new 
objectives, and the main purpose of the „art of government‟ was to deploy new 
techniques and mechanisms capable of bringing economic relations within the realm 
of political practice (ibid., p 92; Foucault 1994/1997, p 67). Thus, „government‟ can 
be understood as an „activity‟ (ibid.), a „techne‟ (technique or technology), a „way of 
doing‟ – a framework of political rationality governed by a conscious goal (Foucault 
1994/2000, p 364; Foucault 1981, pp 353-354). And as an activity, „government‟ 
refers to the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed. To 
govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others (Foucault 
1982, p 221).
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 Over the past few years, a number of scholars have emphasised the term „governmentality‟. 
According to these scholars, „governmentality‟ is a certain way of thinking and acting about the kinds 
of problems that can and should be addressed by various authorities. This thinking and acting is 
embodied in attempts to know and govern the wealth, health and happiness of populations (Miller and 
Rose 1990, p 2; Rose and Miller 1992, p 174; see also Dean 1999, p 16). In this sense, 
„governmentality‟ is the „conduct of conduct‟: a form of activity or practice aiming to shape, guide or 
affect the conduct of individuals or a collective of economic agents (Gordon 1991, pp 2-3; Burchell 
1996, p 19; Rose 2000, p 322; see also Inda 2005, p 1-11; Lemke 2001, p 191). Thus, the neologism 
„governmentality‟ consists distinct rationalities, forms of conduct, and fields of practice, which aim to 
control individuals and collectivities in diverse ways. It is a more or less systematised, regulated and 
reflected mode of power, which following a specific form of reasoning defines the telos of action or 
adequate means to achieve it (Lemke 2002, p 53; Lemke 2003, p 176).  
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Foucault has further elaborated this analytical concept in detail in his 1978 and 1979 
lectures.
125
 These lectures, published more recently, show an important shift in his 
thinking and attention, and more importantly, he points out that economic activities 
are the contingent creations of legislation (Foucault 2004/2008, p 161). In the 1978 
lectures titled Security, Territory, Population, Foucault begins with the notion of 
„biopower‟ by which he tried to understand how, starting from the eighteenth 
century, „a set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the 
human species became the object of political strategy, of general strategy of power‟ 
(Foucault 2004/2007, p 1). But he quickly shifted his focus to mechanisms of 
security and the form of normalisation associated with it (ibid., pp 4 and 11). He 
observes that in the second half of the eighteenth century, a major change took place 
in the techniques of government – a new mechanism was deployed, which rather 
than disciplining (enclosing, protecting and regulating), expanded the market space 
(ibid., pp 34 and 45). Foucault calls this new mechanism „apparatuses of security‟ 
and the essential function of security is to regulate free movement of people and 
things without prohibition (law) or prescription (discipline), but possibly using some 
instruments of law and discipline (ibid., pp 47 and 49). Accordingly, the apparatus of 
security normalises movement but it is fundamentally different from disciplinary 
normalisation because in case of discipline, normalisation consists of trying to get 
people, movements, and actions to conform to specific norms (ibid., p 57). In 
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 It is important to note that Foucault‟s analysis of governmental technique or rationality was not 
new in these lectures. Colin Gordon locates Foucault‟s occupation with this theme in Discipline and 
Punish (1975/1979), in which Foucault recounts the growth of disciplinary techniques designed to 
observe, monitor, shape and control the behaviour of individuals situated within a range of social and 
economic institutions. Foucault understood these governmental techniques as „techniques of power‟ or 
„power/knowledge‟ and later began to study power relations by introducing the term „biopower‟ or 
„biopolitics‟ in The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 (1976/1998) and reintroduced this theme in his 1978 
lectures on „biopolitical government‟ (Gordon 1991, pp 3-5). Stephen J Collier, while agrees with 
Gordon to certain extent, argues that though Foucault‟s initial analysis of political government in 1976 
(The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 and Society Must Be Defended) shares a great deal with the approach 
developed in Discipline and Punish (1975/1979), his elaboration of the concept in later lectures 
(1978-79) shows an important modification in Foucault‟s method and diagnostic style, most notably, a 
shift in focus from the „mechanisms of  normalisation‟ (discipline and regulation) in 1975 and 1976 to 
„mechanisms of security‟ in 1978 and „biopolitics as a problem space‟ in 1979 (Collier 2009, pp 79-
93). My reading of Foucault here diverges from Gordon and Collier because in my view, Foucault 
developed the theme of governmental technique or rationality much earlier in his studies of madness 
(Foucault 1988b, p 19; see also White 1973, p 43). So in Madness and Civilisation (1961/1973), 
Foucault shows that the emergence of scientific confinement as a new institution in the nineteenth 
century has to be understood not only in terms of social and moral imperatives, but rather as an 
economic organisation concerned with increasing the productivity of the labouring subject and to 
organise them according to the need of the economy. Foucault reintroduced the theme in Discipline 
and Punish and continued this line of analysis in his 1978-79 lectures with an important shift in focus: 
rather than looking inside, he shifted his attention outside the institutions, the state (Foucault 
2004/2007, pp 116-119).      
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contrast, security normalises by allowing circulation (exchange) to take place freely 
and ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving around, 
continually going from one point to another (ibid., p 65). Thus, we can observe a 
change in the „art of government‟: a correlation or triangle between law, discipline 
and security. In a sense, there is not a succession of law, then discipline, then 
security, but governmental management is a way of making the old armatures of law 
and discipline function in addition to the specific mechanisms of security (ibid., pp 8, 
10 and 107). Interestingly, in the 1979 lectures titled The Birth of Biopolitics 
(2004/2008) Foucault describes this emerging rationality in governmental practices 
as „modern governmental reason‟ (ibid., p 10). And for Foucault, this rationalisation 
of governmental practices is an „art of governing‟ or „reasoned way of governing‟ 
that consists in arranging things through intellectual instruments: political-economic 
reflection (interventionist social policies) and the redefinition of juridical institutions 
(rules governing the market). Foucault terms this economic-juridical complex „neo-
liberalism‟. He further points out that the redefinition of juridical institutions was a 
necessity for regulating economic activities because the rules were not in tune with 
the competitive market economy. Hence, the problem was in the law (ibid., p 160). 
Therefore, the creation of a legal order that can constantly adapt to the progress of 
economic organisation is a technique of bringing law and the economy together. As 
Foucault writes, „the juridical gives form to the economic, and the economic would 
not be what it is without the juridical‟ (ibid., p 163). In other words, economic 
processes and legal institutions call on, support, modify and shape each other in 
ceaseless reciprocity (ibid., p 164). That is to say, economic processes cannot be 
dissociated from a juridical ensemble and accordingly, the economy becomes a set of 
regulated activities determined by legal institutions. The market must function within 
a juridical-institutional framework guaranteed by the state. This suggests that legal 
institutions or a system of law frames the economy and provides a framework within 
which economic agents can freely make their decisions (ibid., pp 166-173). It is 
worth quoting Foucault at length on this point: 
„Liberalism probably did not derive any more from a juridical reflection than from an 
economic analysis. It was not given birth by the idea of a political society founded on 
a contractual relationship. Rather, in the search for a liberal technology of 
government, regulation by means of a juridical form appeared to constitute a far more 
effective instrument than wisdom or the moderation of the governing…. This 
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regulation was in the “law” after which liberalism sought, not at all because the 
juridical was natural for it but rather because the law defined forms of general 
intervention which were exclusive of particular, individual, exceptional measures and 
because the participation of the governed in the elaboration of that law through a 
parliament constituted the most effective system for a governed economy‟ (Foucault 
1981, p 357).                  
The crucial point is that Foucault understood „governmentality‟ as a method of 
rationalising governmental practices through economic-juridical ensemble that 
appeared and took shape in relation to liberalism and neo-liberalism from the 
eighteenth century onwards (Foucault 1981, pp 353-354). This economic-juridical 
ensemble emerged in response to a crisis in government. The main concern of this 
ensemble was „how‟ to govern the complex comprising of men and things according 
to rational knowledge and reflection. Government is thus an „art of rational 
intervention‟ (Foucault 1979/1981, pp 243 and 248) and as an economic-juridical 
ensemble, the art of governing is formed by institutions, procedures, methods, 
reflections, techniques, and tactics that allow complex and multiple practices to 
operate and intervene (Foucault 1978/1991, p 102; Foucault 1981/1991, p 176; 
Foucault 1984, p 338). Viewed in this way, the notion of government highlights a 
complex and heterogeneous assemblage of mechanisms through which authorities of 
various sorts have sought to shape, normalise and instrumentalise the conduct, 
thought, decisions and aspirations of others to achieve the objectives they consider 
desirable (Miller and Rose 1990, p 8). Thus, governmentality refers to a historically 
specific way of thinking and acting that emerged in the eighteenth century and more 
specifically an approach to governance (Brady 2014, p 19).
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 In a 1993 publication, Hunt proposes that we need to depart from the term „government‟ and focus 
on „governance‟. The focus on „governance‟, he argues, opens up a space that allows us to think of 
government as a process rather than an institution and to break with the habits long instilled by the 
dominance of the nation-state in our experience that only governments govern. He further suggests 
that his intention is to articulate a conception of governance that starts from the interrogation of law as 
a mode of regulation, and in so doing, he intends to avoid an either-or choice between the global and 
the local, between state and civil society (Hunt 1993, pp 305-309; see also Hunt and Wickham 1994, 
chapters 4 and 5). Here I do not follow his/their proposed theoretical framework for two reasons: first, 
I agree with Baxter that rather than illuminating how Foucault‟s work can help us to understand 
government as a specific approach to governance or how laws are used as tactics of governance, Hunt 
and Wickham moved away from Foucault too quickly and turned toward their own research project 
„sociology of law as governance‟ (Baxter 1995-96). Second, Hunt and Wickham propose their 
approach to law as governance on the basis of Durkheimian understanding that the „social‟ is an 
independent category that can be found everywhere and law as distinct social phenomena, is a specific 
area of study. They also find a connection between Durkheimian tradition in the study of the social 
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4.3: Spatialities of Governance 
 
At this juncture, I want to stress two points. First, government as an economic-
juridical ensemble involves tactics of rational intervention (see also Miller and Rose 
1990, p 7; Lemke 2001, p 191) and Foucault points out that laws can be used as 
tactics to arrange things. More specifically, law as a mechanism of security can be 
used to expand the market space, or legal institutions can be used to support, modify, 
and shape economic activities, which Foucault calls „legal interventionism‟ (Foucault 
2004/2008, p 167). Much energy has already been spent on „bringing Foucault into 
law and law into Foucault‟ (Baxter 1995-96) and I do not find it necessary to revisit 
this old debate here.
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 The point that I want to emphasise here is that Foucault was 
concerned with „how‟ and not with „what‟ questions (see, for example, Gordon 1991, 
p 7; Dean 1999, p 16). His concern was with „how law operates‟ (Foucault 
1976/1998, p 144), „how law expands the market space‟, „how law shapes economic 
activities‟ and not with „what law is‟. Foucault points out that law increasingly 
operates as a „norm‟ and by this he means to suggest that normalisation tends to be 
accompanied by an astonishing proliferation of legislation. The norm, then, is not 
opposed to law; rather, law can operate by formulating norms (Ewald 1990, p 
138).
128
 Accordingly, in contemporary regimes of government and control, Rose and 
Valverde argue, law is connected up to, and dependent upon, a matrix of apparatuses 
whose function is mainly regulatory and therefore, we need to analyse the role of 
legal mechanisms, legal arenas, legal forms of reasoning and so on in strategies of 
regulation (Rose and Valverde 1998).  
                                                                                                                                                                            
and Foucaultian understanding of governmentality (Hunt and Wickham 1994, p 78). It is true that 
Durkheim understood the „social‟ as an independent category but as Levi-Strauss points out, without 
taking heed that this new category entails all sorts of specificities corresponding to the various aspects 
through which we apprehend it (Levi-Strauss 1973/1978, p 6). Thus, my approach to governance is 
Foucaultian (governance as an assemblage of diverse mechanisms) because Foucault explicitly 
rejected a Durkheimian study of the social (see, for example, Foucault 1981-82/2007, p 155).    
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 To get a glimpse of this debate, see de Sousa Santos 1985; Hunt 1992 and 1993; Hunt and 
Wickham 1994; Baxter 1995-1996; Tadros 1998; Munro 2001; Wickham 2006; Golder 2008; Golder 
and Fitzpatrick 2009; Golder 2013. For an overall assessment of Foucault‟s contribution to socio-legal 
scholarship, see Valverde 2010.     
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 According to Ewald, in the first volume of the History of Sexuality, Foucault suggests that law 
increasingly operates in the form of norms and in so suggesting, he made a distinction between „the 
juridical‟ (monarchical law) and „the normative‟ (legislation) (Ewald 1990, p 138). In my view, 
Ewald‟s interpretation is right that Foucault understood law increasingly operates as norms, but we do 
not find the distinction between „juridical‟ and „law‟ in his 1978-79 lectures. Rather, he has used the 




Second, the practice of government involves multiple authorities that govern in 
different sites through an elaborate network of relations formed by a complex 
assemblage of forces: institutions, organisations, programmes, aspirations, 
techniques, procedures, and documents (Rose and Miller 1992, p 183; Rose 1996a, p 
42; Rose, O‟Malley and Valverde 2006, p 85; Huxley 2007 and 2008). Thus, some 
scholars suggest that under an emerging order of globalism, there is a concomitant 
proliferation of governmental practices of spatial ordering in which the state and the 
market are reconfigured in novel ways (Perry 2000, p 66; Perry and Maurer 2003, pp 
xiii-xiv). Indeed, one finds new practices of global governmentality, which are 
dispersed in character. And as new ordering mechanisms, these new practices 
increasingly rely on dispersed, marketised, globalised mode of regulation (Perry and 
Maurer 2003, p xiv; Fraser 2003, p 167). These new forms of governance, which 
Sally Merry calls „spatial governmentality‟, flow and move from one place to another 
and therefore, govern spaces rather than persons (Merry 2001, pp 16 and 18). 
 
The point is that Foucault puts specific emphasis on the spatial aspect of governance, 
as he writes, „the art of government could only spread and develop in an age of 
expansion, free from military, political and economic tensions‟ (Foucault 1978/1991, 
p 97). Expansion, as pointed out above, has spatial dimensions and, if for Foucault 
government spreads and develops through expansion, then laws as tactics of 
intervention and normalisation also move, expand, and flow from one place to 
another and in so doing, establish relations between practices and spaces that are 
spatially separated. This expansive nature of the art of governing suggests that we 
need to pay attention to spatialities of governance. An attention to spatialities of 
governance will help us to understand how new spaces, objects, and sites in far flung 
locations are opened up for intervention to achieve certain ends, and how spatially 
separated practices and sites get connected or bound up with one another through the 




4.4: Normalising Appropriation, Spatialising Governance  
 
The concept of „bioeconomy‟ covers a broad range of appropriative activities. More 
specifically, the bioeconomy as a global project and dream intends to capture the 
economic value of biological processes and products through bio-technical 
modification and intellectual property rights. However, the absence of regulation 
creates insecurity in the market because without enforceable regulation there is no 
sustainable access to bio-genetic resources, and without sustainable access it is not 
possible to produce bio-technically modified or manufactured products. In short, 
without enforceable regulation there is no viable future for the bioeconomy and, as 
emphasised in the introductory chapter, this absence has been described as a crisis in 
governance, which must be mitigated through the redefinition of juridical 
institutions. Enforceable regulation, in this sense, becomes a new technique or 
mechanism of governing, and as a method of rational governmental intervention, it 
operates as a „mechanism of security‟. The essential function of law in the 
bioeconomy, therefore, is to govern the movement of biological materials – to ensure 
that biological materials are continuously moving from one place to another. In other 
words, the purpose of law is to normalise appropriation of bio-genetic resources in 
the production of new biologicals. Thus, it is legal institution or a framework of law, 
which functions as a mechanism of normalisation, in the sense that law supports, 
modifies, and shapes appropriative activities, and in so doing, normalises the desire 
to appropriate.  
 
Governance, however, is an art of disposing things, an art of rational intervention. 
The operation of governance, therefore, depends on the identification of objects, sites 
or spaces it intends to govern. And in the bioeconomy, these objects and spaces are 
dispersed. Since the bioeconomy intends to expand the spaces of bio-economic 
production – to deterritorialise the desire to capture and appropriate, it depends upon 
a framework of law that can normalise the appropriation of bio-genetic resources 
situated in disparate locations. Then, the question that begs for exploration is: how 
does a framework of law governs appropriation in dispersed sites. Put otherwise, 
how does the desire to appropriate move and expand through a framework of law. 
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Here I follow the observation of Rose and Miller that „government depends upon 
calculations in one place about how to affect things in another‟ (Rose and Miller 
1992, p 185). It means that we need to look at „action or governance at a distance‟. 
For Nietzsche, „action at a distance‟ comes from the inner will, it is an insatiable 
desire to manifest power or exercise power, it is a force from which there is no 
escape, not even an empty space is outside its grip (Nietzsche 1968, pp 332-333). 
„Action at a distance‟, from this point of view, can be understood as a strategy to 
govern dispersed spaces. Miller and Rose, however, suggest that „governance at a 
distance‟ is a complex mechanism in which one actor adopts a particular way of 
thinking and acting and convinces other actors that their problems or goals are 
intrinsically linked, that their interests are consonant, that each can solve their 
difficulties or achieve their ends by joining forces or working along the same line. 
Thus, by persuasion or compulsion, one actor comes to construe problems in allied 
ways and convinces other actors that their fate in some way is bound up with one 
another. In this way, objects and practices that are separated by time, space and 
territorial boundaries can be aligned and in so doing, it is possible to act from a 
centre of calculation such as government office or the headquarters of an inter-
governmental organisation, on the desires and activities of others who are spatially 
separated (Miller and Rose 1990, pp 9-10; also Rose, O‟Malley and Valverde 2006, 
p 89). Taken together, these observations suggest that governance mechanisms or 
laws can be framed not only to govern objects situated in dispersed spaces and shape 
the activities of others at a distance, but also to normalise and mediate the movement 
of desire to disparate locations. 
 
The emergence of ordering mechanisms designed to govern at a distance is not 
entirely a new phenomenon, especially if one considers the proliferation of an array 
of global legal artefacts in the past few decades, mainly from the headquarters of 
global institutions (such as the WTO, WIPO, UN). However, we can look more 
closely into one such ordering mechanism to understand how it expands the 
bioeconomy to disparate locations at a distance. I specifically focus on the CBD, a 
global and strategic legal instrument proposed and formulated by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), an umbrella organisation of the United Nations 
situated in Geneva. This is not to say that there is a dearth of scholarly and critical 
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analysis of this global legal artefact in the academic literature. Indeed, scholars from 
a variety of disciplinary backgrounds have dwelt on this global instrument to provide 
a critical account of the regimes of environmentality and appropriation of bio-genetic 
resources in the context of global environmental governance.
129
 But as Duffy 
observes, much research and writing on global environmental governance focuses on 
the outcomes, or on the structural/global power relations that are embedded in 
international conventions and institutions (Duffy 2014, p 126). Very few dwell on 
how decisions are made at international fora, how ideas about conservation emerge, 
gain traction, are contested and debated, how compromises are made, and how 
bargains are struck. In essence, most work on conventions analyses which 
agreements are made rather than how they are produced in the first place (ibid.). 
Therefore, the analytic of „governance at a distance‟ is useful for thinking about how 
a governance mechanism framed at a particular location assumed a global character. 
That is, how it normalised the desire to appropriate and at the same time, mediated 
the movement of this desire to dispersed locations. The argument, then, is that a 
closer look into the CBD‟s negotiation process between 1988 and 1992 would reveal 
how a group of experts working under the UNEP adopted a particular way of 
thinking and acting, defined problems as common concern and found solutions in 
common interest, and convinced others that these problems could be solved by 
designing a global legal mechanism. More precisely, I am interested to look at how 
ideas about the bioeconomy emerged and gained traction during the negotiation 
process, or how a group of experts devised a global legal mechanism to govern 
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 Geographical and spatial aspects of environmental governance received extensive attention in 
human and environmental geography, and in anthropology. More specifically, drawing insights from 
Foucault‟s work on neoliberal governmentality, some scholars have analysed the neoliberalisation of 
biodiversity conservation policies and practices as embodying distinct „environmentalities‟. These 
policies and practices, according to these scholars, are a form „green governmentality‟, which intends 
to generate „geo-power‟ through rational insertion of natural and artificial bodies into the machinery 
of production. Further, these scholars argue that the way nature is conceived, acted up and managed in 
these discursive regimes of environmentality, one can clearly find disciplinary interventions where 
power/knowledge operates to inculcate an environmental ethic by means of which people will self-
regulate their behaviour in conservation friendly ways (see Luke 1995, 1999a, 1999b; MacDonald 
2005; Rutherford 2007; Fletcher 2010). Others have focused on new global agreements or regulatory 
regimes for the environment which, in their view, enact a new form of governance or art of eco-
government to regulate relationships between people and things on a global scale. These governance 
regimes, in view of these scholars, as new modalities of power/knowledge are disciplinary in nature, 
and therefore, circulate and expand through multiple sites of encounter. In so doing, these disciplinary 
regimes produce environmental subjects either by compelling them to participate in neoliberal 
processes of eco-government or by forcing them to mobilise opposition against the politics of global 
environmentalism (see Gupta 1998; Goldman 2001 and 2006; Agrawal 2005a and 2005b). 
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appropriation at a distance. And in doing so, normalised and deterritorialised the 
desire to appropriate. 
 
In 1988, the Executive Director of the UNEP established an Ad-Hoc Working Group 
of Experts to investigate the desirability and possibility of an umbrella convention to 
„rationalise‟ activities in the field of biological diversity. The Working Group of 
Experts on Biological Diversity first met in November 1988 at headquarter of the UN 
in Geneva. In the first meeting, the Working Group discussed matters of mutual 
concern and expressed the belief that certain measures should be explored and 
adopted to realise the conservation and sustainable use of bio-genetic resources. By 
emphasising the urgent need of actions and measures at the global level, the Working 
Group proposed to identify gaps in the existing machinery and determine methods by 
which those gaps could be filled. A conclusion was reached that existing instruments 
and programmes could not adequately meet the aim of conservation and 
consequently, a legally binding mechanism was needed to deal with the conservation 
of biological resources at the global level. In this direction, the Working Group 
proposed to examine further the question of access to and ownership of, and placing 
appropriate economic value on, bio-genetic resources (UNEP/Bio.DIV.1/3 1989). A 
number of sessions were convened in 1990. The Working Group met in Geneva for 
its second session to advise further on the contents of the new legal instrument and 
requested the Executive Director to commence a number of studies to address 
outstanding issues: of particular importance was the study of the need and costs of 
global conservation and access to genetic resources and technology. There was a 
consensus that access to genetic resources, knowledge, data, new varieties and 
related technologies are important for conservation and therefore, the question of 
access must be addressed in the planned legal instrument. It was decided that access 
should be based on mutual agreement respecting the permanent sovereignty of States 
over natural resources. However, the relationship between intellectual property 
rights, access to genetic resources and ownership of biotechnology by private and 
public sectors needed to be further examined. Thus, the Working Group concluded 
that there is a need to incorporate an innovative mechanism in the international legal 
instrument that would facilitate the access to biological resources and new 
technologies (UNEP/Bio.Div.2/3 1990). Reports of these studies were presented in 
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the third session held in Geneva. The report titled Biodiversity: Global Conservation 
Needs and Costs stressed that a global strategy is required for the conservation of 
biological resources and it can only be achieved through an international agreement. 
But the main concern was with implementation because the success of a global 
strategy depends on the formation of consensus on global priorities, and global as 
well as regional plans and programmes, which would promote local adaptation and 
implementation (UNEP/Bio.Div.3/3 1990; UNEP/Bio.Div.3/Inf.1 1990).  
 
A number of reports have addressed the issue of access to genetic resources and its 
relationship with intellectual property rights and biotechnology. There was a 
common consensus that the full potential of biological diversity can best be realised 
if genetic resources remain accessible to all users because biological diversity is a 
collective asset, even if in geographical terms it belongs to one region of the world or 
another. It was agreed that access to bio-genetic resources should be „paid open 
access‟. But the terms of access must be formulated in the spirit of co-operation 
between gene-rich developing and technology-rich developed countries and must 
facilitate the acquisition of genetic resources (UNEP/Bio.Div.3/12 1990). This turn 
towards open but paid access was a response to an increasing pressure from gene-
rich developing countries not to make their wild plants and local varieties available 
free of charge (UNEP/Bio.Div.3/Inf.4 1990). Thus, farmers who have conserved and 
improved wild plants and local varieties would get payment for making their plant 
genetic resources available for commercial exploitation. But the negotiation on terms 
and conditions should be global and must be developed jointly. Moreover, the 
argument was that gene-rich countries should have access to technologies that would 
enable them to realise the potential economic value of genetic resources through 
commercialisation (UNEP/Bio.Div.3/8 1990). Therefore, emphasis was placed on the 
development of biotechnology, since biotechnology could alter the value of capital 
stock of known and unknown genetic resources (UNEP/Bio.Div.3/6 1990). More 
importantly, biotechnology could speed up the evaluation of germplasm for specific 
traits and it could be funded by enterprises that profit from the use of biotechnology 
(UNEP/Bio.Div.3/4 1990). In other words, the proposed global legal mechanism was 
a promising avenue for the promotion of biotechnological research and solutions in 
developing countries. However, while industrialised countries depend heavily on 
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developing countries for germplasm they need for biotechnological research, most 
biotechnological solutions are developed by private sectors in industrialised countries 
and protected by intellectual property rights. The proposed legal mechanism, 
therefore, promised to play a „brokering‟ role for the bio-industry located in 
developed nations and also for developing country governments that are interested in 
building their national biotechnology programmes (UNEP/Bio.Div.3/7 1990). The 
Sub-Working Group on Biotechnology presented their final report at UNEP 
Headquarters in Nairobi in November 1990.  
 
In its report, the Sub-Working Group categorically pointed out that biotechnology 
plays an important role in the production of new plant varieties and therefore, 
biotechnology needed to be promoted for the development of genetically engineered 
food crops. The report emphasised that industrialised countries have a responsibility 
to guarantee the transfer of biotechnology to developing countries, and participation 
by multinational corporations in transferring biotechnology should be increased. To 
achieve this purpose, it is necessary to maintain a wide genetic base for the future of 
biotechnological innovations but access to genetic resources should not be free-of-
charge. Similarly, access to biotechnology and know-how must be paid by 
developing countries. Thus, there was a general agreement that the question of 
intellectual property rights should be reflected in the proposed legal mechanism and 
the development of strong national intellectual property regimes should be promoted 
to assist in the flow and development of biotechnology 
(UNEP/Bio.Div/SWGB.1/5/Rev.1 1990). In other words, the legal mechanism would 
act as a facilitator for bio-tech corporations in developed countries to transfer their 
technology to relevant institutions and individuals in developing countries, on the 
one hand, and for the transfer of genetic resources from developing countries to bio-
industries in developed nations, on the other (UNEP/Bio.Div.3/4 1990). Management 
of biological resources, therefore, needs a global law, the basis of which must be 
provided by a global agreement (UNEP/Bio.Div.3/Inf.4 1990). The aim of such a 
legally binding instrument would be to govern biological resources in areas beyond 




In the first session held in Nairobi (November 1990), the Ad Hoc Working Group of 
Legal and Technical Experts on Biological Diversity re-emphasised that an 
innovative mechanism should be incorporated in the legal instrument to facilitate 
access to resources and new technologies and discussed in detail the elements that 
should be included in the draft agreement (UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/1/4 1990; 
UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/1/3 1990). The Ad Hoc Working Group prepared the first draft 
and received detailed comments, suggestions and proposal for amendments from the 
member countries of the UN. An account of these response and suggestions were 
presented in the second session held in Nairobi (UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/1/4/Add.1 
1991; UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/2/2 1991). Taking these suggestions and proposals into 
account and on the instructions of the Ad Hoc Working Group, the UNEP prepared a 
revised draft of the Convention on Biological Diversity. The revised draft was 
reviewed by a group of lawyers representing a balance between the regions to 
produce a concise and coherent legal text (UNEP/Bio.Div/WG.2/3/3 1991). Between 
November 1990 and May 1992, the representatives from the member countries of the 
UN attended seven „intergovernmental committee‟ (as the Ad Hoc Working Group 
came to be known) sessions – highly structured battlegrounds spreading across 
Nairobi, Madrid and Geneva, to intensely discuss, debate and negotiate the uses of 





The most contentious issues debated and negotiated were access to and ownership of 
bio-genetic resources, intellectual property rights, biotechnology and technology 
transfer, fair and equitable sharing of benefits and the rights of farmers. These 
intergovernmental sessions were preliminary consensus building activities where the 
developed and the developing nation-states as actors assembled to debate critical 
issues facing our planet, to challenge competing ideals and showcase the strength of 
their arguments. In short, these sessions were „trial of strength‟ to challenge each 
other, build consensus and forge alliance, all sponsored by the United Nations. 
Accordingly, the draft convention went through several revisions, deletions, 
inclusions of new provisions, and redrafting to address the concerns and issues 
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raised, and implement the amendments proposed. Finally, an agreed text of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity was adopted in the Nairobi Conference on 22 
May 1992 and the Convention was opened for signature at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED known as Rio Earth 
Summit) in Rio de Janeiro on 5 June 1992. 
 
The Rio Conference was the outcome of preparation and preliminary negotiations 
over a period of three years. Though the text of the Convention was negotiated in 
advance, the main purpose of the Conference was to bring diverse actors from 
spatially disparate locations in a space of negotiation and endorse a global legal 
mechanism that would govern appropriation or normalise the desire to appropriate at 
a distance. According to one account of the event,
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„UNCED began on 3 June with a formal inauguration in the plenary hall of the newly 
renovated Rio-Centre complex. The formal signing of the two conventions was 
initiated and continued until the last day of the conference. …the negotiating sessions 
were held in a series of simultaneous, closed meetings in which the official delegates 
negotiated the final form of the three declaratory documents under consideration. 
…Ten days of intense negotiations among the official national delegations were 
capped by a three-day summit meeting attended by 117 heads of state and government 
– a world record. In two days of plenary sessions, the world leaders gave 107 
consecutive 7-minute speeches filled with superlative phraseology. In a dazzling 
display of pretentious discourse, various leaders claimed that the Rio Conference was 
the most important event in human history while others warned that it was the last 
chance to save humanity from destruction. …In this regard, UNCED was a global 
magic act, in which the leaders of the world supposedly solved their problems through 
the evocation of discursive catchwords‟ (Little 1995, pp 267-268).       
In one sense, therefore, in Rio the local became the global. And in another sense, the 
event brings into view that the global is an assemblage of multiple locales, and 
entities or actors that participate in the construction of the global also assume global 
character. However, the point of the above discussion is to demonstrate how a group 
of experts sitting at the headquarter of the UN adopted a particular way of thinking 
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and acting, defined problems, brought diverse entities together from disparate 
locations, and convinced other actors to make compromises, build consensus, and 
find solutions in common interest. In so doing, these actors have devised a global 
legal mechanism and since the purpose of this mechanism is to govern or normalise 
appropriation in disparate locations, it has spatialised and deterritorialised the desire 
to appropriate. Put otherwise, a group of experts has devised a global legal 
mechanism that mediated the movement of desire through the expansion of 
governance.
132
          
 
4.5: Spatialising Normalisation 
 
The emergence of „governance at a distance‟ mechanism, such as the CBD, is a 
defining moment in the expansion of the bioeconomy. The CBD, as the above 
discussion shows, was shaped by dominant economic interests of developed 
countries and global bio-tech corporations, that is, to normalise appropriation. 
Viewed in this way, it can be said that by normalising appropriation, the CBD laid 
down the future path of the emerging bioeconomy. Though the purpose of the 
Convention was to promote sustainable use of biodiversity and conservation, it 
happens to become a global governance mechanism and thus, brings into view a shift 
in thinking and governing that incorporated economic rhetoric and an emerging 
juridical apparatus to normalise the desire to appropriate. It was a major step in the 
institutionalisation of economic interests of global bio-tech corporations over bio-
genetic resources and it is not difficult to see how the Convention aligned 
biotechnology and emphasised the role of transnational corporations within the 
overall scheme of sustainability and conservation. As Coombe observes,  
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„The biotechnology industry requires certainty for commercial transactions and 
regulatory regimes that facilitate access to genetic resources, local knowledge, and 
ecosystem expertise so as to price these undervalued resources and create market-
based incentives for their trade. The CBD, arguably, is first and foremost a legal 
regime designed to meet these economic needs‟ (Coombe 2003, p 283).    
In essence, the Convention legitimised the entrance of biotechnology and bio-tech 
industries in the management of bio-genetic resources and encouraged global bio-
tech corporations to move their technologies to developing countries. And this 
movement has to be channelled through the newly devised global legal process that 
aligns the ideologies of technoscientific modernism with the desire to appropriate. 
This means that the Convention is structured in such a way as to make room for 
global bio-tech industries to access and utilise genetic resources in the development 
of new bio-tech products and move their new technologies to disparate locations 
(Article 1). This point is important in understanding the entrance of the bio-tech 
sector in the appropriation of genetic resources and the consequent expansion of the 
spaces of bio-economic production. My point here is that the Convention framed an 
interventionist form of global governance that institutionalised the participation of 
global bio-tech industries in the appropriation of biodiversity. In so doing, it 
authorised bio-tech corporations to access and utilise genetic resources in return for a 
sustainable technology, such as the development of transgenic crops which, bio-tech 
industries argue, have huge ecological benefits in terms of reducing the use of 
hazardous pesticides and chemicals.  
 
In other words, the desire to normalise the appropriation of genetic resources located 
in diverse spaces was part of an overall strategy in the formulation of governance at a 
distance mechanism and it is clearly evident in the statement I have highlighted 
above that the aim of this globally binding legal document is to govern appropriation 
in areas beyond territorial borders. The intention to involve global bio-tech actors in 
this governance initiative was clearly revealed at the drafting stage. This intention 
becomes clear from the emphasis placed on modern biotechnology‟s ability to alter 
the economic value of genetic resources; and the fact that this evaluation and 
alteration should be funded by transnational enterprises that generate profit from the 
use of biotechnology, specifically, from the production and marketing of transgenic 
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technologies or crops. This attempt to introduce a facilitating mechanism for the 
appropriation and commercialisation of bio-genetic resources aligns very well with 
the „business in and with biodiversity‟ approach adopted by bio-tech industries. In 
response, the bio-tech industry reacted proactively and began to expand its bio-
economic activities into disparate locations either directly by participating in public 
or public/private biotechnology programmes, or by moving their proprietary bio-
technologies to public and private bio-tech institutions in developing countries.  
 
The CBD, therefore, embraced and accommodated the mission of the global bio-tech 
industry to expand its desire to appropriate throughout the globe; and this has 
happened through an ideological alignment of „market-based paradigm of 
environmental management‟ (McAfee 2003, p 210), most apparently visible in the 
access to bio-genetic resources and sharing of profits from their commercialisation 
(Article 1). Here then we find the manifestation that the Convention encouraged the 
bio-tech industry to commercialise bio-genetic resources. More importantly, this 
commercialisation has not only acquired legitimacy through a global legal 
instrument, but it was a part of the overall strategy of global governance. To 
understand the significance of this shift and the coordination between the desire to 
appropriate and expand that underlie the „governance at a distance‟ mechanism, we 
need to look more closely into some of the provisions of the Convention. The 
Convention recognises the economic and scientific value of biological diversity and 
its components (Preamble) and defines biological resources „as the natural stock of 
genetic material within an ecosystem‟ (Heller and Escobar 2003, p 157) that have 
actual or potential value (Article 2). Acknowledging the loss of biological diversity 
because of unsustainable use or appropriation, the Preamble further recommends the 
development of scientific, technical and institutional measures for its protection. In 
other words, the Convention expressed concern regarding unsustainable 
appropriation, but as pointed out above, this concern is mainly with insufficient or 
complete absence of governance mechanism that would govern the appropriation of 
bio-genetic resources. Said differently, unsustainable appropriation of bio-genetic 
resources has been defined as a problem of non-existent or inadequate regulation, 
which demands a new governance mechanism. Thus, regulation of appropriation 




Accordingly, the access and utilisation of bio-genetic resources have been transferred 
from the realm of „common heritage‟ to the boundaries of sovereign jurisdiction. 
Recognising the sovereign states‟ right to exploit their bio-genetic resources, the 
Convention mandates that contracting parties shall develop national strategies, plans 
and programmes for sustainable access and utilisation (Articles 3 and 6). This shift in 
understanding is intriguing because the principle of national sovereignty has been 
deployed to invite nation-states to efficiently map, monitor and create a juridical 
condition that will enable the security of possession necessary for contractual 
relations involving its exploitation (Coombe 2003, p 283). More importantly, this 
legitimisation of the right to exploit by nation-states suggests that appropriation or 
exploitation of bio-genetic resources should be carried out according to the norms of 
law. Put differently, as a form of rational intervention, a framework of law should be 
deployed to arrange, shape, support and expand the spaces of appropriative or 
exploitative activities. Hence, appropriation becomes sustainable once it is 
channelled through the governing mechanisms of the state. Consequently, the 
emphasis on normalising appropriation through the regulatory apparatus of the state 
has animated in the text of the Convention in a curious rhythm (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/2004, p 469). Not surprisingly, then, the authority to normalise appropriation 
rests with the state and is subject to states‟ legislative, institutional and economic 
policies. However, such legislative measures must not impose undue restrictions on 
access; rather, they should create conditions to facilitate appropriation and 
exploitation by other contracting parties. These conditions may include further 
development of such bio-genetic resources through biotechnological research and 
such research might be carried out within the territory and with the full participation 
of the resource provider. In addition, such legislative measures must establish a 
mechanism, which will enable the providing country or community to secure a „fair 
and equitable‟ share of the benefits arising from the commercial utilisation of such 
research and development, either by way of monetary compensation, or through 
transfer of biotechnological processes and products that have been developed. And if 
such biotechnologies are commercialised and protected by patents, then the transfer 
of such technologies must be carried out according to international and domestic 




Taken together, these provisions suggest that the essential function of governance 
mechanism prescribed by the CBD is to establish an „apparatus of security‟ that will 
ensure the circulation and movement of bio-genetic resources from fields to 
laboratories and then from the laboratory to fields and other laboratories in disparate 
locations of the globe, either in the form of raw materials, or in the form patented 
biological objects. And these activities should be carried out through „benefit 
sharing‟ arrangements – a pseudo-legal concept designed to compensate 
communities and nation-states for the shift of resources as well as ownership rights 
to bio-tech industries (Peterson 2001, p 78).
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 But, as McAfee points out, the 
equation of benefits with genetic resources represents an instrumentalist economic 
paradigm. It reduces bio-genetic resources into commodities that must be privatised 
and traded before benefits can be shared, and therefore, intellectual property rights to 
genetic information are the conceptual cornerstone of proposals for the allocation of 
„biodiversity benefits‟ under the CBD (McAfee 1999, pp 144-145). In other words, 
the Convention as a governance mechanism is designed to arrange the field of action 
for bio-tech industries and in so doing, it has normalised the movement of desire in 
all its hidden forms. As Parry observes, both the CBD and its more contemporary 
counterpart, the OECD bioeconomy policy agenda, intend to create an ostensibly 
„normative‟ framework within which the intensive biotechnological exploitation of 
bio-genetic resources might be facilitated under the legitimising rubric of 
„sustainable development‟ (Parry 2007, p 388).  
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around genetic resources‟ (Pottage 2006b, p 151).    
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It has already become clear how the CBD has normalised the desire to appropriate or, 
to reiterate Canguilhem‟s argument, it becomes easy to understand how the 
normalisation of appropriative activities is related to the juridical order. However, the 
CBD is a „governance at a distance‟ mechanism which, as emphasised above, is 
designed not only to shape and govern the activities of others in dispersed locations, 
but also to mediate the movement of desire. Thus, while the CBD operates and 
governs at a distance, it overcomes distance by specifying actions and practices, 
which the distant other needs to follow and adopt. The point is that the Convention is 
aimed at normalising appropriation through domestic legal arrangements so that 
appropriative activities can be carried out in disparate locations with the support of 
state apparatuses. From this point of view, it can be argued that the CBD as a global 
governance mechanism becomes „the capitalist axiomatic‟ – it is capable of 
instrumentalising the state apparatuses and make them operational to expand the 
capitalist logic of the bioeconomy, and consequently, it „organizes its Third World‟ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 482). Consider, for example, the Indian 
Biological Diversity Act 2002. The Act not only reaffirms the sovereign rights of the 
Indian State over its bio-genetic resources, but also reproduces the rhetorical virtue 
of the „global‟, that is, to normalise appropriation through legal norms, in a locally 
binding document. For instance, the Act states that plants, animals, micro-organisms 
and their genetic materials with actual or potential value should be collected and 
extracted for commercial utilisation, and such utilisation includes the use of genes for 
improving crops and livestock through biotechnological intervention (Section 2). 
However, the access to bio-genetic resources, their transfer for research and 
development, and commercial utilisation of such research is subject to prior 
application, approval and permission of the NBA and the State Biodiversity Board 
(Sections 3, 4, 7, 19 and 20).
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 Such permission and approval must ensure the 
equitable sharing of benefits arising from the access and commercial utilisation 
(including any inventions and patents) of bio-genetic resources, either in the form of 
joint ownership of intellectual property rights, technology transfer, setting up venture 
capital fund, or monetary compensation and other non-monetary benefits (Sections 6 
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and 21). Given that the production of Bt. brinjal started in 2002 and radical changes 
were made in the Patent Act in the same year, the inclusion of these provisions in the 
Biological Diversity Act is not surprising. Rather, the Act implicitly recognises the 
propertisation and commercialisation of „new inventions‟ or new biologicals (such as 
transgenic crops) produced through the access and utilisation of bio-genetic 
resources by global/local bio-tech corporations. The Act, therefore, embraced and 
accommodated the desire to normalise appropriation in a local legislation.  
 
What is significant here is that this desire moves through the regulatory apparatus of 
the state, which is not only designed to capture whatever it can, all that is possible, 
but also mimics the global legal mechanism (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 
482). The CBD is thus having a spatial co-existence, it is concerned with the 
simultaneous exploitation of different territories and therefore, it is inseparable from 
a process of relative deterritorialisation (ibid., pp 486-487). Consequently, „the law in 
its entirety undergoes a mutation…because the State apparatus is faced with a new 
task, which consists less in overcoding already coded flows than in organizing 
conjunctions of already decoded flows as such‟ (ibid., p 498; original emphasis). 
Hence, the CBD performs two operations: on the one hand, it has normalised the 
desire to appropriate through legal norms; and on the other, by directing nation-states 
to accommodate normalisation through domestic legal arrangements, it has 
expanded, deterritorialised and spatialised the desire to normalise. These two-way 
operation, is what Deleuze/Guattari call an „apparatus of capture‟ because it consists 




In this chapter, my main aim was to show how the spaces of bio-economic 
production expand. Borrowing insights from Deleuze/Guattari and Canguilhem, the 
chapter observes that this expansion occurs through the desire to normalise 
appropriation through legal norms. Thus, my focus was on how does the desire to 
normalise move; and how its movement was mediated by law. The desire to 
normalise, I have argued, moves through global/local governance mechanisms, such 
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as the CBD and the Biological Diversity Act – two component parts of the machine. 
To demonstrate this understanding, first, I have discussed Foucault‟s analytic of 
„governmentality‟ in detail and highlighted Foucault‟s crucial observation that 
governance is an „economic-juridical‟ ensemble that operates as a mechanism of 
security. The essential function of governance is to normalise movement and in so 
doing, it expands the market space. Its operation, however, depends on juridical 
institution or a framework of law because the law shapes and governs economic 
activities. Since governance normalises movement and expands the spaces of the 
market, it has spatial dimension. Taken together, I have suggested that we need to 
understand how does the desire to normalise move and expand through governance 
mechanisms or a framework of law because the bioeconomy intends to expand the 
spaces of bio-economic production. Thus, by deploying the analytic „governance at a 
distance‟, I have shown that the CBD is a complex ordering mechanism devised to 
govern and normalise the appropriation of bio-genetic resources situated in dispersed 
sites. The CBD, in other words, normalised the desire to appropriate. In particular, I 
have located this desire to normalise in India‟s Biological Diversity Act. Hence, by 
mediating the movement of desire to a distant location, the CBD has deterritorialised 
or spatialised the desire to normalise. From this viewpoint, the CBD has a spatial 
existence because it has expanded the spaces of bio-economic production by 
normalising the desire to appropriate through a seamless web between the global and 
the local. Accordingly, the bioeconomy becomes dispersed and deterritorialised; it 
expands ceaselessly in all directions through the expansion of governance. This in 




CHAPTER 5  
Mapping the Spaces of Power: Knowledge, Transformation and the 
Condition of Possibility 
 
 
























In chapter 3, I have discussed the deterritorialisation of the Euro-American idea of 
materiality and its reterritorialisation in a distant location. My focus was on de/re-
territorialising flows of desire, especially how the desire to propertise Bt. brinjal and 
its future progeny established connections between disparate elements and in so 
doing, brought into existence an emergent space of property. In chapter 4, I have 
shown another dimension of this de/re-territorialisation, which was concerned with 
revealing how the desire to normalise appropriation, capture the economic value, and 
expand the spaces of bio-economic production are operating through governance 
mechanisms. Thus, I have argued that it is the desire to capture and expand that 
normalised appropriation, and this normalisation takes place through the expansion 
or de/re-territorialisation of governance. As indicated in the Introduction, for 
Deleuze, an assemblage of desire will include power arrangements but these must be 
located among the different components of the assemblage (Deleuze 2001/2007, p 
125). This chapter, therefore, describes how „power‟ or „differential force relations‟ 
(Deleuze 1986/1988, p 75) operate or move through different components in the 
bioeconomy. It is necessary to emphasise, however, that Deleuze/Guattari 
understood power in terms of desire – an essential part of the infrastructure that 
„consists in reducing the multiplicities of desire into a single undifferentiated flux‟ 
(Guattari 1975, p 85). These differential force relations, therefore, need to be viewed 
as „differential relations of desire‟.  
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ESG‟s contestation of unauthorised appropriation through the „discourse of 
biopiracy‟ brings into view the operation of differential power/desire relations in the 
bioeconomy.
138
 It is well-known that Foucault dealt with power relations in detail in 
his works: how power operates through relations, how it unfolds in heterogeneous 
spaces, and how it moves through legal norms and institutions. Another important 
aspect of Foucault‟s analysis of power is that power always elicits acts of resistance. 
In the next section, therefore, I discuss in detail how Foucault theorised these 
relations. Against this background, I examine the operation of power in global/local 
intellectual property regimes and evaluate how this operation is analysed in the 
contemporary literature on intellectual property law. A number of scholars have 
analysed critically how the global intellectual property regime, brought into existence 
by the TRIPs Agreement, becomes a vehicle of power and domination (Whitt 1998; 
Arup 2000; Shiva 2000; Drahos and Braithwaite 2002; Lander 2006; Mattei and 
Nader 2008). Yet, these analyses remain within the self-imposed limit of 
documenting the global/local power relationship, and the imperialist or neo-colonial 
tendency of global intellectual property regime. Put differently, these scholars situate 
their analyses and investigation of power and domination within a centre/periphery 
framework. I argue that this top-down approach leaves out the mediated relationality 
of power, in the sense that it provides little understanding of arrangements, 
interactions, connections and mediations through which power unfolds in 
heterogeneous spaces. Thus, rather than treating global intellectual property law or 
the WTO-TRIPs as an instrument of power and domination, we need to view the 
TRIPs regime as a space of power/knowledge, which expands in every direction 
through interaction and mediation between heterogeneous entities. To substantiate 
this argument, I discuss how two institutions – DST and DBT integrated, mediated 
and accommodated the TRIPs regime in a distant location and in so doing, expanded 
the space of power/knowledge. And this expansion and spatialisation through 
deterritorialisation becomes clear once we look into ESG‟s contestation through the 
discourse of biopiracy. Elaborating on Foucault‟s analysis, Deleuze points out that 
different forces co-exist in relation or in opposition to each other and these forces 
                                                             
138
 In this chapter, I use the concepts of „power‟ and „desire‟ interchangeably because for Deleuze, 
„power is an affection of desire‟ (Deleuze 2001/2007, p 125). 
160 
 
express themselves in different manifestations in any given encounter (Deleuze 
1986/1988, p 70). Thus, following Deleuze, I argue that ESG‟s contestation should 
not be viewed as merely an opposition to unauthorised appropriation, but rather a 
„differential power/desire‟. In other words, ESG‟s contestation is an encounter, an 
effect because it emerged in opposition to the desire to expand the spaces of 
power/knowledge. I demonstrate this understanding by discussing how ESG has 
mobilised its contention, demands and claims through heterogeneous spaces. The 
chapter concludes by arguing that as a differential power/desire, ESG‟s contestation 
has the potential to become different. However, by invoking legal mechanisms that 
have normalised appropriation, the ESG itself becomes a part of the infrastructure.          
 
 
5.2: Power and Multiplicity 
 
„Power‟ remains a recurrent theme in Michel Foucault‟s thought. He has analysed 
power in relational terms as it emerged through governmental techniques and 
practices.
139
 In this regard, there are three important aspects in his analysis of power. 
First, he has emphasised the importance of space in understanding the operation of 
power. Second, he has pointed out that power and domination operate through legal 
norms and institutions. And third, he has argued that power always elicits acts of 
resistance. I discuss these three aspects in detail because his insights are important 
resources for thinking about how differential relations of power/desire emerge or 
unfold in the bioeconomy through interactions and mediation between heterogeneous 
entities, such as the WTO-TRIPs, DST, DBT and ESG.      
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, government is an art of rational management which, 
according to Foucault, is not repressive and dominating, but rather involves 
techniques and mechanisms of governing relations composed of men and things. 
However, what remains hidden in these techniques and mechanisms is the operation 
of power. Indeed, Foucault intends to „investigate what might be most hidden in the 
relations of power; to anchor them in the economic infrastructures; to trace them not 
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 Foucault has explicitly pointed this out in his 1977-1978 lectures Security, Territory, Population 
(2004/2007, pp 108 and 247-248) and in 1978-1979 lectures The Birth of Biopolitics (2004/2008, pp 
131, 276 and 304).  
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only in their governmental forms but also in the infra-governmental or para-
governmental ones; to discover them in the material play‟ (Foucault 1988a, p 119). 
Thus, his focus is on the operation of power, and he asserts that this operation of 
power is most clearly visible in the relationship between individuals and institutions. 
Therefore, in his analysis of power, he focuses mainly on the effects of various 
institutions on individuals. For instance, Foucault never uses the word „power‟ 
explicitly in his analysis of madness (Foucault 1961/1973). However, he points out 
later: „in my analysis of madness or the prison, it seemed to me that the question at 
the centre of everything was: what is power? And, to be more specific: how is it 
exercised, what exactly happens when someone exercises power over another‟ 
(Foucault 1988c, pp 101-102 and 103). In Discipline and Punish (1975/1979), 
Foucault recounts the growth of disciplinary mechanisms in the eighteenth century – 
a new class of power that colonised the legal institution (ibid., p 231). Discipline, he 
observes, is a type of power and a modality for its exercise. It comprises of a whole 
set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application and targets. It may 
be taken over either by specialised institutions or by institutions that use it as an 
essential instrument for a particular end. In short, power has infiltrated a multitude of 
institutions, and it is institutions that bring the effects of power to the most distant 
elements. And, for Foucault, disciplinary techniques are connected to economic, 
juridico-political and scientific institutions that assure the infinitesimal distribution of 
power relations (ibid., pp 215-216 and 218). Hence, he argues, power goes much 
deeper than one suspects; there are centres and invisible, little-known points of 
support and therefore, we must unmask the workings of institutions, which always 
exercise power obscurely (Chomsky and Foucault 1974/2006, p 41). Thus, he refuted 
the idea that power is something possessed and held by those in a position to control 
the desires and activities of others. Instead, he observes, 
 
„Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something 
which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here and there, 
never in anybody‟s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. 
Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation‟ (Foucault 1980, p 




What is important here is that power is exercised through a net-like organisation; it is 
dispersed throughout society and the locations of power are multiple. Power is not 
located within particular institutions; rather, it circulates and assumes diverse forms. 
However, this does not mean that institutions are not important. Foucault understood 
power in relational terms and, for him, power is diffused rather than emanating from 
a particular location, or „moving from above to below and from the centre to the 
periphery‟ (Foucault 1988a, p 119). He was more interested to understand how 
power is enacted in interactions. From this point of view, his focus was primarily not 
on institutions, but on interactions between individuals and institutions, and the way 
institutions exercise power upon individuals (Mills 2003, p 52).  
 
 
It is also important to point out that for Foucault, „space is fundamental in any 
exercise of power‟ (Foucault 1994/2000, p 361). He argues that from the nineteenth 
century on, a new thinking about space emerged, that extends far beyond the limits 
of urbanism and architecture. More specifically, with the emergence of new 
technologies (railroads and electricity) and new economic processes, one finds the 
birth of new problems – governing the relations between men and things spread over 
heterogeneous spaces. In other words, Foucault was interested to see how the spatial 
distribution of the exercise of power plunged into the field of social relations that 
brought about some specific effects (ibid., p 362). Thus, in Madness and Civilization 
(1961/1973) Foucault reveals the emergence of various spaces of confinement 
(workhouses, asylums, mental hospitals, prisons) that segregated certain categories 
of people (lunatics, insane and mentally ill) and sociospatially excluded them from 
the normal sites of interaction in society. In The Birth of the Clinic (1963/1973), he 
not only begins with the remark that „this book is about space‟ (ibid., p ix), but 
further observes that „for us, the human body defines, by natural right, the space of 
origin and of distribution of disease: a space whose lines, volumes, surfaces, and 
routes are laid down, in accordance with a now familiar geometry, by the anatomical 
atlas‟ (ibid., p 1). In short, he was concerned with anatomical space and the 
spatialisation of disease and medical knowledge. Similarly, he uses a number of 
spatial metaphors in The Order of Things (1966/1970) and one finds a vivid 
description of the spatialisation of knowledge in the seventeenth century (Foucault 
1994/2000, p 362). In Discipline and Punish (1975/1979) Foucault, the new 
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cartographer, shows how power is exercised, how it controls the body and operates in 
carceral spaces. He made us aware that discipline „is a type of power, a technology, 
that traverses every kind of apparatus or institution, linking them, prolonging them, 
and making them converge and function in a new way‟ (Deleuze 1986/1988, p 26). 
In brief, Foucault draws up a new topology of power in which power no longer 
resides in a privileged place; but rather, it is simply operational and diffused, it 
traverses and passes through disparate spaces and coextensive with the whole social 
field.
140
 In other words, he was interested to analyse the mechanisms of power and in 
so doing, he focused on questions pertaining to how power operates, circulates, and 
traverses through various institutional spaces. Thus, he writes „a whole history 
remains to be written of spaces – which would at the same time be the history of 
powers‟ (Foucault 1980, p 149; original emphasis).  
 
 
Foucault saw power as productive, widely distributed and dispersed in a multitude of 
forms. He argues that a society is not a unitary body in which one power and one 
power only exercises itself. Rather, a society is an archipelago of powers and the 
forms of power are heterogeneous. There is a juxtaposition, coordination and liaising 
of different powers and therefore, we must speak of powers and try to localise them 
in their historical and geographical specificity (Foucault 1981-82/2007, p 156). In 
this sense, for Foucault, „power is co-extensive with the whole social body‟ 
(Foucault 1980, p 142), „it acts…over the whole surface of the social field according 
to a system of relays, modes of connections, transmission, and distribution‟ (Foucault 
1979, p 59). We find a fairly detailed elaboration of these arguments in the first 
volume of The History of Sexuality (1976/1998). In the chapter titled „Method‟, he 
categorically argues, 
 
„It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity 
of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate… and lastly, as the 
strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional 
crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in 
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 Even an unapologetic critic such as Jean Baudrillard acknowledges that „this time we are in a full 
universe, a space radiating with power but also cracked, like a shattered windshield still holding 
together. …The reference of power, which has a long history, is discussed again today by Foucault at 
the level of dispersed, interstitial power as a grid of bodies and of the ramiform pattern of control‟ 
(Baudrillard 1977/2007, pp 48-49).   
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the various social hegemonies. Power‟s condition of possibility, or in any case the 
viewpoint which permits one to understand its exercise, even in its more 
“peripheral” effects…is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of 
their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local 
and unstable.…Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but 
because it comes from everywhere (ibid., pp 92-93). 
 
 
Thus, for Foucault, power has no centre; rather it has infinitesimal mechanisms, 
techniques, and tactics, which are invested in numerous institutions. The integration 
of these practices and mechanisms, and their interconnections delineate the general 
conditions of domination. By domination, Foucault means multiple forms of 
domination that can be exercised in a society and, for him, the system of right (laws, 
apparatuses, institutions, rules) and the judiciary are permanent vehicles for relations 
of domination, and for polymorphous techniques of subjugation. Foucault articulates 
this argument more explicitly; as he puts it, „the system of right, the domain of the 
law, is permanent agents of these relations of domination, these polymorphous 
techniques of subjugation‟ (Foucault 1980, p 96). Hence, we can say, adapting 
Foucault, that power „has become one with the law‟; the law is not the principle or 
inner rule of power. It is the outside that envelops power; law is the shadow through 
which power advances and law itself is a shadow of the advancing power (Foucault 
1986/1987, pp 34, 35 and 38). However, for Foucault, power or domination always 
elicits acts of resistance. As he writes, „where there is power, there is resistance‟ or 
„there are no relations of power without resistances‟ (Foucault 1976/1998, p 95; 
Foucault 1980, p 142). What is important is that Foucault understood resistance not 
as the negation of power, but rather as productive – a counter-power that opposes 
dispersed techniques, mechanisms and practices (Foucault 1975/1979, p 219; 
Foucault 1980, p 56). In this sense, for Foucault as well as for Deleuze/Guattari, 
differential relations of power/desire operate in society, which become visible in 
encounters, interactions, and mediation between heterogeneous entities. What we 
need to show, then, is how power/desire relations are organised in the infrastructure, 
that is, to trace their movements and reveal their differential forms. Thus, in the rest 
of the chapter, I discuss how power/desire operates and moves through the global 
intellectual property regime, such as the WTO-TRIPs, and how this operation is 
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mediated, accommodated and expanded by other institutions, such as the DST and 
the DBT, and finally, ESG‟s desire to contest the power/knowledge regime through 
the discourse of biopiracy.  
 
5.3: Spaces of Power I: WTO-TRIPs 
 
For Foucault, „power in its exercise goes much further‟ than the state and thus, an 
exclusive focus on state power overlooks „all the mechanisms and effects of power 
which don‟t pass directly via the state apparatus, yet often sustain the State more 
effectively than its own institutions, enlarging and maximising its effectiveness‟ 
(Foucault 1980, pp 72-73). Hence, he suggests that „one cannot confine oneself to 
analysing the state apparatus alone if one wants to grasp the mechanisms of power in 
their detail and complexity‟ (ibid., p 72). This observation becomes apparent if we 
examine closely the WTO-TRIPs Agreement which, according to some scholars, has 
destabilised and shifted the locus of power (Sell 1999 and 2002; Dutfield 2003; May 
and Sell 2006). Their argument is that power has shifted from its organisational 
centre of the state to a global institution which, on the one hand, becomes a vehicle 
of power and domination and on the other, influences, sustains and maximises the 
effectiveness of state‟s institutions. In this section, I will mainly dwell upon how a 
global institution becomes an instrument of power and domination, and in the next 
section, I will focus on how this power is influencing and sustaining the effectiveness 
of state‟s institutions in a distant location.         
 
 
In Chapter 3, I have described the process of deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation of 
global intellectual property law through movement, interaction and mediation. In 
particular, I have shown how the Euro-American idea of materiality has moved to a 
distant location through global intellectual property regime or the TRIPs Agreement. 
Further, I have highlighted a number of critical observations made by scholars, 
which point out that by moving intellectual property norms and practices developed 
in Euro-American jurisdictions to dispersed locations of the globe, the TRIPs regime 
has expanded the economic interests, dominance and power of developed countries 
and their corporations. So power and domination move, operate and function through 
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global institutions and legal practices, such as the WTO or global intellectual 
property norms. Or, we can say that since power is dispersed and heteromorphous, it 
is adapted, re-inforced and transformed by global strategies to form global 
domination (Foucault 1980, p 142). Said differently, for Foucault, law as tactics of 
exercising power is a subset of a global strategy or is a part of an apparatus 
(dispositif) and hence, law becomes a vehicle of domination or, becomes a part of the 
polymorphous techniques of subjugation.
141
 The TRIPs Agreement, therefore, 
functions as an operating mechanism, it integrates the power of developed countries 
and their corporations, and it organises the field for power and domination to operate.  
 
 
A number of scholars have elaborated on this operation of power and domination 
through global intellectual property regime. For instance, Arup points out that the 
TRIPs Agreement demands member countries to adopt trade-friendly approaches to 
intellectual property protection and in so doing, the agreement shows the tendency to 
enhance global market power (Arup 2000, p 41). Global intellectual property law, in 
this view, becomes a source of market power that enables the technology-rich global 
corporations to profit from monopolistic market price. But this understanding leaves 
out what Hilgartner defines as „configuration power‟, that is, the „ability to influence 
how technologies are intertwined with the social world‟ (Hilgartner 2009, p 212). He 
argues that rather than only conveying market power, intellectual property rights also 
convey power that can be exerted in negotiations, which shape technological 
artefacts, infrastructures, or systems (ibid.). In other words, in addition to market 
power, intellectual property rights yield power to shape decision making, such as 
setting conditions for transferring technologies protected by intellectual property 
rights. Thus, he observes, power „radiate[s] outward from the invention itself to 
encompass a variety of decisions aimed at shaping the terms under which the 
invention is intertwined with broader‟ (ibid., p 213) economic, techno-scientific and 
legal orders, including technology transfer, foreign direct investment, and changing 
                                                             
141
 Here, I have borrowed my understanding from Rabinow. He points out that „a tactic, apparently, is 
a subset of a strategy‟ (Rabinow 2003, p 52). I am not very convinced with Jacques de Ville‟s 
proposition that Foucault understood law in the broadest sense to include apparatuses, institutions and 
rules. I agree with him that we need to see how law becomes a vehicle of domination (de Ville 2011, p 
214), but in my view, for Foucault, law as tactics of governmental intervention (I have emphasised 
this point in chapter 4) is a subset of a strategy and therefore, an ensemble of „apparatus‟ – an 
assemblage of heterogeneous elements (Foucault 1980, p 194).   
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local legislations to grant patents over new biologicals. Put otherwise, intellectual 
property law can serve as a vehicle for asserting domination over the social and 
economic relations surrounding it (ibid.). This is because „information and 
knowledge constitute the building blocks of culture, industry, and science‟ (Haunss 
and Shadlen 2009, p 1), and legal norms that govern the access to knowledge and 
information have tremendous influence on how the actors can access knowledge-
intensive products, such as seeds, which affects food security and poverty reduction 
strategies. Thus, intellectual property law affects the trajectories of global 
technological and economic development and diffusion (ibid.). In this scenario, 
global intellectual property law making as a collective decision was meant to 
consider and take into account different economic situations and social aspirations. 
However, by forcing developing countries with different socio-economic conditions 
to adopt a „universal template‟, the TRIPs Agreement deprived these countries of 
their ability to tailor intellectual property systems to local conditions (Yu 2002, p 3). 
Even worse, this global legal instrument is a product of an epistemic community the 
dominant core of which, according to Braithwaite and Drahos, is comprised of 
transnational elites and their lawyers. These „lawyers, by virtue of their technical 
knowledge, are a driving force in this epistemic community‟ (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000, p 75). As Mattei and Nader further elaborate, while power sometimes 
uses outright propaganda, professionalism proves more effective and therefore, at the 
international level, particular professional elites acquire the influence necessary to 
provide legitimacy to hegemonic power and to be sure, help in the construction of a 
legal consciousness coherent with imperialism (Mattei and Nader 2008, pp 82-83). 
For these elites, the TRIPs Agreement was a major step in the globalisation of 
standards of patents, trademarks and trade secrets (Drahos 2003). The IPC succeeded 
in getting most of what it wanted in the TRIPs Agreement, since their demands are 
reflected clearly in the final agreement (Sell 2002, p 97). And what this epistemic 
community demanded and promoted through the TRIPs is a „maximalist rights-
culture‟, which is based on the assumption that protection of intellectual property 
rights will automatically promote innovation, and in that process, the more rights the 





Intellectual property rights, Drahos and Braithwaite argue, are government tools for 
regulating markets in information and therefore, the TRIPs entails more than global 
intellectual property protection. While for Drahos and Braithwaite, the TRIPs 
Agreement promotes „information feudalism‟ – a source of private authority and 
power over informational resources (Drahos and Braithwaite 2002, pp 3 and 12); 
Shiva argues that intellectual property rights under the WTO are a tool for the 
recolonisation of the Third World by western powers (Shiva 2000, p 502). She 
further observes that TRIPs recognises private rights over the knowledge and 
creativity that take place in the scientific realm and in so doing, it promotes 
„monocultures of the mind‟ (Shiva 1993), which displace, disqualify and deny other 
ways of knowing and the creativity of other cultures (Shiva 1998, p 15). This view 
has been reiterated by a number of other scholars. For instance, Whitt has used the 
term „biocolonialism‟ to describe the extraction and commodification of bio-genetic 
resources from developing countries by modern bio-tech science that transforms 
them into intellectual properties, aided and abetted by the western legal system, most 
strikingly by intellectual property law. She argues that since modern intellectual 
property law treats technoscientific knowledge as inventive, original and innovative, 
it is sharply at odds with other knowledge systems and this division emphasises the 
power relations integral to western knowledge systems and legal concepts. Hence, 
law is a central factor in the knowledge/power equation (Whitt 1998, pp 33-34). In a 
similar vein, Lander argues, since the Eurocentric colonial assumption is that the 
only possible knowledge is Western industrial knowledge, all indigenous and rural 
knowledges and technologies involving the selection, combination, and preservation 
of diverse species are devalued by modern bio-tech science and intellectual property 
law (Lander 2006, pp 202-203). Likewise, Kuchler points out, „the Eurocentrism of 
[modern intellectual property law] often devalues creative expressive forms which 
are produced collectively, intergenerationally, or in unfamiliar media, by those with 
non-European cultural traditions‟ (Kuchler 2004, p 235).  
 
 
Taken together these observations suggest that modern science, bio-tech science in 
particular, and intellectual property law produced a linear and unitary vision of 
progress, creativity and knowledge production. This economistic and proprietary 
rationality underlying technoscientific progress and creativity, however, came with 
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capitalist or corporate science because „the first step in the capitalisation of science is 
to secure knowledge as private property…Thus property in knowledge with potential 
economic value must be captured quickly to secure value from it‟ (Etzkowitz and 
Webster, 1995, p 482). Consequently, any creativity, invention and knowledge that 
do not meet the criteria of capitalist science or fall outside its rationality are treated 
as valueless, unscientific, and non-creative, and dismissed as traditional or primitive. 
As Watson-Verren and Turnbull put it, 
 
„By and large, past cross-cultural work has taken Western “rationality” and 
“scientificity” as the bench mark criteria by which other culture‟s knowledges 
should be evaluated. So-called traditional knowledge systems of indigenous peoples 
have frequently been portrayed as closed, pragmatic, utilitarian, value laden, 
indexical, context dependent, and so on, implying that they cannot have the same 
authority and credibility as science because their localness restricts them to the 
social and cultural circumstances of their production. These were accounts of 
dichotomy where the great divide in knowledge systems coincided with the great 
divide between societies that are powerful and those that are not‟ (Watson-Verren 
and Turnbull 1995, pp 115-116). 
 
In other words, it is science that draws the borderline between „modern‟ or 
„scientific‟ and „primitive‟ or „other‟ knowledge systems. So, in terms of modern 
science, traditional or indigenous knowledge
142
 is a „defeated knowledge‟ 
(Visvanathan 2005, p 90) or „subjugated knowledge‟, in the sense that it has been 
disqualified as inadequate to meet the criteria of modern technoscience and as such, 
remains „beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‟ (Foucault 1980, p 
82). „Such a hierarchy or devaluation‟, Visvanathan argues, „creates the possibility of 
the museumisation or appropriation of these knowledges‟ (Visvanathan 2005, p 91). 
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 The meaning of the term „traditional or indigenous knowledge‟ is contestable because the tern 
„traditional‟ or „indigenous‟ has been used differently in different literature, contexts, countries and 
organisations to describe various communities situated in dispersed locations. As Devy points out, „no 
single term can describe them with any degree of semantic assuredness, nor can any universal 
definition of an invented descriptive term stretch without fatigue beyond the margins of single nation 
or continent‟ (Devy 2009, p xi). In recent intellectual property rights literature, the terms „traditional 
knowledge‟, „indigenous knowledge‟ and „local knowledge‟ have been used interchangeably. Stephen 
Brush has provided a broader definition of „indigenous knowledge‟. According to this definition, 
„indigenous knowledge‟ „refers to popular or folk knowledge that can be contrasted with formal and 
specialised knowledge that defines scientific, professional, and intellectual elites in both Western and 
non-Western societies. Broadly defined, indigenous knowledge is the systematic information that 
remains in the informal sector, usually unwritten and preserved in oral tradition rather than texts‟ 
(Brush 1996, p 4). Here, I have used the term to denote this broader meaning. 
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And, as I have pointed out above, law, specifically intellectual property law, is 
complicit in maintaining and managing this hierarchy because it only protects the 
knowledges produced my modern technoscience. Thus, as a boundary keeper, global 
intellectual property law legitimises the power and domination of developed 
countries and their technoscientific enterprise resulting in the further restructuring of 
global geographies of control and domination (Carolan 2007, pp 126 and 134). As 
Mattei and Nader observe, „nobody would genetically modify seeds without 
guarantee that the legal system would help impose such technology on farmers 
world-wide, forcing them to abandon communitarian practices of seed sharing and 
swapping‟ (Mattei and Nader 2008, p 84). The global legitimacy of intellectual 
property rights over „new biologicals‟ propagated by the WTO-TRIPs, therefore, 
formalises the disparity of wealth and power that technology yields, and serves the 
needs of powerful corporate actors (ibid.). And an important corollary to this is that 
„by coding certain outcomes and practices as legal and others not‟, global intellectual 
property law restructures the relationship between developed and developing 
countries (May 2002, p 138). Thus, how „law shapes power and power shapes law‟ 
(Halliday 2009, p 266) is crucial in understanding the materiality of power in law and 
its operation through global legal mechanism, such as the TRIPs Agreement.  
 
 
Literature discussed above clearly shows that global intellectual property law 
becomes a vehicle of power and domination, or how power and domination operate 
through global intellectual property regime. Moreover, it is also evident how global 
intellectual property law becomes a target of powerful actors, where that influence 
comes from, and how the TRIPs Agreement expanded or deterritorialised the power 
and domination of developed countries and their corporations to dispersed locations. 
Nevertheless, an important slippage persists in these accounts because these 
literatures present a binary or centred view of power, one which tends to assume that 
global institutions or global intellectual property law embody a rational-legal 
authority that channels power in particular directions (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, p 
669) – from centre to the periphery, from global to the local. This is an easy 
template, as Allen points out, for understanding the location, whereabouts, and reach 
of power, or sheer concentration of capabilities in big corporations or global 
institutions, and is far from unique. In this somewhat exaggerated view, he further 
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argues, „power is perhaps portrayed rather unthinkingly as something which radiates 
out from an identifiable central point, with a reach that appears almost effortless‟ 
(Allen 2004, p 19). Therefore, we should no longer simply assume that expansion, 
distribution and reach of power across distances is effortless because reach, distance, 
proximity and presence are not straightforward givens, they involve a topological 
mix of distanciated and proximate actions (Allen 2009, p 198). The argument, then, 
is that an analysis which simply narrates the spatially-centred notion of power and its 
effortless expansion to dispersed locations through global institutions or legal 
mechanisms is contrary to a Foucaultian understanding of power, which emphasises 
the unfolding of power in heterogeneous spaces through relations, interactions and 
connections. Hence, a top-down approach to spatiality of power inevitably runs the 
risk of leaving out the mediated relationality of power and in doing so, it provides 
little understanding of connections, interactions and relations between heterogeneous 
entities through which power moves and unfolds in heterogeneous spaces. 
 
 
This means that we need to move our attention not only towards heterogeneous 
entities, but also towards mediated relations, symbiosis and alliances between them. 
What this argument suggests is that rather than treating global intellectual property 
law as simply an instrument or vehicle of power and domination, the TRIPs regime 
should be viewed as a space of power/knowledge, in which a very specific form of 
knowledge becomes global. A „knowledge space‟, Turnbull argues, emerges from the 
collective work of knowledge producers. To move knowledge from its site of 
production to other places, producers deploy a variety of strategies and in so doing, 
establish connections between otherwise heterogeneous actors (Turnbull 1997, p 
553). In this sense, the space of knowledge that the TRIPs regime protects and 
expands to dispersed locations of the globe is the knowledge space of Euro-
American jurisdictions, and its dispersal is achieved by deploying a specific legal 
strategy (Euro-American intellectual property law) that defines this knowledge space 
as superior and universal. Thus, by globalising and enforcing a Euro-American 
framework of knowledge/property developed in a very specific geopolitical milieu, 
the TRIPs regime promotes a certain way of seeing, knowing and understanding the 
world, while delegitimising or subsuming others (Wright 2005, p 907). And when 
knowledge is defined and analysed in terms of region, domain, displacement and 
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transposition „one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a 
form of power and disseminates the effects of power‟ (Foucault 1980, p 69).  
 
 
The TRIPs regime, therefore, becomes a space of power/knowledge, which is not 
only shaped by Euro-American framework of knowledge, but also provides 
mechanisms for evaluating knowledges of other jurisdictions. Accordingly, in this 
space of power/knowledge, a very specific framework of knowledge becomes a point 
of reference, a framework of all places (Wright 2005, p 906), which effectively 
manifests the power of developed countries and their corporations. But transforming 
a specific knowledge space into a space of knowledge/power and its expansion, and 
making its presence felt in dispersed locations of the globe was not a straight forward 
process and certainly, not an effortless extension of Euro-American 
power/knowledge over a flat surface. Rather, it was an outcome of extensive and 
intensive negotiations, lobbying, forming committees, building coalitions and 
alliances, and drawing developing country actors through persuasion, coercion or 
pressure spanning over eight years. In other words, as Wright points out, a space of 
power/knowledge 
 
„…becomes possible, among other things, due to the power of pro-IPR countries in 
the WTO, the changing discourses of “fairness” around global trade rules and 
effective lobbying strategies of business coalitions. It is, in short, the result of a will 
to power and a profound illustration of the power of defining a situated knowledge 
as global and anti-place‟ (ibid.).           
 
Thus, a space of power/knowledge that defies the global/local binary emerged 
through a collective effort of distanciated and proximate actors and actions and 
therefore, in the next section, I intend to show how this space of power/knowledge 
has expanded and made its presence felt in a distant location through connections and 
relations.   
 
 




As discussed above, heterogeneous actors pushed hard to develop global intellectual 
property rights and to produce an operational space, which is not just global but 
extends to disparate locations of the globe. The expansion of the space of operation 
to a distant location, however, depends on local institutions organising the field for 
global intellectual property law to operate. Thus, institutions that organise the field in 
local settings are coterminous with the emergence of power/knowledge regime. But 
institutions are neither the sources of power, nor practices or operating mechanisms 
that explain what power is or who has power. Rather, institutions are the agents of 
stabilisation, integration, and actualisation (Deleuze 1986/1988, p 75). Hence, new 
spaces of power emerge through institutions that are acting on behalf of the state or 
other institutions. These new spaces are important sites for understanding how the 
power/knowledge regime has been accommodated, expanded and made its presence 
felt in a distant location. In Chapter 1, I have shown that the Bt. brinjal arises out of 
an assemblage of heterogeneous entities situated in disparate locations. The initial 
funding for this collaborative relationship came from the DBT – a regulatory 
institution functions under MST, Government of India. The DBT agreed to fund the 
collaboration after a proposal was submitted by the ABSP II Project to promote 
biotechnologies (Monsanto‟s Bt. gene) to produce insect resistant or tolerant brinjal 
plant in India. The arrival of DBT and utilisation of Monsanto‟s proprietary Bt. gene 
in the production of Bt. brinjal suggest that influence comes from specific location 
and more importantly, action is overtaken by or distributed to others. 
 
 
I would like to focus my investigation on two institutions – the DST and the DBT 
that have organised the field for power to operate.  The DST was established in 1971, 
with the objective of promoting new areas of science and technology, and to function 
as a nodal institution for organising, coordinating and promoting science and 
technology activities in India. It is responsible for specific projects and programmes, 
including the formulation of policies relating to science and technology with special 
emphasis on the promotion of new and emerging areas. The DST also coordinates 
the activities of other departments working under its aegis.
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 Further, it provides 
support to basic and applied research, and financially sponsors scientific and 
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technological research and development. In addition, commercialisation of 
technology, fostering international cooperation in science and technology, and 
supporting technology entrepreneurship are the activities that fall within its 
mandate.
144
 In the Science and Technology Policy 2003, a DST policy document, the 
President of India (then Dr A P J Abdul Kalam) states, 
 
„Basically we have come a long way since our independence, from mere buyers of 
technology to those of who have made science and technology as an important 
contributor for national development and societal transformation. In a world where 
powers are determined by their share of the world‟s knowledge, reflected by patents, 
papers and so on, the WTO starts to play a crucial role in the economic development. 
It is important for India to put all her acts together to become a continuous innovator 
and creator of science and technology intensive products‟ (DST 2003).    
 
To make this vision a reality, the Policy Document further states that India‟s science 
and technology system has to be infused with new vitality, and to meet present needs 
in the era of globalisation, India needs „to encourage research and innovation in areas 
of relevance for the economy and society, particularly by promoting close and 
productive interaction between private and public institutions in science and 
technology‟ (ibid.). The Document recognises the importance of knowledge as a 
source of economic might and power and therefore, special importance was placed 
on information technology, biotechnology and material sciences and technologies. In 
this direction, further emphasis was placed on transforming new knowledges into 
commercial successes for achieving high economic growth and global 
competitiveness (ibid.). Towards this end, the Policy document proposed to establish 
an intellectual property rights (IPR) regime which would provide full protection of 
intellectual properties generated from research and development. The regime would 
also provide a strong, supportive and comprehensive policy environment, and 
further, intellectual property legislations would ensure maximum incentives for 
individual inventors, scientific and technological communities (ibid.). The Policy 
Document notes that intellectual property rights have to be viewed not as a distinct 
domain, but rather „as an effective policy instrument that would be relevant to wide 
                                                             
144




ranging socio-economic, technological and political concepts‟ (ibid.). More 
interestingly, while the Document is critical about the propertisation of collective 
knowledge of societies for commercial profit of a few and keen to protect traditional 
knowledge systems through national policies and international actions; its plan to 
document, evaluate, further develop and harness traditional knowledge of natural 
resources and biodiversity for the purposes of wealth creation somehow contradicts 
its critical ethos.  
 
 
In a more recent Policy Document, the DST invigorated this vision to position India 
among the top five global scientific powers by 2020 (DST 2013). The Science, 
Technology and Innovation Policy 2013 points out that economic investment in 
scientific research generates knowledge, and innovation converts knowledge into 
wealth and/or value. In the sense, science, technology and innovation exist separately 
in disconnected spaces and it is their integration that leads to new value creation 
(ibid.). The aim of this recent policy guidance, therefore, is to attract investment in 
science, science-led technology and innovation to produce economic wealth. 
Towards this end, the policy guidance puts emphasis on changing the mindset and 
value systems to recognise, respect and reward performances which create wealth 
from science and technology derived knowledge (ibid.). And this recognition and 
reward through the intellectual property rights system is not entirely an innovative 
idea because a Patent Facilitating Centre (PFC) was set up by the DST in 1995. The 
PFC was created to keep track on new developments and issues in the area of IPR 
and make them known to policy makers. It also organises awareness workshops 
relating to patents and provides patent facilities to scientists and technologists in the 
country. It becomes clear, after visiting its web site, that PFC brought a new 
dimension in the promotion of research and development programmes because for 
PFC, „intellectual property protection plays a key role in gaining an advantageous 
position in the competitive technological game for achieving economic growth‟.
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However, what is interesting in these techno-economic discourses is that both 
documents reiterate the widely accepted understanding of knowledge as the source of 
economic wealth and power, reflected by intellectual property rights. Further, the 
2003 policy document acknowledges the role of WTO in economic development and 
proposes to utilise traditional knowledge of natural resources and biodiversity for 
wealth generation. In other words, according to these policy documents, there is an 
intricate relationship between knowledge, power and intellectual property, and this 
insistence is a clear indication that the space of knowledge/power that emerged 
through the TRIPs regime has expanded and made its presence felt in a distant 
location. And this expansion and presence become more evident as I reflect on 
another institution – the DBT, which played an active role in the production of 
transgenic brinjal. As pointed out above, the DBT is a regulatory institution, which 
promotes research, development and innovation in the field of biotechnology. It was 
established for the benefit of society, entrepreneurs, trade and industry, and therefore, 
it funds and supports all Indian universities, research organisations, corporations or 
industries working in the field of biotechnology (FICCI 2015). For instance, the DBT 
provides fund to The National Institute of Plant Genome Research (NIPGR) – an 
autonomous institution started functioning in 1998. The Institute was established to 
undertake, promote and coordinate research in basic and applied plant molecular 
biology. To fulfil its objectives, the Institute utilises molecular biology approaches 
(such as tissue culture and genetic engineering) to identify important genes and 
manipulate these genes for producing transgenic plants with improved agronomic 
traits and stress resistance.
146
 In recent times, the DBT has achieved significant 
growth in the area of agricultural biotechnology and established strategic partnership 
with many countries in the EU (FICCI 2015).  
 
 
The DBT also formulates strategic policy and vision documents periodically. In a 
strategic document, announced recently, the DBT has pointed out that biotechnology 
has the potential to be a globally transformative intellectual enterprise (DBT 2014). It 
defines „biotechnology‟ as the application of science and technology to living 
organisms as well as parts, products and models to alter living or non-living 
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materials for the production of knowledge, goods and services. Therefore, the DBT‟s 
renewed mission is to provide impetus for new understanding of life processes, 
utilise the knowledge to produce biotech products and create a strong infrastructure 
for commercialisation to establish India as a world class bio-manufacturing hub in 
the emerging bioeconomy. To achieve this goal, the DBT proposes to launch a 
national mission on bioprospecting. And the aim of this mission is to facilitate 
bioprospecting of natural resources, its utilisation for developing new products, and 
explore global markets for these products. According to the DBT, these would be 
manufactured biomaterials are intellectual assets and therefore, a system of 
intellectual property rights must be in place to protect them (ibid.). What we notice 
here is that the DBT equally places strong emphasis on knowledge creation through 
modern biotechnology – a technoscientific enterprise that appropriates the biological 
potentiality of living organisms to manufacture new biologicals. And these newly 
produced biologicals are the symbol of technoscientific progress and economic 
wealth; they need to be protected through intellectual property rights because in the 
emerging bioeconomy, power is reflected by patents.  
 
 
Here, DBT‟s emphasis on intellectual property rights is not surprising because 
Monsanto not only played an active role in the formulation of TRIPs Agreement, but 
it was also a corporate partner of the ABSP II Project and a collaborator with 
Mahyco in the production of Bt. brinjal, which involves its proprietary Bt. gene. 
However, given that collaborative relationships developed between heterogeneous 
entities in 2002 and 2003 to produce Bt. brinjal, with India preparing to implement 
the TRIPs Agreement in 2005, this emphasis on transforming bio-genetic resources 
into intellectual properties in policy documents from 2003 onwards is interesting. It 
emphasises the willingness of institutions to integrate the space of power/knowledge 
in a distant location. And this, in turn, highlights how these institutions became the 
agents of integration and prepared the field for power/knowledge regime to operate 
and expand, and brings into view the mediation, interaction and connection between 
heterogeneous entities. Yet this integration, accommodation and expansion of the 
space of power/knowledge in a distant location would not have been possible without 
the relative de/re-territorialisation of Euro-American intellectual property law by the 
TRIPs Agreement. From this point of view, de/re-territorialisation of the space of 
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power/knowledge established connections between global/local institutions situated 
in disparate locations – global/local spaces of power/knowledge co-function and 
operate in symbiosis. And this co-functioning of and symbiosis between de/re-
territorialisation reveal the spatialisation of the power/knowledge regime. Put 
differently, space is fundamental in de/re-territorialisation because power, legal 
practices and norms move through heterogeneous spaces and in so moving, they 
create spatial relations. However, this spatialisation is not merely an outcome or the 
effect of de/re-territorialisation; rather, it brings into view movement, flow, alliance 
and co-functioning through which the spaces of power/knowledge integrate and 
emerge.  
 
5.5: Transformative Spaces and the Condition of Possibility 
 
In the preceding two sections, I have elaborated how the power/knowledge regime 
becomes deterritorialised through mediation, connections and interactions between 
heterogeneous entities. In particular, I have emphasised how the spaces of 
power/knowledge expand through global intellectual property norms, and co-
functioning and co-presence of global/local institutions. In this section, I dwell on 
other spaces of power, specifically space(s) of counter-power. As Deleuze observes, 
„alongside (or rather opposite) particular features of power which correspond to its 
relations, a diagram of forces presents particular features of resistance…‟ (Deleuze 
1986/1988, p 89). Thus, I view ESG‟s contestation as a „differential power/desire‟ 
because what remains enveloped in ESG‟s discourse of biopiracy is a desire to 
contest or oppose the expansion of the power/knowledge regime. This desire to 
contest comes into view once we look into how ESG has mobilised its contention 
through heterogeneous spaces. These spaces are effects that emerged in direct 
opposition to the power/knowledge regime promoted by the TRIPs Agreement and 
therefore, they are transformative spaces.  
 
 
As detailed above, the emergent power/knowledge regime has devalued indigenous 
or traditional knowledges and technologies of farming and rural communities 
developed collectively and intergenerationally. In terms of this power/knowledge 
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regime, a very specific form of knowledge is creative, inventive and superior, and 
knowledge and technologies that fall outside this form are defined as unscientific and 
inferior. In so doing, this power/knowledge regime not only disseminates the power 
of Western technoscience and intellectual property law, but also promotes 
appropriation and propertisation of traditional knowledge and bio-genetic resources 
associated with it by the former, which civil society activists and subaltern actors 
have described as „biopiracy‟. According to Kloppenburg, „biopiracy‟ as an 
appropriative activity has deep historical roots because corporations and countries of 
the North have realised enormous benefits by appropriating crop genetic resources 
and medicinal plants taken from peasant farmers and indigenous peoples without 
payments and with the justification that such materials are the “common heritage of 
mankind”‟ (Kloppenburg 2000, p 512). However, the appropriation of biological 
resources and their propertisation through modern intellectual property law by 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries of the North made developing countries 
increasingly aware of the value of bio-genetic resources located within their 
territorial borders. Thus, as pointed out in Chapter 4, the access, utilisation and 
propertisation of biological resources become a contentious issue during the 
negotiation process of the CBD. The developing countries were no longer willing to 
make their bio-genetic resources available to industrialised countries free of cost 
which meant that access to and utilisation of wild plants and germplasm of local 
varieties are subject to payments. This demand for payment or compensation 
culminated into the „access and benefit sharing‟ provisions in the CBD, which states 
that access should be based on mutually agreed terms including a fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from such access and utilisation (Article 15). Relying on 
this provision, a number of private and public-private „bioprospecting‟ initiatives 
were formalised with countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 1990s to 
explore and assess wild plants and indigenous genetic materials for commercially 
valuable biochemical properties (Oldham 2007, p 122). However, these initiatives 
become extremely controversial due to their exploitative, commoditising and 
commercialising nature, specifically through modern bio-tech science and 
intellectual property rights. Though the issues of corporate control and the growth of 
intellectual property rights over agricultural inputs, such as pesticides and seeds, 
were early on the agenda of activists working in the area of biodiversity 
conservation, in the 1990s this activism was extended into the wider domain of 
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biological diversity (ibid.). Thus, in a 1993 Communique, RAFI (now ETC) used the 
term „biopiracy‟ to describe the patenting or ownership of indigenous knowledge and 
germplasm from the south without compensation (RAFI 1993). In subsequent years, 
the term became extremely popular in advocacy circles both in the North as well as 
the South and achieved a global dimension leading to powerful campaigns against 
biopiracy that prompted the revocation or withdrawal of a number of controversial 
patent claims, such as PNG patent, Basmati, Neem, and Turmeric Patents (for details, 
see Cunningham 1998; Shiva 1998).  
 
 
Significantly, in their activism, advocacy groups have continuously highlighted the 
centrality of modern bio-technical science and intellectual property law in 
commoditising and propertising bio-genetic resources from the South and by doing 
so, drawn attention to power and domination associated with Euro-American cultural 
and legal forms. Hence, the power/knowledge constellation that systematically 
reproduces power and knowledge in new forms are resisted or subverted by social 
movements, which become, themselves, the site of important counter-discourses 
(Escobar 1993, p 56). Accordingly, the discourse of biopiracy, which from the 1990s 
onwards became extremely popular and polyvalent in activism against modern 
biotechnology and intellectual property law, needs to be viewed as a strategy adopted 
by advocacy groups to resist and destabilise the expansion of the power/knowledge 
regime. The biopiracy discourse, therefore, emerged as a „counter-discourse‟ against 
the expansionist agendas, the unfair and inequitable access to and monopolisation of 
bio-genetic resources by global bio-tech corporations (Robinson 2010, p 43). It is, in 
short, emerged as a reaction or in opposition to dominant ideologies embedded in the 
power/knowledge regime. Alternatively, we can say that the biopiracy discourse as a 
strategy of resistance is a form of „counter-power‟, a contingent outcome of the 
tensions that exist in relations of power or „entanglements of power‟ (Sharpe et al. 
2000, p 1). In this light, it can be said that ESG‟s allegation of biopiracy in the 
production of Bt. brinjal is a strategy adopted to resist and contest unfair and 
inequitable access and utilisation of local brinjal varieties by an assemblage of 
heterogeneous entities. And this resistance through the discourse of biopiracy brings 
into view the operation of power/desire in the production of Bt. brinjal. Thus, it can 
be argued that ESG‟ resistance to biopiracy is a relational effect of the 
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power/knowledge regime – a form of counter-power/desire that reveals the mutual 
constitution of power and desire. Hence, resistance is „neither outside of nor 
independent from the systems of power‟; rather, it tells us „more about forms of 
power and how people are caught up in them‟ (Abu-Lughod 1990, pp 42 and 50).  
 
While this resistance to the power/knowledge regime through the discourse of 
biopiracy gives us the means to understand the presence and operation of 
power/desire in the controversy surrounding Bt. brinjal, the existence of protest and 
other struggles aimed at achieving social and economic equality, and scrutinising 
elite interests embedded in economic and development policies, have been active in 
India for a long time. The concern with ecological damage, cultural destruction, and 
inequitable access to land and natural resources were central to these struggles. For 
instance, in the 1970s, while the government representatives and environmental 
experts were debating the issue of environmental and ecological problems in 
Stockholm (Stockholm Conference, 1972) and other forums, a number of movements 
emerged in India that contested the dominant views and faith in the use of modern 
science and technology in economic progress and development, such as Chipko and 
later, Appiko movements against the commercial exploitation of local forest 
resources. In later years, a number of other struggles highlighted the displacement of 
local population, destruction of natural resources, and environmental pollution (for 
example, Narmada Valley Project and Bhopal Gas Disaster). In each of these 
struggles, voice arising from the margins managed to demonstrate the pitfalls of 
modern technoscience and capitalist vision in development related projects and 
programmes. By their very nature, these struggles brought heterogeneous modes of 
interventions together to bring changes in policies and raise consciousness about 
rights. Thus, while at the base, the burden of mobilisation was with those directly 
affected; their contentions acquired mass mobilisation and credibility through the 
involvement of voluntary organisations, advocacy or pressure groups, media, 
scientists, activist academics, lawyers, and sympathetic policymakers. Together these 
actors employed various strategies of confrontations with the intention to bring 
transformations across social and economic landscapes in postcolonial India. What 
followed was a remarkable ideological transformation, and also a concomitant shift 
occurred in movement activism (Ray and Katzenstein 2005, p 21). Consequently, 
three related strategies were adopted and articulated in these activisms – lobbying, 
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through the press and related institutions, the policymakers and political 
representatives, litigation in courts, and involving scientific experts to provide 
research-based knowledge and suggest alternatives (Sethi 1993, p 137). What is 
crucial, however, is that in ecological activism, „action remains located dominantly 
in the framework of rights and justice‟, in the sense that acts of confrontation 
demanded the redefinition of rights and entitlements through legal interventions and 
economic policies (ibid., pp 128 and 145).  
 
 
The above discussion suggests that social movements, advocacy groups and 
subaltern actors seek to influence policies and raise consciousness about injustice and 
legal rights. Here the term „social movement‟ deserves a bit more elaboration. While 
ordinary people often emerge into the streets and join forces to engage in 
confrontations with elites, authorities and powerful opponents, these are not social 
movements. Such confrontations as contentious politics are normal in a democratic 
polity. But when such confrontations and contentious politics develop a repertoire of 
contention and the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful 
opponents, social movement emerges (Tarrow 1998, p 2). Thus, at the base of every 
social movement, protest or acts of resistance, there is contentious politics backed by 
a cycle of contention and collective action frame, which take many forms. In other 
words, „contentious collective action‟ becomes the basis of social movements or acts 
of resistance (ibid., p 3). In acts of resistance, advocacy groups and subaltern actors 
mobilise contentions, demands, elaborate ideologies, and construct collective 
identities through „concerted campaigns of collective action‟ (ibid., p 4). However, as 
Touraine points out, to term a collective action as social movement, it is essential 
that it challenges a mode of generalised social domination (Touraine 2004, p 718). 
Hence, in acts of resistance, collective action not only mounts collective challenges 
and builds solidarity against powerful opponents, but also produces alternative 
narratives of development, progress, and justice, which are most clearly visible in 
counter-discourses. More sharply, by raising voice, acts of resistance seek to create a 
space of hearing as well as a space of transformation, which should not be dismissed 
lightly because these are the spaces where „people at the grassroots‟ or „social 
majorities‟ challenge and counter the oppressive monoliths expanding through the 
power/knowledge regime promoted by „social minorities‟ (Esteva and Prakash 1998, 
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p 4). From this perspective, ESG‟s resistance to biopiracy in the production of Bt. 
brinjal – a form counter-power that challenges the dominant ideologies embedded in 
the power/knowledge regime, can be described as contentious politics because it has 
mobilised a number of contentious demands and claims that become the basis of 
sustained collective action. While ESG‟s contentious politics cannot be termed social 
movement in its own right, it remains inherently tied to the broader discourse of 
biopiracy, which emerged from the ecological movements in India and elsewhere.  
 
 
The point, however, is that confronting the power/knowledge regime through the 
discourse of biopiracy draws our attention to a shift in the configuration of power, 
and more importantly, its articulation in the production of Bt. brinjal is a 
characteristic feature of contentious politics that disrupts the expansion of 
power/knowledge regimes. Accordingly, the controversy surrounding the production 
of Bt. brinjal becomes an „arena‟ of confrontations or a space of struggle where 
contentions, demands and values vie for attention. In speaking about resistance or 
counter-power, we are looking through the eyes of those engaged in acts of 
resistance or confrontations. In the Bt. brinjal controversy, advocacy groups and 
subaltern actors mobilised and moved their contentious politics or counter-power 
through a range of spaces, which following Cornwall can be designated as „popular 
spaces‟ and „invited spaces‟ (Cornwall 2002a and 2004).
147
 As pointed out above, in 
any act of resistance, protest or opposition, social actors develop a repertoire of 
contention based on collective action frame and therefore, framing plays an 
important role in contentious collective action. Framing issues in terms of opposition 
– diagnose causes and problems, identifying the opponents, pointing out injustice, 
formulating claims, adopting strategies for actions, motivate social actors to 
challenge and confront powerful opponents. In short, the framing of issues for 
resistance and opposition is an act of counter-power. Thus, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
in the Bt. brinjal controversy, initially the discourses of opposition were premised on 
the risk and uncertainty of bio-technical science, in the sense that advocacy groups, 
general public and concerned scientists opposed the commercialisation of Bt. brinjal 
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on the ground of health, safety and environmental concerns associated with GMOs. 
In other words, these opposing discourses were framed in terms of two competing 
ideals of science and society, especially as general public dissents that moved 
through „popular spaces‟, such as protesting on the street, newspapers and other 
electronic media, organising public meetings and protest in front of political office.  
 
 
However, on the insistence of concerned policy makers and advocacy groups, the 
nature of this dissent and opposition changed subsequently and traversed through 
various „invited spaces‟. For instance, as pointed out in Chapter 4, in 2010 Jairam 
Ramesh (then Minister of Environment and Forests) conducted a series of public 
consultations in seven cities in India. These public consultations were organised on 
behalf of the MoEF to hear all views and consider all issues, both for and against, 
before making a decision regarding the commercialisation of Bt. brinjal. In these 
public consultations, concerned citizens, scientists, NGOs, individual farmers and 
farmers‟ organisations, agricultural experts, environmentalists, representatives of 
Mahyco and different political parties actively participated and discussed various 
issues associated with modern biotechnology. And these issues were not just limited 
to risk and uncertainty surrounding bio-technical science and its regulation, but 
rather moved towards broader concerns, such as loss of biodiversity, dependency on 
multinational seed corporations and monopolistic control over agricultural inputs, 
intellectual property rights over living organism and farmers‟ rights, unauthorised 
appropriation/biopiracy, collective rights over germplasm and protection of 
traditional knowledge, food sovereignty and autonomy.
148
 What we notice here is 
that advocacy groups, subaltern actors and concerned citizens have diagnosed a 
number of problems and articulated opposition through a repertoire of dissents, 
contentious claims and demands, and in doing so, they have framed issues and 
mobilised their opposition to a power/knowledge regime in much broader terms. Out 
of these heterogeneous concerns and demands, the discourse of unauthorised 
appropriation or biopiracy became most contentious and strongly articulated by ESG 
not just in one of these consultative sessions (discussed in Chapter 1), but also in a 
number of other spaces. For instance, in February 2010, ESG formally lodged a 
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complaint with the KBB alleging unfair and inequitable utilisation of local brinjal 
varieties by Mahyco/Monsanto and their collaborators in the production of Bt. 
brinjal.
149
 Further, in a complaint to the NBA, the ESG has reiterated this 
contention.
150
 In both these complaints, ESG alleged biopiracy by leading 
transnational corporations, universities and powerful bilateral financing agencies of 
the world. Similarly, in 2012, the ESG has moved a PIL to the Karnataka High Court 
in Bangalore, in which it has contended that the entire project of developing Bt. 
brinjal constitutes a theft of the genetic wealth of India.
151
 The ESG, therefore, not 
only pointed out the injustice created through such illegal activities, but also 
demanded a comprehensive inquiry to establish the nature and extent of violations of 
the Biological Diversity Act 2002, fix responsibilities and liabilities, and initiate 
criminal proceedings against the violators as required by law. 
 
 
There is no doubt that these sites of resistance have expanded the spaces of 
contention and created a condition of possibility for activists and subaltern actors to 
bring transformation in the power/knowledge regime. However, the spaces made 
available by powerful actors remain infused with existing relations of power that 
permit only limited influence and marginalise voices leading to the legitimisation of 
interventions or policy prescriptions of the powerful (Cornwall 2002a, p 51; 
Cornwall 2002b, pp 8-9). Thus, while the MoEF imposed an indefinite moratorium 
on the commercialisation Bt. brinjal, the decision was based not on the allegation of 
biopiracy, but rather on the risk and uncertainty of bio-technical science (MoEF 
2010b). This emphasis on science as the main actor not just reproduces the power of 
modern technoscience, but systematically ignores social struggle against the 
power/knowledge regime. In contrast, the judiciary is more concerned with biopiracy 
and in turn, the protection of biodiversity, traditional crops and knowledges. For 
instance, in pursuance to a PIL suit filed by Gene Campaign in 2005, the Supreme 
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Court of India in a 2010 order directed the Indian government to demonstrate what 
steps it has taken to protect traditional crops (ibid.). In a similar vein, acknowledging 
the PIL brought by ESG in 2012, the Karnataka High Court observed that „dharnas 
[protest] must be organised against the United States of America for its continued 
intransigence in complying with global biodiversity norms, highlighting that such 
action might perhaps be necessary in tackling challenges to global biodiversity 
conservation‟ (ESG 2012).
152
 While these latter strategies to contest and resist power 
and domination through law, it might be argued, are trivial as compared to all-
encompassing nature of the power/knowledge regime, they nevertheless bring into 
view law‟s ambivalent relationship with power because law becomes a tool of 
contestation and a space of resistance, and at the same time, it mediates the desire to 
expand the power/knowledge regime.   
 
 
Two central features can be marked out from this discussion of the operation of 
differential power/desire relations in the bioeconomy. These heterogeneous elements 
came together through the de/reterritorialising flow of desire. On the one hand, 
Mahyco/Monsanto, their collaborators, WTO-TRIPs, DST and DBT are connected 
through the desire to produce, propertise, appropriate, and expand the spaces of bio-
economic production and power/knowledge. The ESG and other subaltern groups, on 
the other hand, came together through the desire to contest or oppose this expansion. 
Thus, it is desire that connects and brings these heterogeneous elements in contact 
with each other. Likewise, while the desire to expand the power/knowledge regime 
has moved through dispersed institutional spaces, the desire to contest moved from 
familiar popular spaces to „transient consultative events‟ (Cornwall 2004, p 2) to 
other invited, though more permanent and domesticated, legal avenues. These 
interactions between disparate elements, in other words, bring into view how 
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This chapter shows how power/desire moves and operates in the bioeconomy 
through dispersed spaces. Thus, my focus was on co-presence, co-functioning, 
interactions and mediation between distanciated and proximate entities. In this 
direction, I have emphasised that in the bioeconomy, power operates through the 
global intellectual property regime, such as the WTO-TRIPs. But rather than treating 
the WTO-TRIPs as an instrument of power, I have argued that it is important to view 
the TRIPs regime as a space of power/knowledge because it is deterritorialised and 
spatial. However, this deterritorialisation and spatialisation would have not been 
possible without the support of institutions, such DST and DBT that have integrated, 
accommodated and mediated the TRIPs regime. In other words, these institutions 
organised the field for TRIPs regime to operate in a distant location. And by doing 
so, they have not only reterritorialised the desire to expand, but also emerged as new 
spaces of power/desire. Since my purpose was to examine differentiated relations of 
power/desire, I have looked into ESG‟s contestation as „differential power/desire‟ 
which, I have argued, is not merely an opposition to unauthorised appropriation, but 
rather an effect, a counter-power/desire that emerged in direct opposition to the 
desire to expand the power/knowledge regime. Accordingly, I have demonstrated 
that the Bt. brinjal controversy is a discursive space in which the desire to contest has 
emerged in a multitude of forms. But paradoxically, law figures prominently in this 
discursive space of counter-power, in the sense that law has become an instrument 
that mobilises resistance and at the same time, an arena of contestation. The 
formulation of challenge in legal terms not only brings into view the injustice and 
unjust nature of prevailing socio-economic relations, but also provides an indication 
of the cognitive transformation at play in constructing desire. Thus, I argue that this 
contestation through the discourse of biopiracy is a form of „becoming‟ – the desire 
to become different, to become resistant, to become contentious against the 
expansion of the power/knowledge regime. However, this becoming has been 
articulated through and mediated by the CBD and the Biological Diversity Act 
which, as I have shown in chapter 4, have normalised the desire to appropriate, to 
capture the economic value, to deterritorialise the spaces of bio-economic 
production. ESG‟s desire to contest unauthorised appropriation through the CBD and 
the Biological Diversity Act, therefore, is a failure or a loss of power. Put otherwise, 
ESG‟s desire to contest has the potential to become different, to choose a different 
line of flight. However, by relying on legal mechanisms that have normalised 
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appropriation, ESG‟s desire to contest or resist becomes imprisoned and assimilated 
in the assemblage, that is, becoming proprietary subjects, which is nothing other than 
becoming part of the desiring-machine, becoming part of the infrastructure – an 


























CHAPTER 6  
Spaces of Becoming: Assemblage of Desire and Emergent 
Subjectivity 
 







„“Subjection” signifies…the process of becoming a subject.‟  
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„…all these heterogeneous elements compose “the” multiplicity of symbiosis and 
becoming.‟  
 







Chapter 5 shows how differential power/desire relations operate in the bioeconomy. 
This operation becomes visible once we look into the discourse of biopiracy as an 
effect of or, an opposition to the expanding power/knowledge regime. In the Bt. 
brinjal controversy, ESG‟s contestation highlights deprivation, exclusion and loss of 
identity. ESG‟s contestation, from this point of view, is a „differential power/desire‟ 
– a counter-hegemonic subject position, which ESG and other social activists choose 
to convey their discontents and to articulate a sense of injustice. However, while 
subaltern actors employ various tactics (public demonstration, media publicity, street 
plays and mass petition to mobilise protest), legal norms and formal institutional 
representations, such as litigation, often become more useful in translating demands 
and claims into rights. This rights consciousness is very much evident in ESG‟s 
mobilisation of law and legal strategies. That is, the rights of local communities to 
receive a „fair‟ share of the benefits (monetary or otherwise) arising out of the 
commercial utilisation of local brinjal germplasm as set out in the CBD, the 
Biological Diversity Act, and other legal instruments (Bonn Guideline and Nagoya 
Protocol). The point here is that the ESG has invoked legal norms and practices 
prescribed by global/local governance mechanisms. These mechanisms, as discussed 
in chapter 4, have deterritorialised, normalised and spatialised appropriation. A 
provocative argument, perhaps, but the discourse of biopiracy as a differential 
power/desire has the potential to become different, to follow a different line of flight. 
Paradoxically, however, the discourse was mobilised through the component parts of 
the bioeconomy. The discourse of biopiracy thus never becomes different and this is 
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clearly visible in ESG‟s articulation of rights claim. To be specific, the demand to 
heal injustice by way of receiving a share of the benefits arising from exploitative 
activities is a move that welcomes and accommodates the desire to normalise 
appropriation and propertisation.     
 
I see this transformation as a rupture in the discursive space of counter-power/desire 
giving rise to emergent subjectivities. This chapter, therefore, aims to provide an 
understanding of how emergent subjectivity, that is, subjectivity in its nascent state 
(Guattari 1996, p 195), takes shape in the bioeconomy. The starting point is 
Foucault‟s analyses of the relation between subjection and subjectivation. For 
Foucault, subjection creates a condition for the emergence of transformed subjects. 
Put differently, the transformed subjects emerge through a subtle mix of coercion 
technologies and self-technologies prescribed by various governmental agencies, 
which ensure subjection. Simply stated, various mechanisms and practices create a 
condition in which the subjects can transform themselves – a process of 
subjectivation or, a process of becoming a subject (Butler 1997, p 2). Taking note of 
this understanding, I delve into OECD and DBT‟s policy prescriptions and show that 
these prescriptions are aimed towards transforming the behaviours and conducts of 
the subjects – to produce transformed subjects. My analytical point of departure, 
however, is slightly off to the track because I am interested to understand how a 
multiplicity shapes emergent subjectivity in the bioeconomy. With this in mind, I 
emphasise how desire moves through disparate elements and in so doing, establishes 
machinic conjunctions between them. Thus, I focus on the movement of desire in the 
Bt. brinjal controversy, especially through the mechanisms and practices prescribed 
by the TRIPs and the CBD. I argue that this continuous movement of desire between 
the component parts of the bioeconomy create a condition for the emergence of 
desiring-subjects – a process of becoming. I set out to explore this argument further, 
precisely by looking into ESG‟s articulation of legal rights in the discourse of 
biopiracy. In particular, ESG‟s rights discourse puts emphasis on „benefit-sharing‟ 
and „prior informed consent‟ to redress injustice. I analyse these highly charged 
assertions and illustrate that subjectivity in the bioeconomy emerges through 
mechanisms and practices, which the subjects invoke to articulate their claims, 
demands and rights. After all, what remains folded in these mechanisms and 
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practices is the desire to produce transformed subjects. Indeed, the mobilisation of 
rights discourse is an indication of transformation – an assimilation with the 
dominant ideals of the bioeconomy. This assimilation, I argue, is a becoming – 
becoming part of the infrastructure, becoming part of the desiring-machine – an 
emergent subjectivity, shaped and produced by a multiplicity.  
 
6.2: Subjection and Subjectivation 
 
The discourse of biopiracy, I have argued, gives rise to emergent subjectivity, and 
this subjectivity remains folded in propertising and appropriative mechanisms 
through which the desire to expand the spaces of bio-economic production moves. 
The modern subject, according to Foucault, emerges at the intersection of subjection 
and subjectivation. He terms this process „assujetissement‟ (Foucault 1975/1979) 
which, as Butler explains, „denotes both the becoming of the subject and the process 
of subjection – one inhabits the figure of autonomy only by becoming subjected to 
power, a subjection which implies radical dependency‟ (Butler 1997, p 83). 
Subjectivation thus signifies the process of becoming a subject. This becoming, 
however, depends on subjection because it is subjection that transforms the subjects. 
Hence, in the essay The Subject and Power, Foucault writes that his objective was 
not to analyse power, but to understand how human beings are made subjects 
(Foucault 1982, pp 209). As he observes,   
„It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the 
word “subject”: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his 
own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of 
power that subjugates and makes subject to‟ (ibid., p 212).        
Foucault was interested to understand what happens when someone exercises power 
over another (Foucault 1988c, p 102). His attention was on the effects of power, and 
he analysed these effects through subjection. Although Foucault puts emphasis on 
subjection (assujettissement), it becomes clear that he articulates the process through 
which subjectivities take shape. Therefore, subjection should not be viewed only in 
terms of subjugation or subordination. Rather, it needs to be understood as a process 
of subjectivation – subjection leads to the activation or production of subjectivity. 
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Foucault analysed this process of subjectivation in a very different fashion in his later 
works, such as The Use of Pleasure (1984/1992), and also in the recently published 
annual College de France lecture series The Hermeneutics of the Subject (2001/2005) 
and The Birth of Biopolitics (2004/2008).
156
 Specifically, in these later works, 
Foucault examines how a calculated orchestration of techniques can be used to 
transform human beings. These techniques, according to him, are „technologies of 
the self‟, which permit „individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of 
others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain 
state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality‟ (Foucault 1988b, p 
18). To Foucault, acting upon the self are the modes through which human beings 
construe and shape their activities, thoughts and desires. Thus, in The Birth of 
Biopolitics, he shows that at the end of the eighteenth century certain techniques 
were put into practice to transform individuals into homo oeconomicus – an 
entrepreneur of himself (Foucault 2004/2008, p 226). Accordingly, certain 
arrangements were made to lodge individual‟s life within the framework of a 
multiplicity of diverse enterprises connected up to and entangled with each other so 
that their actions, decisions and choices have meaningful and perceptible effects 
(ibid., p 241). In other words, these arrangements were put into place to transform as 
well as to get hold of the economic behaviour of individuals. The subject, therefore, 
is considered homo oeconomicus once she transforms her behaviour into rational 
conduct, pursues her own interest and at the same time, her interest converges with 
the interest of others (ibid., p 270). Put otherwise, homo oeconomicus is someone 
who transforms her behaviours, desires, thoughts, and activities according to the 
needs of the economy. The crucial point is that homo oeconomicus is an „enterprising 
self‟ – an active self and at the same time, a calculative self that calculates about 
itself and that acts upon itself in order to better itself (Rose 1996b, p 154). This 
transformation of human beings into enterprising selves is driven by techniques of 
the self, which are integrated into the structures of coercion or domination (Foucault 
1980/1993, p 203). In a sense, the subjects are tied to a multiplicity of techniques 
and, according to Foucault, this versatile equilibrium between techniques through 
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which the self is constructed or modified „is a mode of subjection, a new production 
of subjectivity‟ (Read 2009, p 32).  
 
A detailed elaboration of this understanding can be found in The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject (Foucault 2001/2005), in which he points out that the notion of „care of 
oneself‟ (epimeleia heautou) is „an attitude towards the self, others, and the world‟. It 
is a certain way of considering things, undertaking actions and having relations with 
other people (ibid., p 10). It also „implies a certain way of attending to what we think 
and what takes place in our thought‟. He further explains that it is not simply a 
general attitude or form of attention turned on the self, but rather designates a 
number of actions and practices by which one changes, purifies, transforms and 
transfigures oneself (ibid., p 11). Since the subject is a form and not a substance 
(Foucault 1984/1987, p 121), he refers to a whole domain of complex and regulated 
activities that the subject was given to enable her to fight all her life (Foucault 
1994/1997, pp 95 and 97). The care of the self, then, is both a duty and a technique 
of taking care of the activities that permit individuals to change and transform 
(Foucault 1988b, p 25). And, for Foucault, these practices of „attending to oneself‟ or 
„taking care of oneself‟ (Foucault 1994/1997, p 93) are „practices of subjectivation‟ 
(Davidson 2001/2005). Foucault further elaborated this understanding in The Use of 
Pleasure (Foucault 1984/1992), as he observes, that these rules of conduct or rules of 
action are a complex interplay of elements recommended by various prescriptive 
agencies according to „which one ought to “conduct oneself” – that is, the manner in 
which one ought to form as an ethical subject‟ (ibid., pp 25-26). Thus, one can 
transform herself into an ethical subject through practices, which may include the 
„movements of desire in all its hidden forms, including the most obscure‟ (ibid., p 
27). And the formation of ethical subject or transformation of one‟s own mode of 
being on the basis of recommended conduct and practices, according to Foucault, is a 
form subjectivation that subjection ensures (ibid., pp 28-32).  
 
The techniques of „care of the self‟ were oriented toward the discovery and the 
formulation of truth concerning oneself (Foucault 1980/1993, p 204). These 
techniques, in other words, were complementary to governmental ensemble because 
194 
 
as a part of „self-technology‟, the purpose of „care of the self‟ was to assure „coercion 
and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself‟ (ibid.). 
Then, the techniques and practices through which the power/desire functions and 
operates may, at first glance, appear to be external to the subject, slowly internalised 
and embraced by the subject to inaugurate her emergence, as Deleuze observes, „the 
relation to oneself that is self-mastery, “is a power that one brought to bear on 
oneself in the power that one exercised over others”‟ (Deleuze 1986/1988, p 100; 
original emphasis). Foucault has emphasised this point, as he explains, „power 
consists in complex relations: these relations involve a set of rational techniques, and 
the efficiency of those techniques is due to a subtle integration of coercion 
technologies and self-technologies‟ (Foucault 1980/1993, p 204). The integration of 
techniques and practices that demands subjection as well as enables the subject to 
transform themselves is the condition in which the subject of desire emerges. As 
Foucault states, his intention was to „analyze the practices by which individuals were 
led to focus their attention on themselves, to decipher, recognise, and acknowledge 
themselves as subjects of desire‟ (Foucault 1984/1992, p 5).  
 
6.3: Emergence of Desiring Subject 
 
Foucault‟s insights suggest that subjectivation is a process of becoming, which 
construes, transforms and shapes the activities, thoughts and desires of individuals. 
The subjects of desire, then, are „gradually, progressively, really and materially 
constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, 
thoughts etc.‟ (Foucault 1980, pp 97-98). This observation is important, since it 
highlights the importance of looking into an ensemble of techniques and practices 
that demands subjection and by doing so, ensures the transformation of the subject. 
Put otherwise, subjection transforms the actions, behaviours and conducts of the 
subjects and in the bioeconomy, this subjection occurs through the techniques and 
practices prescribed by various global/local institutions. While these techniques and 
practices are oriented toward the overall well-being of the subjects, they are designed 
to transform economic behaviours, so that the actions and conducts of the subjects 
align with the needs of the bioeconomy. Simply put, these techniques are put in place 
to transform the subject into homo oeconomicus. For instance, in its vision of the 
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emerging bioeconomy, the OECD puts emphasis on capturing the latent value of 
biological resources to support economic growth and social well-being, and in this 
direction, recognises the importance of biotechnological inventions and innovation. 
To realise this vision, it prescribes long-term strategies, concerned mainly with the 
governance of access and utilisation of bio-genetic resources. An important aspect of 
this policy prescription is the emphasis on market. The OECD considers market as an 
integral part of biodiversity conservation because once the commercial value of bio-
genetic resources is recognised, their exploitation would become sustainable. 
Accordingly, policies should be geared towards creating new markets in bio-genetic 
resources. Yet, the creation of new markets depends on governance mechanisms, 
which not only regulate access and utilisation, but also recognise well-defined 
property rights. The policy concern is thus with existing legal mechanisms and 
practices that are essential for the governance of appropriative activities, conducts 
and behaviours. Or, consider for example, the increasing emphasis on intellectual 
property rights and bioprospecting in India‟s biotechnology strategies discussed in 
chapter 1. In a number of policy documents, the DBT has clearly pointed out the 
importance of capturing the accumulative potential of biological resources to expand 
the spaces of bio-economic production. This means transforming bio-genetic 
resources into industrial raw materials and intellectual properties. Consequently, the 
role of intellectual property and biodiversity laws become paramount in legitimising 
access and appropriation. However, the point is that transforming bio-genetic 
resources into tradable assets depends on economic behaviours and activities. So the 
conducts, thoughts, and desires of the subject must be transformed and this 
transformation should be achieved by re-defining existing laws and norms.      
 
 
This continuing emphasis on governing access and utilisation, and property rights in 
policy prescriptions is significant. In particular, what these policy prescriptions 
reveal is a notion of subjectivity. There is a tacit assumption that the subjects would 
transform their behaviours, actions, thoughts, and decisions according to the 
practices recommended. Or we might say that the subjects ought to conduct their 
activities in a way that they can be aligned with the aspirations of the bioeconomy. 
Strictly speaking, these prescriptions are „technologies of the self‟, which permit the 
subjects to transform themselves into enterprising selves or homo oeconomicus. 
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Hence, these policies are geared towards creating a condition in which the activities 
of the subject can be governed and regulated. This is particularly evident in 
global/local legal arrangements, such the WTO-TRIPs, the Indian Patent Act, the 
CBD and the Biological Diversity Act, which prescribe mechanisms and practices to 
normalise appropriation and propertisation of bio-genetic resources. But what 
remains enveloped in these mechanisms and practices is a process of subjectivation 
because they demand subjection. This means that the subjects need to transform their 
appropriative and proprietary activities according to the needs of the bioeconomy. 
These mechanisms and practices, then, are practices of subjectivation, they are 
designed to produce transformed subject.  
 
 
Nonetheless, the underlying rationale of these practices goes much deeper. In a 
sense, while the practices of subjectivation transform the subject, this subjectivation 
is shaped by interactions and relations between heterogeneous elements. 
Consequently, subjectivity in the bioeconomy is inseparable from a multiplicity. 
After all, the bioeconomy is comprised of disparate elements that connect and relate 
to one another through lines and movement.  An affinity and alliance of the subject 
with these lines activate the process of subjectivation or becoming. Put differently, a 
multiplicity contains a large number of elements, and these elements establish 
connections, form alliances, and work in symbiosis; it is a space of continuity. 
Hence, what matters in a multiplicity is a set of relations, which are inseparable from 
each other. And the mechanisms and practices through which these relations take 
shape are the points of subjectivation that transform the subject according to the 
supposed ideals of the assemblage. This means that desire is not internal to a subject, 
but rather, it is a process of construction in which heterogeneous elements combine. 
The emergence of desiring-subject, therefore, is shaped by a combination of 
disparate elements, it is an effect of assemblage and thus, we need to „describe the 
assemblage in which such a desire becomes possible, gets moving and declares itself‟ 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1977/1987, p 97).  
 




The bioeconomy operates in a connective fashion, through machinic conjunctions. It 
is a deterritorialised machinic assemblage. I have emphasised this understanding 
through my analysis of the Bt. brinjal controversy in which heterogeneous elements 
co-function, combine, connect, and relate with one another. This has prompted me to 
suggest that the controversy is an effect of machinic assemblage. Crucially, the 
assemblage is formed through the de/re-territorialising flow of desire because it is 
desire that assembles, establishes conjunctions, and programmes the assemblage 
(Deleuze and Parnet 1977/1987, p 79). The bioeconomy, from this perspective, is a 
material production of desire, or a desiring-machine. Alternatively, we can say that 
desire co-functions and works in symbiosis, it circulates in the assemblage and 
therefore, is a part of functioning assemblage (Deleuze 2001/2007, pp 125 and 130). 
Since an assemblage is a constellation of disparate elements, desire is „coextensive 
with the whole line of the outside‟ (Deleuze 1986/1988, p 123). It follows that desire 
is to be found in different components of the assemblage, or in a „whole series of 
semiotic components‟ (Guattari 2009, p 283) involved in the assemblage. Arguably, 
then, disparate elements emit desire in the bioeconomy to transform the subjects, 
augmenting or diminishing their power to act (Deleuze/Guattari 1980/2004, p 283). 
And this desire to transform remains folded in mechanisms and practices, which the 
subjects invoke. Consequently, the subjects move, or are moved by elements along 
the lines desire moves, assembles and relates.  
 
 
Consider, for example, Mahyo/Monsanto‟s desire to produce and propertise a new 
life form in the Bt. brinjal controversy that moved through global/local intellectual 
property law. As discussed in chapter 3, Mahyco claimed that it had invented a new 
life form through bio-technical ingenuity – the Bt. brinjal and therefore, it has 
property rights over it. Significantly, the production of Bt. brinjal also involves 
Monsanto‟s Bt. gene. As a proprietary technology, the Bt. gene demands intellectual 
property protection of genetically modified living organisms, and at the same time, 
prohibits others from reproducing the new life form or any fragments of it in any 
manner in India. Accordingly, Mahyco not only reiterated the importance of 
protecting Monsanto‟s property rights, but also demanded intellectual property 
protection over the modified brinjal germplasm because it contains other 
technologies, such as the Bt. gene and MHSCL technology. Mahyco‟s property 
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rights claim thus extends to emergent life forms that the Bt. brinjal would produce. 
What this suggests is that Mahyco‟s desire to propertise not just remained limited to 
Bt. brinjal, but further moved towards propertising emergence. This desire to 
propertise emergence, I have shown, brought into existence an emergent space of 
property in India. And this desire was mediated by disparate elements and moved 
through heterogeneous spaces. The TRIPs Agreement, for instance, not only 
recognises the rights of legal subjects to protect intellectual properties, but also 
prescribes mechanisms to claim such rights irrespective of place and location, so that 
„legitimate trade‟ in intellectual properties can be carried out throughout the globe. I 
have discussed how these practices are reterritorialised in India‟s intellectual 
property legislation. What is more important here is that these global/local legal 
mechanisms are emplaced to change the economic behaviours of the subjects. In the 
sense that in order to claim intellectual property rights, the subjects ought to 
transform and carry out their activities according to the practices recommended. In so 
doing, the proprietary subjects will not just take care of their own and others‟ desire, 
but will also transform others‟ behaviour, such as not to violate intellectual property 
rights. Global/local intellectual property practices are thus designed to produce 
transformed subject, and this transformation comes through the desire to propertise 
emergence, as it is evident in Mahyco/Monsanto‟s property rights claim over the Bt. 
brinjal. The point is that this desire to propertise emergence, not just moves through, 
but remains coded in intellectual property mechanisms and practices.    
 
 
The desire to propertise operates in conjunction with the desire to normalise 
appropriation. As discussed in chapter 4, the expansion of the bioeconomy demands 
unparalleled access to and utilisation of bio-genetic resources. So governmental 
interventions are necessary to ensure the continuous movement of biological 
materials from one place to another. Simply stated, the viability of the bioeconomy 
hinges on creating a secure environment in which the appropriation and movement of 
bio-genetic resources can be authorised through a framework of law or legal 
mechanisms. The CBD and its counterpart, the Biological Diversity Act – two 
governance mechanisms, are designed to perform this task. The CBD, for instance, is 
a global legal instrument and my discussion shows how the idea of bioeconomy 
emerged and gained traction during the negotiation process. More importantly, how a 
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group of experts defined problems and adopted a particular way of thinking 
(unsustainable appropriation) and in doing so, devised mechanisms and practices to 
govern the access and utilisation of biological materials at a distance. Since bio-
genetic resources are commercially viable assets, the CBD puts emphasis on their 
conservation and sustainable use. Thus, the core concern revolves around the issue of 
access and utilisation or commercial exploitation, which should be resolved through 
the use of genetic engineering and the recognition of ownership rights. As one 
commentator remarks, „the drafters of the convention believed that the best strategy 
to protect biological and genetic resources was to give states explicit property rights‟ 
(Merson 2001, p 284). Accordingly, the CBD not only emphasises the role of 
modern biotechnology in evaluating the commercial value of germplasm, but also 
recognises the importance of property rights in protecting economic interests. This in 
turn suggests that the solution for unsustainable appropriation remains in modern 
bio-technical science and property rights. This is the solution OECD‟s Bioeconomy 
Project re-iterates. Hence, I have argued (in chapter 4) that the CBD has laid down 
the future path of the bioeconomy. But as emphasised above, the policy prescription 
of the OECD is directed towards transforming the economic behaviours and 
activities of the subjects. Or, one can say that to capture the economic value of 
biological materials and to expand the spaces of bio-economic production, a 
transformation in appropriative behaviours and activities is necessary – the subjects 
need to transform their conducts, activities, thoughts and desires. And this is clearly 
visible in the Bt. brinjal controversy, especially in Mahyco/Monsanto‟s desire to 
produce a new life as well as a new property form. In this respect, a framework of 
law and legal mechanisms are important because a secure environment is a necessary 
prerequisite for carrying out appropriation. Therefore, mechanisms and practices 
should be put in place to normalise appropriative activities, which are available in the 
CBD and the Biological Diversity Act. Viewing in this way, I have suggested that 
the CBD has normalised the desire to appropriate and capture, thereby expanded the 
spaces of bio-economic production. This observation is important, as it highlights 
that the CBD, like the TRIPs, has a transformative dimension – it is designed to 
transform the behaviours and activities of the subjects, and this transformation comes 
through mechanisms and practices in which the desire to capture, to appropriate, to 





The desire to expand the spaces of bio-economic production is equally visible in 
global/local intellectual property practices. In chapter 5, I have shown how the desire 
to expand the spaces of power/knowledge operates in the bioeconomy, especially 
through the TRIPs regime, and in particular how this expansion is mediated by 
institutions situated in a distant location. However, in the Bt. brinjal controversy and 
elsewhere, advocacy groups have contested these expansionist tendencies through 
the discourse of biopiracy, which reflects the real concern over increasing 
appropriation and propertisation of bio-genetic resources. An important aspect of this 
concern is the claim that wild plants and local germplasm containing commercially 
viable information and chemical properties are domesticated, conserved and 
protected by indigenous and local farming communities for generations. As such, 
these resources and knowledge associated with them are a part of communal life and 
collective mode of living. Hence, appropriation and propertisation of these resources 
by global/local bio-tech corporations without permission and compensation is unfair 
and inequitable. To fight injustice and remove imbalances, civil society actors, both 
in developed and developing countries, have demanded compensation, and a share of 
the benefits arising from appropriation for the providers of resources. Interestingly, 
these claims and demands are mobilised through the CBD and other local 
counterparts, such as the Biological Diversity Act. These global/local legal 
instruments not only recognise the rights of indigenous and local farming 
communities over their resources and knowledge, but also prescribe mechanisms 
through which such demands and claims should be mobilised. What this brings into 
view is that these mechanisms are designed to transform the thoughts, desires, and 
conducts of the subjects – to transform the contentious subjects into desiring 
subjects. The fight for justice, therefore, gradually and materially transformed into a 
desire to receive monetary and other benefits from exploitative activities. This 
transformation aligns very well with the desire to normalise appropriation and 
expansion because the mechanisms through which the desire to contest moves are 
component parts of the bioeconomy. Thus, by invoking the components through 
which desire moves and assembles, the contentious subject becomes more in 
command of herself as subject of enunciation in mental reality, for in the end the 
subject is only obeying to herself (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 143). 
Subjectivation, then, is activated by a topological relationship between the inside and 
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the outside – the thoughts, behaviours, and actions of the subjects are affected by the 
outside. Or we might say that the prescribed mechanisms and practices create a 
condition in which the subjects internalise the outside – fold the outside into inside. 
As Deleuze writes, „the relation to oneself is homologous to the relation with the 
outside‟ (Deleuze 2001/2007, p 259; Deleuze 1986/1988, p 119). The inside and the 
outside are always in contact with each other through the mediators – the 
components of the assemblage. Emergent subjectivity, therefore, is shaped by a 
continuous flow of desire because „desire is the real agent merging each time with 
the variables of an assemblage‟ (Deleuze and Parnet 1977/1987, p 103). So the 
presence of desire – its operation, movement, distribution and manifestation through 
disparate elements, enables the subject to transform, thereby inaugurate the 
emergence of desiring-subject.  
 
6.5: Becoming Subject 
 
The bioeconomy is a space of mutation – it reveals how the desiring-subject slowly 
emerges through mechanisms and practices prescribed by various global/local 
institutions. This emergence is clearly visible in the strategies subjects adopt, 
especially in the discourse of biopiracy. In their fight for justice, civil society actors 
have mobilised contentious claims and demands through the language of rights, such 
as the right to receive a „fair and equitable‟ share of benefits arising from commercial 
exploitation. In the Bt. brinjal controversy, this rights discourse becomes a strategy to 
fight unauthorised appropriation of bio-genetic resources. For instance, in its 
allegation of biopiracy, the ESG claimed that Mahyco/Monsanto and their 
collaborators have accessed local brinjal germplasm to develop Bt. brinjal. Since no 
authorisation was obtained from the NBA or other state bodies, the access is illegal 
and violated the provisions of the Biological Diversity Act. The ESG further stated 
that this violation „denies the local communities who have cultivated and protected 
traditional varieties from time immemorial from their due right to benefit from 





 This view was reiterated in a press release in 2011, which highlighted 
the rights of local communities to receive benefits as per the internationally 
applicable „access and benefit sharing mechanisms‟.
158
 These mechanisms are 
obviously the CBD 1992, the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization 2002, and 
the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing 2010. Even further, in a PIL suit 
at the Karnataka High Court, the ESG has drawn court‟s attention to injustice created 
through such a violation. For ESG, the alleged biopiracy is a gross miscarriage of 
„justice‟ and violation of a number of „fundamental rights‟ (enshrined in the 
Constitution of India) and other legally protected interests. Such unchecked and 
egregious cases of biopiracy, according to ESG, raise concerns about food security, 
the adequacy and accessibility of food, and the „exclusion‟ of original providers of 
bio-resources and their indigenous modes of life. More importantly, the ESG 
contended that such a violation affects traditional farming practices in indigenous 
communities, compromises the sovereign control over nation‟s bio-resources, and 
erodes social, economic and ecological „autonomy‟ of communities in growing their 
own food.
159
   
 
What is significant here is that the ESG has invoked legal rights from the CBD, the 
Biological Diversity Act, and other international legal instruments to highlight 
injustice – the unauthorised appropriation of bio-genetic resources, which disregards 
autonomy, identity and indigenous mode of life, and violates the right to receive a 
„fair and equitable‟ share of benefits. Of course, counter-strategic discourses aimed at 
fighting injustice and reclaiming autonomy are causes worth fighting for. And, to this 
effect, ESG has mobilised legal rights to translate demands and claims into justice 
and entitlements. So law matters in social struggles because „it is often the law which 
provides the language and the locale for resistance‟ (Merry 1995, p 14). This is not 
surprising, however. In social movements, social actors always invent novel 
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expressions to articulate a sense of injustice and social power to fight against 
deprivation, for survival and identity (Frank and Fuentes 1990, p 127). As 
emphasised in chapter 5, in social movements or popular resistance law is understood 
as a resource, which activists and subaltern agencies utilise to advance their claims. 
Presuming that law articulates an idea of justice and a sense of power, subaltern 
actors invoke and rely on law as the most authoritative and definitive arbiter of 
rightness and a frame of reference (Turk 1976, p 281). Therefore, as a means of self-
realisation, social activists mobilise law to translate their desire and demands into 
rights claim (Zemans 1983, p 700). Certainly, one can say that law as a 
communicative device sets the very terms of struggle and call into attention the 
violation of legal rights. Law thus becomes an end and means of action because it 
provides both normative principles and strategic resources for the conduct of social 
struggles (McCann 2004, p 508). In this sense, law is „understood as a quiet plastic 
and malleable medium, routinely employed to reconfigure relations, redefine 
entitlements, and formulate aspirations‟ (McCann 2006, p 22). That is to say, law as 
a strategic resource plays a constitutive role in bringing rights consciousness – to 
understand claims and entitlements in terms of legal rights (ibid). Rights claim, from 
this point of view, becomes a strategic device to fight injustice. For instance, Alan 
Hunt argues for rights-based strategies in struggle for social change. He points out 
that „rights-in-action involve an articulation and mobilization of forms of collective 
identities‟ (Hunt 1990, p 325). For him, counter-hegemonic rights strategy „play[s] a 
part in constituting the social actors, whether individual or collective, whose identity 
is changed by and through the mobilisation of some particular rights discourse‟ 
(ibid., pp 325-326).  
 
 
It is true that contentious subjects constitute themselves through rights discourse, in 
the sense that transformation comes through the articulation of claims and demands 
in terms of legal right. Thus, we may well be tempted think that in the Bt. brinjal 
controversy, the mobilisation of legal right is an articulation of collective identities 
formed through rights consciousness. But we need to be careful about such 




„We cannot think without abstractions: they cause us to think, they lure our feelings 
and affects. But our duty is to take care of our abstractions, never to bow down in 
front of what they are doing to us – especially when they demand that we heroically 
accept the sacrifices they entail, the insuperable dilemmas and contradictions in which 
they trap us‟ (Stengers 2008, p 50). 
 
Hence, I do not see the mobilisation of legal rights as an articulation of collective 
identities, but rather, as a rupture in the discursive space of counter-power. In a 
sense, the articulation of claims and demands through legal rights inaugurates the 
emergence of desiring-subject because what remains folded in rights discourse is a 
desire to receive compensation and a „fair and equitable‟ share of benefits. The point 
is that desire is central in the formation of transformed subject – both dominant and 
subjugated, and this desire remains folded in mechanisms through which the 
discourse of rights was articulated. Given that these mechanisms are framed to 
protect the interest of the subjects, there is a presupposition that the contentious 
subjects would invoke legal rights to mobilise their claims. Put otherwise, these 
prescribed mechanisms not only recognise the contention and desire of the subjects, 
but also encourage them to articulate their desire the way law defines and formulates 
– the language of rights. Law encourages the subjects to articulate their concerns, to 
assert their rights, and by doing so, puts the subjects into the position to demand 
autonomy and to obtain benefits that were previously denied to them (Collier et al. 
1997). In the bioeconomy, however, the law does so in two complementary ways. It 
solicits expressions, interests, demands and claims of the subjects and to this end, 
prescribes mechanisms and practices that the subjects are free to invoke to further 
their desire. Hence, on the one hand, the desire to propertise, to appropriate, to 
normalise, to capture, and to expand the spaces of bio-economic production are 
moving and flowing through these mechanisms. On the other, the same mechanisms 
are prescribed to the subjects to mobilise their claims, especially through legal rights. 
This suggests that these mechanisms are designed and framed to transform the 
subjects, to produce desiring-subjects. Law thus plays an important role in 
constituting subjectivities – the invocation of law and legal rights in social struggle 
transforms the subjects and thereby yield new subjectivities (Coombe 1991, p 5; 
Hirsch and Lazarus-Black 1994, p 13). In the Bt. brinjal controversy, the ESG has 
invoked legal rights to articulate claims and demands, and this articulation reminds 
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us of Foucault‟s astute observation that „anyone who attempts to oppose the 
law…will only encounter the silent and infinitely accommodating welcome of the 
law‟ (Foucault 1966/1987, p 38). This is very much evident in the discourse of 
biopiracy. In a sense, contentious claims, demands and rights are gradually 
transformed and accommodated in the law, which prescribes mechanisms to heal 
injustice through monetary compensation. The mobilisation of claims and demands 
through prescribed mechanisms, therefore, is an indication of the emergence of 
transformed subject. The point that needs to be stressed here is that what remains 
folded in law or legal mechanism is desire, shaped by co-functioning of and 
interactions between disparate entities. Not surprisingly, then, the law, along with 
desire, is constantly present in the assemblage. It is a part of functioning assemblage. 
Since law is a component part of the bioeconomy, desire moves around, flows 
through and traverses the assemblage in accordance with the law. What is more, law 
supports the movements of desire in all its hidden forms. Indeed, it can be argued 
that desire is inseparable from the law, neither from machinic complexes, nor from 
subjectivation. Accordingly, by conforming to law and embracing the legal 
mechanisms prescribed, the subject utters and reflects on her own desire and in doing 
so, becomes a part of the assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari 1980/2004, p 144).  
 
6.6: Spaces of Becoming 
 
As emphasised above, the discourse of biopiracy mobilised to resist the expansion of 
the bioeconomy gradually transformed into a rights discourse. And what remains 
folded in this rights discourse is a desire to include the custodians of bio-genetic 
resources in exploitative activities. This inclusion has been formalised through legal 
mechanism, such as the benefit-sharing arrangement. The benefit-sharing mechanism 
forms the central element of the CBD (Art. 15.7). Put simply, the benefit-sharing 
mechanism was put in place to protect economically valuable bio-genetic resources 
from unauthorised appropriation. As a precondition to access and commercial 
exploitation, the purpose of the mechanism is to ensure that the custodians of bio-
genetic resources get a fair share of the benefits arising from the utilisation of 
resources protected by them for generations (Rosendal 2006, p 81). Thus, the aim of 
the CBD was to provide a legal framework through which indigenous and farming 
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communities can demand monetary compensation. Viewing in this way, one can say 
that the benefit-sharing mechanism is aimed towards achieving greater social justice. 
Significantly, the CBD not only endorses the epistemic value of indigenous or local 
peoples‟ knowledge and practices, but also recognises their right to receive monetary 
benefits that was previous denied. Or one might say that the benefit-sharing 
arrangement prescribed by the CBD is a step towards enhancing global redistributive 
justice, understood in terms of redistributing the economic wealth, which accrued as 
a result of unauthorised appropriation of southern plant genetic resources. The right 
to access thus comes with an obligation to share benefits. And those who disregards 
this obligation „are unjust agents, committing unjust actions, insofar as they violate a 
legitimate social rule set up to prevent exploitation and injustice‟ (Schroeder and 
Pogge 2009, p 270). Echoing this understanding, the ESG brought to court‟s 
attention the Constitutional guarantees and effective sovereign laws that exist to 
protect India‟s bio-genetic resources and knowledge associated with them. In ESG‟s 
view, there is a blatant violation of the law because an egregious act of biopiracy was 
committed in the production of Bt. brinjal. This violation, the ESG contended, led to 
a situation in which precious bio-genetic resources have been taken away by 
unscrupulous scientists, botanists and businessmen without complying with the legal 
requirements of access and benefit-sharing. As a result, there is an irretrievable loss 
of revenue to the public exchequer because by and large a share of benefits from 





The right to receive a share of the benefits, according to ESG, operates as a 
compensatory mechanism which, as Peterson points out, emerged out of market-
driven development paradigms (Peterson 2001, p 78). What this means is that while 
the benefit-sharing arrangement can offer material form of justice – at least in theory, 
its emphasis on monetary compensation implicitly converts appropriation into a 
commercial enterprise, subject to profit motives (Widenhorn 2014, p 382). As 
GRAIN puts it, the Convention was seen as a beacon to bring forth equality and 
justice. So the custodians of bio-genetic resources are supposed to get a fair deal, but 
what seems to be happening is that this purpose is increasingly being hijacked by an 
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exclusively commercial approach (Grain 2000). Indeed, the benefit-sharing 
mechanism speaks the language of inclusion, but the main emphasis is on the right to 
receive compensation and a „fair and equitable‟ share of the benefits. For instance, 
Cori Hayden argues that the CBD „has been particularly influential in reshaping the 
global topographies of rights and obligation‟ because it comes with a mandate that 
„companies compensate or otherwise share benefits with source nations, as a 
condition for their continued access to “Southern” biological resources‟ (Hayden 
2003a, pp 1-2). The CBD, from this point of view, „has produced both an idiom of 
expectation and an institutional framework‟, backed up by an increasing number of 
national laws and watchful eyes of activists groups, „to turn a one-way process of 
extraction into a multidirectional process of exchange‟ (ibid., p 2). This promise and 
its redistributive potential, she further notes, offers market-mediated inclusion or 
enfranchisement through which contemporary social struggles are being painted. 
Certainly, the idea of benefit-sharing „is being used in many ways now to imagine 
how native and indigenous resource holders might become new kinds of participants 
or rights-holders‟ (ibid., p 37), as the discourse of biopiracy in the Bt. brinjal 
controversy demonstrates. Then, it is not surprising that the right to receive benefit 
itself becomes a tool of inclusion. However, the idiom of inclusion, as Hayden 
suggests, is mainly concerned with creating „interests‟ (claims) in biodiversity by 
producing a shared ground: that each has something tangible to gain from 
commercial exploitation. The crucial lubricant here, according to her, is the idea of 
„taking as giving‟ – a market-mediated redistribution mechanism. What remains 
implicit in this idea is the assumption that indigenous peoples and other benefit-
sharers have a legitimate property rights in both knowledge and plants (Hayden 
2003b and 2007). In fact, as Hayden points out, the production of interest in 
commercial exploitation „depends heavily on the presumption of self-interested, 
maximizing actor…who will respond appropriately (rationally) to biodiversity‟s 
newly attributed and articulated value‟ (Hayden 2003a, p 61). 
 
 
Notwithstanding Hayden‟s observation, it needs to be stressed that the CBD was 
aimed towards normalising appropriation and this normalisation is achieved by 
transforming contentious subjects into the subjects of legal rights. This is particularly 
evident in the discourse of biopiracy, since contentious claims and demands 
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gradually transformed into a right to receive benefit from exploitative activities. 
Thus, claims or what Hayden terms „interests‟, are the contingent creation of legal 
mechanisms through which the desire to appropriate, to propertise, to normalise, and 
to expand the spaces of bio-economic production operate. As we have seen in the Bt. 
brinjal controversy, the promise and potential to receive a share of the benefits, 
which remain attached with commercial exploitation, emerged as a result of the 
continuous flow of desire between heterogeneous elements. Moreover, the rights 
claim was mobilised through the component parts of the bioeconomy. This in turn 
suggests that claims or interests depend on desire for their articulation and 
emergence because it is desire that connects, assembles, creates chains and produces 
intensities. The idiom of inclusion, that is, sharing burdens and benefits, therefore 
transforms the subjects, and this transformation not just coincides with the 
normalising strategies of appropriation, but remains folded in the expansive 
strategies of the bioeconomy. At any rate, the idiom of inclusion is a part of the 
overall strategy of expansion, so that bio-genetic resources can be transformed into 
tradable commodities in the rubric of redistributive justice. There is a calculated 
orchestration of techniques and practices aimed towards shaping, construing, 
arranging and normalising appropriative activities. In particular, these techniques and 
practices permit the subjects to shape their activities, thoughts and desires. The 
subjects, then, transform their actions, conducts and behaviours to pursue their own 
interests, which implicitly converge with the interests of global/local bio-tech 
industries. Or, perhaps, we can say following Deleuze that the subjects transform 
themselves in reference to their relations with others – a „self-constitution‟ that 
derives from the code prescribed (Deleuze 1986/1988, p 100). Indeed, the conducts, 
arrangements and practices that global/location institutions prescribe operate beneath 
the code forming the hermeneutics on the basis of which the subjects transform 
themselves, claim their rights, and shape their actions in a recognised form, fixed 
once and for all (ibid., p 105). Certainly, one can argue that the self-interested 
subjects – the benefit-claimants, emerge through incentive structures shaped by profit 
driven bioprospectors (Hayden 2003a, p 61). The bioprospectors, however, frame the 
incentive structure on the basis of mechanisms and practices prescribed by the CBD. 
Ultimately, then, what remains folded in incentive structure is an „infrastructure‟ – 
the desire to propertise, to appropriate, to capture, to normalise, and to expand that 
transform the subjects. And so, this transformation is a self-constitution because the 
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subjects ought to transform their actions and conducts to become benefit-recipients – 
to become homo oeconomicus.  
 
In the Bt. brinjal controversy, the ESG not only invoked the benefit-sharing 
provision of the CBD, but also pointed out the ineffective implementation of the 
Biological Diversity Act. It further brought to attention the failure of the NBA to 
notify important regulations regarding access to biodiversity and intellectual property 
rights. These regulations, according to ESG, are essential mechanisms to check and 
balance access and utilisation. This failure, the ESG argued, has resulted in a gross 
miscarriage of justice and should be redressed through appropriate implementation of 
the provisions of the Biological Diversity Act. For ESG, this implementation is 
important, since it would not only redress injustice in the present care, but also 
extend protection to future generations.
161
 In this vein, the ESG has emphasised the 
importance of „prior informed consent‟ to protect bio-genetic resources from 
arbitrary and unreasonable appropriation. As ESG asserts,  
„the law mandates that when biodiversity is to be accessed in any manner for 
commercial, research and other uses, local communities who have protected local 
varieties and cultivars for generations must be consulted and if they consent benefits 




The legal requirement of „prior informed consent‟ is an important element of benefit-
sharing mechanism prescribed by the CBD (Art. 15.5) and other complementary 
instruments, such as the Bonn Guideline (Art. 24) and the Nagoya Protocol (Art. 6). 
In terms of these instruments, access and utilisation of bio-genetic resources are 
subject to prior informed consent of the stakeholders providing such resources, such 
as indigenous and local communities. This legal requirement, as evident in ESG‟s 
claim, is intended to protect bio-genetic resources from unauthorised appropriation. 
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The underlying rationale, however, is to create a mechanism through which the 
stakeholders can be made a party to exploitative activities because access should be 
based on mutually agreed terms, including the benefit-sharing arrangement. More 
importantly, this emphasis on stakeholders‟ consent is an implicit recognition that 
indigenous and local communities have some forms of proprietary or communal 
rights over their resources.       
 
In fact, the CBD rests, as some commentators argue, on the notion of exploitation, 
the essential prerequisite of which is adequate property rights to bio-genetic 
resources and related knowledge (Boisvert and Caron 2002, p 151). Here, the 
emphasis on property right is aimed at creating a condition of negotiated and 
mutually profitable access and utilisation. In this sense, the legal framework 
presented by the Convention operates as a prelude to the introduction of bilateral 
market-like contracts between the holders and the users to ensure the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits (ibid., p 152). Indeed, the Convention promotes 
transferrable rights to bio-genetic resources because the movement of resources is 
subject to the movement of rights. This movement, however, depends on prior 
informed consent. Simply stated, the requirement of prior informed consent has a 
distinctive character – it provides a guarantee to the users that resources and rights 
are moving with proper authorisation, and equally protects the rights of providers to 
receive a share of the benefits arising from commercial exploitation of their 
resources. As Fowler observes, genetic resources are not raw materials, but refined 
products or prior art developed through centuries of selection and breeding. So 
„through the CBD, developing countries enunciated their desire for qualitatively 
different relationships between suppliers and recipients of genetic resources‟ (Fowler 
2001, pp 478-479). In some way, it might appear that the providers of bio-genetic 
resources are assigned a privileged position in the bioeconomy – they are the steward 
in charge of protecting and conserving the rapidly disappearing stock of genetic 
resources – a position of empowerment that enables them to negotiate the economic 
value of their contribution. The Convention thus prescribes a very specific role for 
the providers: not just conserve and value their resources, but also negotiate a price 
for their consent, participate in exploitative activities, and profit from their rights. So, 
on the one hand, the Convention prescribes mechanisms to facilitate negotiation and 
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reciprocal exchange; and on the other, paves the way for the providers to invoke 
these mechanisms to transform themselves into rational, profit-maximising actors or 
homo oeconomicus. The claim for autonomy and the right to consent, recognised by 
the Convention and reiterated by ESG, are the means through which the providers 
are supposed to promote, valorise and maximise their entrepreneuring selves. Here, 
then, the Convention constructs a very specific kind of subjects – to achieve justice 
and to claim rights, the providers need to behave and conduct their activities in a 
certain way, that is, to transform and constitute themselves according to the 
techniques and mechanisms prescribed.          
 
The understanding that justice should be achieved, as asserted by ESG repeatedly, by 
receiving a share of the benefits arising from commercial exploitation not only 
normalises appropriative activities, but also transforms the providers into subjects of 
property. At stake, is an assimilation, alliance or symbiosis of desire between the 
users and the providers of bio-genetic resources. This desire is clearly evident in 
ESG‟s reference to „prior informed consent‟ and „benefit-sharing arrangement‟ 
which, as my discussion shows, are intended to transform and constitute the subjects 
according to the aspiration of the bioeconomy. And it becomes ever more obvious 
from ESG‟s assertions because what remains folded in claims and demands is a 
desire is to include the providers in exploitative activities. Indeed, the indigenous and 
farming communities need to transform themselves – conduct their activities in a 
certain way to protect their resources and knowledge. I see this transformation as an 
assimilation with the dominant ideals of bioeconomy. That is, to ensure the 
production of desiring-subjects, so that the spaces of bio-economic production can be 
expanded.    
 
The discussion above suggests that in the bioeconomy, and in the Bt. brinjal 
controversy in particular, heterogeneous elements combine or converge to constitute 
the process of becoming. It turns out that an association is the necessary condition in 
which relations emerge, ideas are mobilised, evoked and designated to the subject, 
and the subject who thinks, believes and speaks in the same language, constitutes her 
own becoming (Deleuze 1953/1991, pp 98-104). It follows that the emergent 
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subjectivity is formed by a collective (Guattari 1996, p 196). The term „collective‟ 
should be understood here in the sense of a multiplicity that develops beyond the 
subject. Hence, the inseparability of emergent subjectivity from the technical and 
institutional mechanisms that support it (ibid., pp 196-197). To become, however, is 
not to attain a form because becoming is a process, it is always in the midst of being 
formed. Thus, to become, one needs to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or 
indifferentiation where one can no longer be distinguished from others (Deleuze 
1993/1997, p 1). Then, what I want to point out, rather disturbingly, is that to protect 
and conserve their resources and knowledge, the providers need to put themselves in 
the zone of proximity and adopt the language of indifferentiation. That is, to 
participate in commercial exploitation, to transform their resources into commodities, 
and even to transform themselves into subjects of property, into enterprising selves. 
In short, the providers need to assimilate themselves and become co-participants by 
forging exclusive alliance with the component parts of the bioeconomy. Strikingly, 
this becoming is not a part of their communal and intergenerational history. Rather, it 
entails leaving behind their culture, identity and autonomy. Put otherwise, to become 
co-participants, to become homo oeconomicus, the providers need to leave behind 
their history, howsoever recent (Deleuze 1990/1995, p 171), In what follows, there is 
a discursive shift in the constitution of subjectivity in the bioeconomy. This 
transformation, I would argue, is an emergent subjectivity – a becoming, shaped and 
produced by deploying a multiplicity of mechanisms and practices or „polyphonic 
modes of subjectivation‟ (Guattari, 1996, p 199) through which desire moves and 
assembles. Crucially, then, the mobilisation of claims, demands and rights by ESG in 
the Bt. brinjal controversy is not surprising. It is rather folding once again of what 
remains folded, or overcoding of what remains coded in heterogeneous techniques 
and practices. It becomes apparent that the desiring-subjects are an ensemble of the 
bioeconomy, a part of the infrastructure. Thus, we can say, along with 
Deleuze/Guattari, the subjects always remain peripheral to the bioeconomy, 
„garnering here, there, and everywhere a reward in the form of a becoming‟ (Deleuze 






In this chapter, my aim was to provide an account of how subjectivity takes shape 
and emerges in the bioeconomy. Foucault‟s analytical framework illustrates that the 
transformed subjects emerge through subjection. An important aspect of his analysis 
is the emphasis that subjectivity is a process of becoming, which takes shape through 
techniques and mechanisms prescribed by various governmental institutions. This 
understanding becomes clear in my discussion of OECD and DBT‟s policy 
prescriptions. However, without leaving the Foucaultian analytic entirely, I have 
moved towards a Deleuze/Guattarian analysis of becoming. Because I was interested 
to see how does the continuous movement of desire between disparate elements 
shape becoming in the bioeconomy. In short, how subjectivity is shaped and 
produced by a multiplicity. Consequently, my analysis also moved in a slightly 
different direction. I have shown how desire moves through diverse mechanisms and 
practices, especially in the Bt. brinjal controversy, which are designed to shape and 
transform the behaviours, thoughts, conducts and activities of the subjects. So I have 
argued that it is the movement of desire that creates a condition for the emergence of 
desiring-subjects. And this desire remains folded in legal mechanisms and practices 
prescribed by various global/local institutions. To substantiate this argument, I have 
focused on strategies adopted by ESG to mobilise claims and demands, especially the 
rights discourse, and its insistence on „benefit-sharing‟ arrangement and „prior 
informed consent‟ to redress injustice. Significantly, these claims and demands 
moved through the component parts of the bioeconomy designed to transform the 
subjects, to produce homo oeconomicus. Indeed, the mechanisms and practices, 
which the ESG invoked to articulate rights claim, are aimed at transforming the 
subjects in a certain way, so that they can be aligned with the aspiration of the 
bioeconomy. ESG‟s invocation of the component parts of the bioeconomy, therefore, 
is an assimilation in the assemblage, becoming part of the infrastructure – an 
emergent subjectivity, shaped by disparate elements through which desire moves and 
flows.    
         





























This thesis was aimed towards examining how the bioeconomy operates; and how 
law mediates such operation in a global/postcolonial context. In exploring the main 
questions, the thesis emphasised the importance of „thinking through‟ the philosophy 
of Deleuze/Guattari. Since Deleuze/Guattari were committed to bring movement in 
thought and to experiment with concepts, the thesis deployed the concept of 
„desiring-machine‟ to explain the operation of the bioeconomy. Although comprised 
of dispersed elements, the bioeconomy operates in a connective fashion, through 
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conjunctions. The main focus, then, was to understand what establishes conjunctions 
between the elements. Put otherwise, how the elements connect and function in 
conjunction. The thesis has shown that disparate elements relate to each other 
through the continuous movement of desire. This movement, however, was mediated 
by law. In fact, the thesis revealed that this desire remains folded in heterogeneous 
legal mechanisms and practices through which the bioeconomy intends to expand the 
spaces of bio-economic production. A corollary to this observation is that the 
bioeconomy is an infrastructure in which disparate elements connect, relate, 
combine, co-function and work in symbiosis through the de/re-territorialising flows 
of desire. Accordingly, the thesis suggests that it is important to understand the 
bioeconomy as a „desiring-machine‟.  
 
I have attempted to substantiate the above observations through my discussion of the 
Bt. brinjal controversy in India and, thus, Deleuze/Guattari‟s philosophical thinking 
remains the enduring thread throughout the thesis. The preceding chapters already 
detailed how the desire to propertise, to normalise appropriation, to contest, and to 
produce transformed subjects moved through disparate elements in the controversy. 
And how law mediated these movements and by doing so, spatialised materiality, 
normalisation, power and subjectivity. The conclusion thus brings together the ideas 
laid out throughout the thesis. However, given that the thesis combined dispersed 
lines, movements and flows, and deployed a range of complex concepts to construct 
the dimensions of the bioeconomy, it is difficult to simplify the arguments presented 
throughout. The conclusion, therefore, reiterates the main observation made in each 
chapter without going into details.          
 
The Bt. brinjal controversy has been an important source of inquiry throughout the 
thesis. Specifically, I have looked into the controversy as an „event‟ in which 
heterogeneous entities co-exist, interact, co-function and relate to each other. Thus, 
by unfolding the event, I have highlighted a number of competing modalities that run 
throughout the controversy. The first concerns the debate surrounding risk and 
uncertainty of bio-technical science. This debate arose in the wake of 
commercialisation and remains exclusively tied to techno-economic scepticism and 
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optimism. The focus of second modality was on uncertainty in the regulatory 
governance of biotechnology. To be more specific, a number of scholars have 
pointed out the uncertainty in legal mechanisms which regulate risk assessment and 
the environmental release of GMO‟s. Interestingly, these two competing but related 
modalities revolve around facts. Then, my argument is that these narratives of facts 
in scientific and legal discourses produce a „factish epistemology‟ of law and 
science. The third modality, somewhat different from the preceding two, brought to 
attention the issue of biopiracy – unauthorised appropriation of local brinjal 
germplasm by a number of global/local entities in the production of Bt. brinjal. The 
discourse of biopiracy reveals the interaction between disparate elements, such as 
global/local bio-tech corporations, regulatory institutions, bio-genetic resources, civil 
society actors, biodiversity laws, and proprietary bio-technical artefact. In short, the 
biopiracy discourse shows that the production of Bt. brinjal is not just a simple affair 
of facts and certainty, but rather involves issues concerning unauthorised 
appropriation, right to receive a „fair and equitable‟ share of the benefits arising from 
commercial exploitation, and legal requirement of „prior informed consent‟. The 
main concern, from this perspective, was with governance – governing the access 
and utilisation of bio-genetic resources through legal norms. This insistence on 
governing appropriation through law is an indication of how the desire to normalise 
appropriation operates in the bioeconomy.  However, I have pointed out that a 
number of other issues remain folded in the event, especially how desire moves 
through disparate elements, such as Mahyco/Monsanto‟s desire to propertise 
emergence, the desire to contest or interaction between differentiated relations of 
power/desire, and the desire to produce transformed subjects. And so, I have argued 
that the Bt. brinjal controversy has multiple dimensions, it is a multiplicity.            
 
But the question is: how do we provide an account of the co-existence of disparate 
elements, their inter-actions, inter-relations, co-functioning and dispersion? Put 
differently, how do we describe a multiplicity or what methodological approach does 
one need to adopt to construct the dimensions of the multiple? This is a 
methodological challenge that chapter 2 attempted to address. To this end, I have 
pointed out that in contemporary „law and globalisation‟ scholarship, legal scholars 
theorise and understand the multiple or multiplicity in terms of many or plural legal 
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orders, fields, levels and spaces. In contrast, I have adopted a very specific 
methodological approach, which „thinks through‟ the concept of „multiplicity‟. As a 
topological concept, it puts emphasis on constructing the multiple by adding 
elements successively through conjunctions. It follows that a multiplicity is a 
formation in which heterogeneous elements come together through lines and 
movements. Thus, what matters in a multiplicity are not the elements, but rather their 
movements or deterritorialisation, dispersion and interrelations. From this point of 
view, a multiplicity has many dimensions. However, one needs to construct these 
dimensions through „rhizomatic thinking‟, which moves in all directions. As a style 
of thinking, it establishes paths of communication between dispersed elements and 
arranges them in semiotic chains through connections, combinations, and linkages. In 
what follows, by linking, connecting and combining one element with the other, 
rhizomatic thinking constructs an assemblage – a complex constellation of 
heterogeneous elements. In this direction, I have emphasised that a multiplicity is an 
assemblage – it is a piece by piece construction. Rhizomatic thinking, in this sense, is 
equally a style of composition because the relations between the many need to be 
actualised in extensive series. Therefore, mapping or cartography is an essential 
element of rhizomatic thinking. I reiterate these insights here because they 
foreground the approach through which I have constructed and described the 
dimensions of the controversy. And this construction was not just limited to adding 
elements successively; it was equally aimed towards linking and combining one 
concept with another through conjunctions. Rhizomatic thinking thus paved the way 
for experimentation with concepts and accordingly, I have added new concepts 
successively throughout the chapters to multiply and expand the dimension.   
 
Since I have framed my investigation through the Bt. brinjal controversy in which 
multiplicities remain folded, the point of orientation is the movement of desire 
because it is desire that couples, connects, assembles and creates chains. So chapter 3 
has demonstrated that Mahyco/Monsanto‟s desire to produce and propertise a new 
life form brought into existence an emergent space of property in a distant location. 
The point, however, is that this desire to propertise remains folded in the idea of 
materiality in Euro-American intellectual property law, which moved through 
dispersed spaces. Thus, while the focus of the chapter was on movement or 
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deterritorialisation of the idea of materiality, I have also emphasised its 
territorialisation and re-territorialisation. Significantly, this de/re-territorialisation 
was mediated by disparate elements, such as Monsanto, Bt. gene, the TRIPs 
Agreement and Indian patent law. The chapter, therefore, traced how an emergent 
space of property comes into existence through the movement of desire, which 
established machinic conjunctions between the elements. What this suggests is that 
de/re-territorialisation is not just mere „extension and diffusion‟, rather it is a 
„movement in process‟ because it brings into view continuity, consistency and 
dispersion. This understanding has recurred in chapter 4 but in a very different 
dimension. As emphasised, deterritorialisation is a „movement in process‟ and thus, 
in deterritorialisation we only find expansion, a guiding thread of my discussion of 
normalisation in chapter 4. The chapter looked into the issue of governing access and 
utilisation of bio-genetic resources that we find in ESG‟s discourse of biopiracy. 
Since the viability of the bioeconomy depends on unparalleled access to bio-genetic 
resources, governance mechanisms are important to normalise appropriation. With 
this in mind, I have argued that instead of idealising the discourse of biopiracy, one 
needs to examine how normalisation occurs through the expansion of governance. To 
this end, I have linked up the concepts of „governmentality‟ and „normalisation‟ with 
„de/re-territorialisation‟. The purpose of governance, from Foucault‟s point of view, 
is to expand the spaces of the market by normalising the movement of persons and 
things. However, this normalisation depends on legal institutions or a framework of 
law, an understanding affirmed by Georges Canguilhem. The chapter observed that 
the CBD and its local counterpart, the Biological Diversity Act, are aimed towards 
normalising the appropriation of bio-genetic resources. In particular, the analysis 
revealed that the CBD not only legitimised appropriation, but also normalised the 
movement of desire, so that the spaces of bio-economic production can be expanded. 
Stated otherwise, global/local governance mechanisms have deterritorialised and 
spatialised the desire to normalise appropriation. 
 
In chapter 5, I have looked more closely into ESG‟s contestation of unauthorised 
appropriation through the discourse of biopiracy. I have emphasised that it is 
necessary to understand this opposition or encounter as a differential power/desire. 
Foucault‟s analyses of power relations thus became relevant for my discussion. 
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Considering Foucault‟s emphasis on power in spatial and relational terms, the 
chapter scrutinised how power relations are analysed in contemporary intellectual 
property law scholarship. The chapter pointed out that these literatures view the 
TRIPs regime as a vehicle of power and domination and by doing so, situate power 
relations within a centre/periphery framework. Instead, the chapter demonstrated that 
the TRIPs regime is a space of power/knowledge that expands in all directions 
through interaction and mediation. Put otherwise, what remains folded in the TRIPs 
regime is the desire to expand a specific space of power/knowledge across the globe. 
And this desire is mediated by heterogeneous entities and therefore, moved through 
dispersed spaces. That being said, the desire to expand is contested by civil society 
actors, especially through the discourse of biopiracy. Thus, the chapter has argued 
that ESG‟s contestation is a counter-power or a differential desire. While my aim in 
this chapter was to provide an account of how differentiated relations of power/desire 
operate in the bioeconomy, I have ended the discussion on a different note, that is, to 
view the differential power/desire as a form of becoming giving rise to emergent 
subjectivities.  
 
Ultimately, the main purpose of my discussion in chapter 5 was to show how desire 
moves, creates chains and establishes conjunctions. On this view, chapter 6 expanded 
the analyses carried out in chapter 5. Given that the discourse of biopiracy was 
mobilised to highlight injustice, the ESG made a number of claims and demands in 
the Bt. brinjal controversy. These claims and demands were articulated in terms of 
legal rights – the right to receive a „fair and equitable‟ share of the benefits arising 
out of the commercial exploitation of local germplasm, and the legal requirement of 
„prior informed consent‟. Interestingly, the ESG has mobilised its rights claim 
through the CBD and the Biological Diversity Act – two component parts of the 
bioeconomy that have deterritorialised and spatialised the desire to normalise 
appropriation. The articulation of legal rights to heal injustice, I have argued, gives 
rise to emergent subjectivities because what remains folded in rights discourse is the 
desire to produce transformed subjects. The point, however, is that this desire to 
transform is shaped by heterogeneous elements through which the desire to 
propertise, to normalise appropriation, to contest, and to expand the spaces of bio-
economic production move. Thus, while the chapter began with Foucaultian analytic 
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of subjectivity, it gradually moved towards a Deleuze/Guattarian analysis of 
„becoming‟ to demonstrate how a multiplicity shapes and produces emergent 
subjectivity in the bioeconomy. In what follows, the chapter has shown that this 
emergent subjectivity is a becoming – becoming a part of the desiring-machine.    
 
In this thesis, I have discussed how law mediates the operation of the bioeconomy in 
a global/postcolonial context. Keeping this in view, I would like to reflect briefly on 
law‟s operation in the bioeconomy, and in the global legal order in general. 
Certainly, the operation of the bioeconomy is global; it is expansive and deterritorial. 
It follows that law‟s operation has equally become global, expansive and 
deterritorialised. This is not surprising, however. Because law and globalisation 
scholars have already pointed out the globalisation of law, or the emergence of 
global law. To this end, they have also shown how law operates, regulates and 
governs at multiple levels or scales. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the 
bioeconomy is comprised of dispersed elements. Yet these elements relate to each 
other and function in conjunction. And it has already become clear how law mediates 
their functioning and establishes conjunctions between them. Simply stated, law co-
functions, co-ordinates, creates chains and produces intensities. And, as emphasised 
briefly in chapter 2, this conjunctive synthesis has implication for how we theorise 
the operation of law in the global legal order. No doubt, one can pay attention to 
multiple, plural, fragmented, inter-connected legal orders or fields. Likewise, one can 
definitely describe the spatiality of law by focusing on geographic reach, diffusion 
and scale. But, as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has observed recently, law‟s spatial 
turn is much larger and much more threatening that demands serious engagement and 
new conceptualisation (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2012, p 90). In this light, it is 
important to understand how law establishes conjunctions and produces functional 
synthesis between dispersed elements. In brief, can we describe the operation and 
spatialisation of law by looking into how it operates through conjunctions. A crucial 
supplement in this regard would be to think about the „global legal order‟ (or perhaps 
„global legal structure‟) as an „infrastructure‟ in which the multiple, the plural, the 
disparate come together, hang together, co-function and relate to each other through 
conjunctions. Such a re-framing is essential to understand the operation of law in the 
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global legal order. However, to explore such a possibility, a movement in our 
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